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EXPLORING THE BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE FEDERAL FLOOD MITIGATION IN THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER REGION  
Linda Bailey 
August 1, 2017 
 This dissertation is a comprehensive study of flood mitigation in the Mississippi River 
region as it is impacted by federal flood policies and programs.  The study begins with a historical 
narrative of flooding events and flood mitigation that provided the impetus for federal flood 
mitigation in the late 1920s.  The historical narrative sheds light on issues related to federalism, 
path dependency, dynamic growth, and socio-culture influence during the development of flood 
mitigation policy.   Growth machine theory is used to describe how inequality and disparate 
access to political power has worked to exacerbate flood disaster outcomes and how this dynamic 
is legitimately perpetuated via federal policies.   The second half of the dissertation is focused on 
a comprehensive evaluation of current mitigation planning mandates, programs, and planning 
tools.     
 The dissertation is divided into six chapters, covering the historical development, 
theoretical implications, a critique of current practices, and future recommendations for federal 
flood mitigation.   Chapter One provides a basic overview of the issues related to federal flood 
mitigation and the potential shortcomings of the current system.  Chapter Two delves into a 
historical narrative that provides a rich account of early responses to flooding and how federal 
flood policy developed from these experiences.  Chapter Three discusses the theoretical 
explanations as to why exacerbated disaster impacts are a result of policy actor influences.  It also 
covers the literature involving present mitigation planning practices. Chapter Four describes the 




Five discusses the findings and implications derived from the comprehensive assessment of 
mitigation practices.  Finally, Chapter Six provides a discussion of how current federal flood 
mitigation policy is influenced by growth machine dynamics as evidenced through these findings.  
It also provides insight for improving current practices and makes recommendations for further 
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The need for federal flood control in the United States originated in the lower region of 
the Mississippi River in the 1800s and found legitimacy at the beginning of the 20th Century.  
Political feasibility for federal flood control has consistently been met with resistance at various 
levels and by various stakeholders. This resistance basically manifests itself in ways that seem 
legitimate and there is no resolution that can possibly satisfy everyone.  However, a federal flood 
control system is ineffective if it does not integrate a coordinated effort at all levels of 
government and with all stakeholders.  Lacking a coordinated effort, the flood control system 
may even contribute to greater vulnerability by providing citizens a sense of false security within 
the floodplain resulting in higher losses and greater recovery costs.   
While floodplain areas are only a small portion of the national landscape as a whole, it 
commands to be addressed as one of the most concerning and costly areas to mitigate for flooding 
events.  Many hazard researchers will argue that the U.S. government actually does more to 
contribute to flooding than to mitigate for it. While the federal government sets the guidelines for 
floodplain management, local jurisdictions are the primary regulators of the floodplain.  There are 
very few constraints on their land use decisions at the state or federal level. Thus, development in 
the floodplain continues unimpeded and appears to be reinforced within the existing political 
structure.   
Growth machine politics play a strong role in this process.  Many claim that local 
jurisdictions or local elites attempt to secure expensive federal funded structural flood mitigation 




these local officials seek to develop the area behind the levees and floodwalls in order to bring in 
more revenue for local coffers. It is not necessarily the case that these land use decisions are wise 
choices and in the best interest of the community. Local officials will champion the idea that  
 development is necessary to provide more benefit for the whole community. However, 
most of the benefit will reside with those elites hawking development contracts and developing 
these risky areas while the majority of the community is paying the high cost of assuming this 
risk.   
In 1945, Gilbert F. White, often referred to as the “father of floodplain management” 
wrote a dissertation titled Human Adjustments to Floods, and this became a seminal piece of work 
that claimed there was too much emphasis faced on structural methods of flood mitigation and 
not enough consideration of non-structural methods such as land use regulation and insurance 
(White, 1945).  His work echoes the sentiment that large, expensive, structural projects were 
being appropriated despite evidence that flood costs continued to increase (White, 1945).  White 
(1945) argued for a comprehensive approach to the flood problem with target reduction as a goal 
and to reduce the need for federal relief.  By 1968, his suggestions were being employed through 
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 which was an attempt to provide insurance for 
structures in the floodplain and incentivize local government to create ordinances enforcing 
minimum standards of retrofitting structures in the floodplain.   
How did this legislation impact the flood problem? Did it reduce flood costs?  Karen 
O’Neil (2006, 173) argues that the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) actually subsidized 
construction in the floodplain as a result of this program.  Flood costs continue to rise and 
according to the Government Accountability Office (2013) the NFIP at that time was in debt to 
the U.S. Treasury to the tune of 24 billion dollars.  
This research seeks to answer some basic questions.  How does the path dependent 
development (historical underpinnings) of flood mitigation in this region impact present 




problems in floodplain management? Does the cost of flooding continue to rise despite 
implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation? Did non-structural mitigation 
policies and programs implemented over time reduce the cost of flooding?  More specifically, did 
mandating local governments to create hazard mitigation plans reduce the cost of flooding? Are 
local governments still too primarily focused on structural mitigation as the answer to flood 
mitigation?   
Mitigation is “the effort to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of 
disasters” (FEMA, 2015).  Flood mitigation is specific to reducing impacts from flood disasters.   
Structural mitigation encompasses such things as building floodwalls, floodgates, levees, and 
other major land adjustments or barriers that attempt to control the flow of water away from areas 
to protect property from flooding. Non-structural mitigation refers to types of strategies or actions 
that contribute to flood disaster impact reductions such as land use policies, insurance programs, 
incentive programs, education, outreach, studies, zoning, enforcement and other administrative-
type functions.  Hazard mitigation plans are planning tools designed to assist state, tribal and 
local governments identify hazard risks, collaborate with local stakeholders in risk reduction, 
identify strategies and actions to reduce risk, prioritize mitigation actions, and identify funding 
sources (FEMA, 2015).  
Recently, disaster researchers have honed in on the idea that growth machine dynamics 
may be the “unifying theoretical paradigm” (Tierney, 2010) explaining how economic and 
political forces exacerbate our vulnerability to hazards.  Looking at flooding specifically, growth 
machine dynamics seem to be the most plausible explanation for our inability to reduce costs 
associated with flooding disasters.   
Previously, hazard researcher Dennis Mileti (1999, 12) advocated the idea of a “global 
systems perspective” in order to achieve more comprehensive mitigation planning.  He explained 
that three major systems-- the natural environment, the built environment, and the social 




disaster costs (Mileti, 1999, 12).  Mileti (1999) expands the systems approach from partially 
holistic (Easton, 1953) to completely holistic-- highly interconnected and more comprehensive. 
He believes that by looking from a global systems perspective, there is a shift from the traditional 
systems model creating an overall system that is “greater than, and different from, the sum of its 
parts” versus “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts” (Mileti, 1999, 106-107).   
Mileti (1999, 13) declares that social factors have, for the most part, been overlooked and 
their power has been underestimated.  He claims that change in social values will result in a more 
effectively mitigated environment (Mileti, 1999, 13).  Mileti (1999, 17) argues that traditional 
system theorists’ “overemphasis on stability” results in “labeling the change and process as 
negative”.  Actually, growth machine dynamics dominate our social culture so significantly that it 
creates the instability that ultimately causes systems to fail regardless of whether the feedback is 
negative or perceived as positive.  The feedback could be a false positive when the growth 
machine processes mask vulnerabilities. Therefore, systemic approaches are dependent on 
eradicating growth machine dynamics from the social culture.  Thus growth machine dynamics 
dominate as the overarching theory in how hazard or flood vulnerability manifests and renders 
mitigation efforts ineffective.   
In sum, along with identifying the most persistent problems in floodplain management, 
this research contributes to the growing consensus that growth machine theory best identifies how 
these problems manifest.  Hence this research attempts to answer the question: Is it the case that 
growth machine dynamics are continuing to render the federal flood control system ineffective?    
The research study focuses on 10 states and 108 counties that border the Mississippi 
River from the upper to lower bounds within the United States.  Using the Mississippi River 
region as the region of analysis is very important not only to show how federal flood mitigation 
policies and programs developed historically; but also this region exemplifies the importance of 
considering path dependency in this system and how flood mitigation is bounded.  Path 




on where we are now, but also upon where we have been” (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2000, 981).  
Historical flooding in the Mississippi River region played an integral role in influencing federal 
involvement in flood controls.  The use of levees was a practice adapted from Europe by early 
settlers in Louisiana and these early manipulations of flood water are one of several means that 
created a path dependent condition that impacted the circumstances we have now.  
This study will first attempt to describe the historical underpinnings which resulted in a 
path dependent condition within the region.  The path dependent condition specific to this area 
then influenced the development of federal policy prescriptions for flood mitigation.  Path 
dependency is also symptomatic of growth machine dynamics therefore it is necessary to examine 
the history of settlement in order to understand how growth machine politics influences overall 
design and limits to a comprehensive flood mitigation system.  
Next, there is a review of the literature associated with flooding, growth machine theory 
and systems theory as they relate to flooding.  Primary to this analysis is a discussion of the 
works of Gilbert F. White (1945) and his significant contribution to flood mitigation study.  
White (1945) theorized that as the amount of structural mitigation increased, so did the costs 
associated with flooding.  He argued for a target reduction strategy that focused on non-structural 
mitigation as the most effective way to reduce the cost of flooding (White, 1945).  This research 
expounds on his work and brings it forward.  This study attempts to answer a secondary question: 
Does the cost of flooding continue to rise despite engaging in both structural and non-structural 
mitigation initiatives?   
In the process of conducting this study, this researcher attempted to collect and evaluate 
the state and county all-hazard mitigation plans from these ten states and 108 counties.  First, a 
time-series analysis was conducted to determine whether or not flood costs decreased with the 
implementation of all-hazard mitigation plans under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. 
Secondly, this study identifies flood mitigation goals and actions in hopes to gain insight on 




allows us to make determinations on the trends in flood mitigation planning and to explain 
whether or not these trends are being influenced by growth machine dynamics.  Gilbert White 
(1945) argued that despite all efforts to mitigate flooding using structural methods, the cost of 
flooding continued to rise.  He pointed to the problem of the “status quo” influencing mitigation 
efforts in a way that was making flood mitigation efforts futile.  Today we would describe 
White’s (1945) “status quo” to be growth machine dynamics influence.  White (1945) argued that 
the way forward to reduce flooding would be through target reduction measures in the form of 
policy and programs rather than large expensive dirt-moving and wall-building structural 
projects.  In this research study, non-structural mitigation action items refer to any action that 
relates to target reduction such as policies and programs that incentivize identifying and 
retrofitting or moving repetitive flooding properties in the floodplain; adequately insuring 
properties within the floodplain; using technology and other tools to identify hazard areas in need 
of attention; and education and outreach to inform and prepare populations near or within the 
floodplain.   
Using content analysis, each flood mitigation action was evaluated to determine if it was 
considered a structural or non-structural mitigation action item and then further categorized by 
the type of action in order to develop a composite picture of flood mitigation actions used within 
this region.  The analysis was intended to determine several things.  First, what are the main types 
of flood mitigation actions used within the whole region within the focus of the study?  Second, is 
there evidence of a structural mitigation preference over non-structural mitigation?  Third, are 
these flood mitigation actions similar across the entire region or do they vary based on 
geographical location?  Fourth, are there any other patterns within these mitigation plan actions 
that might provide better insight into determining how growth machine dynamics may be 
impacting the course of mitigation planning? Finally, this data was compared to a national survey 
of local officials conducted by FEMA regarding their opinions of the flood mitigation needs and 




In addition, several other types of data were also collected to paint a more comprehensive 
picture of the region and flooding problems within this region.  For one, 50 years of flooding 
disaster data was collected to determine frequency and costs associated with flooding within the 
region.  The data allowed the researcher to look at flood frequency and property damage costs at 
the county level and identify counties with greater flooding risks and higher costs.  
Demographic and housing characteristics were studied to determine who may live in the 
floodplain and whether there may be greater vulnerabilities related to these populations.  
Specifically, we wanted to look at some variables related to greater social vulnerability that were   
available at both the county level data and census tract level.  Based on ad hoc interactions with 
local emergency managers who claim they are unable to identify who exactly is in the floodplain, 
GIS mapping more clearly identified this population.  The data was contrasted to the SoVI 
(Clutter et al., 2012), a social vulnerability index created by Susan Clutter and others at the 
University of South Carolina.  The SoVI is a measure of social vulnerability to all hazards at the 
county level.  Therefore, if we looked at the county SoVI scores and county level ACS data and 
compare it to data available at the census tract level, would we find pockets of vulnerabilities that 
would not otherwise be identified?  Would this be useful information for local emergency 
managers to distinguish greater social vulnerabilities specifically related to flooding?   Secondly, 
at what level of analysis, e.g. county, census tract, census block, can social vulnerability be 
measured?   
Finally, data associated with the National Flood Insurance Program and Community 
Rating System gathered from a FEMA database was evaluated for county participation rates.  The 
information was used to make determinations about non-structural mitigation actions specific to 
program participation and repetitive loss within state and local hazard mitigation plans.  
Particularly, is there evidence that counties are participating in these incentivized programs? If 
not, are there clues to why these programs are under-utilized?  Does the growth machine dynamic 




Research on mitigation plan quality has continued to grow since the late 1990s.  
Evaluating plan quality is challenging due to wide variability and changes in guidance coming 
from the federal government.  The federal government mandated (DMA, 2000) counties to have 
mitigation plans beginning in 2000 and ordered updates in these plans at five year intervals.  It is 
reasonable to argue mitigation plan standardization could not be realized in the ten year period 
that we have focused on.  On the other hand, after ten years, we should expect greater 
participation and greater focus on accountability.  In fact, we should be accomplished in 
participation and solely focused on the many ways these plans can be more impactful.  This study 
will recommend the ways we can accomplish this.  Not only do we need to be concerned with the 
internal validity of the plans themselves and the effectiveness of top-down guidance, but also 
ways in which information from the plans can be gathered and utilized from the bottom-up to 
create a functional feedback loop for better results.  Herein lies great potential to resolve some of 
disconnects between different levels of government, provide more effective oversight and greater 









BACKGROUND OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER REGION 
The Natural Environment and the Mississippi River 
To understand the enormity of what we are dealing with in terms of flood management 
on the Mississippi River, it is helpful to provide a comprehensive description of the Mississippi 
River system, the fourth largest river in the world.  
The headwaters begin in a small stream in Minnesota. From here it takes about 90 days 
for a drop of water to flow out the mouth of the Mississippi River into the Gulf of Mexico. It 
drains 41 percent of 48 contiguous states, which is a total of 1,245,000 square miles.  It accepts 
the flows of various rivers and streams in 31 states and two Canadian provinces and serves as the 
natural border for ten states.  In river miles, it extends just over 2,300 miles long given its 
curviness and meandering nature.  
The upper Mississippi River flows through Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois.  The upper 
portion of the river, or the river head, is fed by waterfalls and cradled within a gorge.  This 
portion of the river is rocky and has higher elevation drops per mile. Here the river cannot be 
traveled by other means than a canoe or kayak until it reaches the area around Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  
In the 1930-40s a lock and dam system was built that allows for water to pool in order to 
make it deep enough for navigation.  The lock and dam system is a stair step design where each 
dam holds back and pools the water rather than allowing to run freely with natural waterfalls and 
rapids.  The upper portion of the river is known for vast wildlife refuges in the natural wetland 
areas.  The wetlands serve as overflow basins for the river when it floods.  The dividing point 




From Cairo, Illinois the river develops a faster current and has far less elevation slope.  
This portion of the river is mitigated differently (mainly by levee) because it does not have dams 
to pool the water.  The river, guided by levees, flows faster allowing it to scour the bottom which 
makes it deeper and heavy with sediment which gives it a muddy appearance.   It is an obscure 
fact that the river’s sandy landscape was formed by the river rather than the river actually cutting 
through the land (Loyola University Wetland Resource Center, 2011).  The river has a lower 
alluvial valley of 35,000 square miles which is 650 miles long and 25-125 miles wide. The lower 
valley lies within the following seven states: Missouri, Illinois, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana.   
In the delta region of the Mississippi River, the river has a tendency to change course 
about every 1,000 years. There are five previous recorded changes in the river that actually built 
Louisiana (Figure 2.1).  The first change resulted in the formation of the Atchafalaya River and 
secondly the Teche region.  From here, the river flops to the direction of New Orleans and creates 
the eastrn region of Louisiana.  The third shift created St. Bernard; the fourth created Lafourche, 
and the fifth shift formed Plaquemine. The river is in the sixth route developing what we call the 
“bird’s foot” and the present mouth of the Mississippi River.  
The river attempts to take the shortest and steepest route to the Gulf of Mexico.  By the 
early 1930s, this became a topic of expert discussion (Kelman, 2006) as Old River had 
established a continuous easterly flow taking on more and more of the Mississippi River and 
directing this volume into the Atchafalaya River.  Presently the Atchafalaya River is about 150 
miles shorter and steeper than the Mississippi River’s present route towards Baton Rouge and 
New Orleans; therefore, the river naturally attempted to shift and completely join the 
Atchafalaya.   
Flooding impacts on the Mississippi River by natural forces are due to more frequent and 
intense rains in both the upper and lower portions but also by higher volumes of snowmelt in the 




is greater in warmer atmospheres, the lower portion of the river might be more likely to have 
episodes of flooding.    In the 1993 floods, the upper Mississippi experienced massive and 
catastrophic flooding which would have been detrimental to the lower Mississippi if it were not 
for drought conditions affecting the area below Cairo, Illinois.   
The Human System on the Mississippi River: Settlement, Growth, and Economic Traits 
Dennis Mileti (1999) notes that if people’s characteristics were more homogenous, then 
disaster mitigation would be easier and we would suffer fewer losses. If homogenous conditions 
were the case, we would have a more simplified and standard way to mitigate because we would 
only be dealing with the “magnitude” of the natural hazard (Mileti, 1999).  However, the human 
system variables associated with the Mississippi River System are numerous and complex.  These 
include population sizes, socioeconomic conditions, political views, diverse purposes for using or 
residing near the river, and different cultural perceptions at different areas along the river. Thus, 
our characteristics and interests are incredibly diverse which makes it far more difficult to create 
mitigation initiatives satisfactory for everyone.  In addition, there will always be a degree of 
uncertainty that we cannot completely account for in the decision-making process.  
There are over 125 established communities on the river’s edge and some are more 
populated than others with heavily populated metropolitan areas such as New Orleans, Louisiana 
(1,235,650), Memphis, Tennessee (646,889), St. Louis, Missouri (319,294), Minneapolis/St. Paul, 
Minnesota (891,218) dotting the river landscape (U.S. Census, 2010).  In addition, the river is 
steeped in culture with distinguished differences between the northern and southern ends and 
rural and urban areas.  It can even be said there are cultural differences on opposite sides of the 
river.  
Racial inequality and poverty have plagued regions along the river. Given this fact, 
politics and wealth influence have made significant impacts on mitigation of the river system.  
According to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2001) the Mississippi Delta is one of the 




anywhere else in the U.S. to contain a majority percentage of black population.  The Delta has a 
17 percent unemployment rate and growing with 50.5 percent of the population living below 
poverty level (USCCR, 2001).  Rural poverty is exacerbated in the lower region of the 
Mississippi River and can partially be attributed to discrimination against blacks that continues to 
present day.  Black discrimination could not be more accentuated than during the 1927 floods 
when over 30,000 black plantation workers were forced into concentration camps on the river 
working day and night to build protection on the levees (Barry, 1997).  Many of these men were 
lost in the flooding as they were stranded and abandoned atop the levees as human sandbags.  The 
official death toll is very misleading and inaccurate given the nature of inequality in 1927 and 
blacks were not counted in the census of fatalities (Barry, 1997).    
Settlement in the southern region of the Mississippi River began with the 1717 French 
settlement on the crescent shaped land adjacent to the Mississippi River. This ridge was formed 
by sediment deposits from the river where it takes a sharp turn east to northeast before it flows 
straight south for 100 miles into the Gulf of Mexico.  Thus L’Isle de la Nouvelle Orléans (The 
Island of New Orleans—at the time believed to be surrounded by water), later became New 
Orleans. There was speculation among settlers from Indiana and Kentucky territories that travel 
by river could lead them to the Gulf of Mexico and river trade would be foundational to 
development of the American Colonies.  Unfortunately, Spain declared full control of the 
Mississippi River cutting northern colonists off from the lower portion of the Mississippi. The 
1803 Louisiana Purchase (costing just over 11 million dollars) secured the right to public use for 
travel the length of the Mississippi without intervention by the Spanish. The purchase prompted 
increased trade and travel on the river.   From this point, New Orleans was on its way to 
becoming the largest trade route in and out of the U.S. colonies.  Living on the delta of the fourth 
longest river in the world would be profitable and rewarding, but it also meant dealing with many 




Presently, the upper portion of the Mississippi River serves the region’s 30 million people 
as a resource for power plant operations, delivery and export of goods (70-85 million tons of 
cargo annually), and various other things that enable the public and industry to survive (USGS, 
2007).  The 1,200,000 acres of floodplains have been adapted for pasture and agriculture use as 
well.  Likewise, the lower Mississippi River has a huge agricultural niche within its basin.  The 
rich and fertile soils left from upstream sediments provide for millions of acres of winter wheat, 
corn, soybeans, cotton, sugarcane, sorghum and rice.  The Atchafalaya basin provides a 
livelihood for about 1,100 commercial fishermen who provide 82 million pounds of crawfish 
(McCain et al., 2007) which makes up nearly 95 percent of the national crawfish harvest for the 
food and restaurant industry.  The lower Mississippi River serves to provide fertilizer, chemicals, 
petroleum, lumber and pulp, gravel, steel, and coal throughout the river system.   
Over 400 million tons of bulk cargo is distributed along the river system with 200 million 
of this tonnage being gasoline and petroleum products (Nienaber, 2007).  448 million tons of 
cargo is exported annually through the Port of New Orleans accounting for $37 billion dollars of 
the national economy (Stanford, 2011).  In grains alone, 1.1 billion bushels of corn, 385 million 
bushels of soy beans, and 32 million bushels of wheat that make up 90 percent of grain exports 
are carried down the river (Kruse, 2004).  The Mississippi River is a vital link to the economy 
serving as the most efficient means of transportation. Barges can carry 1,500 tons of bulk 
products which is far greater capacity than any other method of transportation.   
The Constructed Environment 
The constructed environment defined by Mileti (1999) consists of housing, utilities, 
transportation, technology, communications, critical facilities and engineered structures. 
Tributaries and river connections making trade possible gave rise to great American cities 
scattered along its riverbanks. Railroads and automobiles contributed and complicated the 
American connection with the river. We built bridges, dams, and levees to protect these cities 




surfaces that allow more runoff into the river system.  Pumping stations and holding ponds help 
manage flooding within cities but poorly maintained infrastructures often leave cities vulnerable 
when their measures are obsolete or in need of upgrades and repairs.  
Dependence on the Mississippi River resulted in the need to make changes by building 
diversion structures such as levees, carve-outs or canals in order to protect settlements or improve 
navigation. As a result of these changes, there were unintended consequences that led to an 
ongoing management system which would monitor and remedy problems arising from those 
alterations.  These conditions makes the system path dependent (Collier and Collier, 1991) which 
limits the course or changes possible after a previous major action is taken.  
Historical Underpinnings:  Public Space, Power, and Path Dependency  
The history behind flood control becomes an entertaining story beyond the informative.  
The historical narrative describing how settlement occurred around the river, how we used the 
river, and the changes made to the river establishes that the growth machine dynamics have 
created a path dependent system that also contributes to increasing vulnerability to catastrophic 
flood disasters. Comprehensive evaluation of the flooding problem, the theories behind flooding 
problems, and the social influences that perpetuate and exacerbate the flooding problem are 
examined.  
Consider who controlled the river, the space in front of the river and who established 
where riparian rights end and public space begins?  Kelman (2006) argues that these are the main 
issues that have played a predominate role in flood mitigation since the infancy of the United 
States.  The nation has a culture steeped in individualism and strong respect for private property 
rights.  The role of government in the interest of flood control and public safety has been highly 
controversial; and over time, there have been many changes depending on the zeitgeist.   
Time and path dependency are key elements in developing an understanding of how the 
federal flood control system originated.  The historical to contemporary settlement and 




transformations in addressing flooding problems.  Since colonial times, the battle between 
preservation of nature and development of the riverbanks has ensued.  Shortly after the Louisiana 
Purchase, privatizing the riverfront in New Orleans became an issue that reached national 
importance.  Prior to selling Louisiana, the French had sold parcels of land abutting the riverfront.  
Here the transition from French governing to U.S. territory and governance was clunky even 
though U.S. government relied heavily on French and English law.  The prevailing attitude in the 
infant U.S. was one of “reverence for property rights” while the prevailing attitude in New 
Orleans was one of “committing to civil law heritage” (Kelman, 2006, 41).    
Early 1800s riverfront property deeds contained a covenant that required the landowner 
to maintain a levee along the riverbank.  Levee policy was further codified by state government in 
Louisiana Act 154 (1813) and Louisiana Act 156 (1817) to ensure the police juries had authority 
to sue landowners for work performed as a result of levee maintenance negligence (Poe, 2006, 
62).  In populated areas, this became problematic with owners because they felt too much of the 
burden was on them to protect not only their own land but those owning land behind them.  They 
felt this should be a shared endeavor.   
In rural areas upstream from New Orleans, building or maintaining the levee was even 
more problematic and complicated. First, the terrain along the riverfront in an undeveloped state 
was very dense with vines, trees and undergrowth.  The river created its own natural levee 
forming a ridge as it overtopped the banks, then dropped heavy sediment first and cascaded the 
rest in a graded fashion until the slope gave way to marshy floodplain and backcountry (Poe, 
2006).    Huge swaths of giant cane or canebrakes within the undergrowth helped sustain the 
levee as the knotty fibrous root systems formed mats beneath the surface holding the sediment in 
place (Poe, 2006).  The land in an undeveloped state was so dense that settling proved difficult as 
the only possible access was by the waterway.  The land easiest to clear was the land closest to 
the river that had dried, thus owners built their homes, slave quarters, barns, and livestock pens 




from flooding, snakes and vermin (Poe, 2006).  The most difficult laborious land to clear was that 
of the backcountry which remained damp and heavy and very mineral rich and perfect for cotton 
farming (Poe, 2006). Flooding occurred often and carried bugs that destroyed crops and stagnated 
water pools that incubated mosquitos, thus yellow fever epidemics were rampant.  Likewise, river 
erosion often took chunks of the riverbanks forcing settlers to rebuild homes and levees further 
back on their properties and often at a lower level than previously.   
In 1803 New Orleans, as the result of the Mississippi River’s sediment building nature, a 
land mass had formed on the east bank upstream from the crescent “C” (today’s French Quarter) 
between the river and the private property line of Jean Gravier, a wealthy landowner of 
Faubourge St. Mary (Kelman, 2006).  During periods of low water, this muddy sediment bank, 
the batture, was considered public use and served as a community promenade as it dried out in the 
summer months.  The batture provided an access point for flat boats and fishing and was often 
used by locals to extract sediment for personal needs on their own property (Kelman, 2006).   
Jean Gravier, owner of Faubourge St. Mary (today’s New Orleans central business 
district) had become increasingly territorial over the batture and set up his own barriers to prevent 
public access (Kelman, 2006). The locals had pretty much disregarded Gravier and attributed 
much of his behavior as being that of an eccentric old fool.  On the other hand, Gravier had 
decided that this batture held potential profit for him if he could lay claim then market the land 
for development and improvements (Kelman, 2006).  In Gravier’s mind, while the river “giveth 
and taketh away” this was the hazard of owning property that abuts a river.  Therefore, he 
believed the land gifted by nature was solely his riparian property (Kelman, 2006).   
In 1807 Gravier had sought out the recently transplanted New York attorney Edward 
Livingston for collaboration and challenged the local council to acknowledge his riparian rights 
to the batture (Kelman, 2006).  Livingston had left New York in a state of disgrace after his 
subordinate embezzled $50,000 from the city treasury while Livingston was holding public office 




President Jefferson during the Hamilton-Burr political conflict in New York.  Like several of his 
colleagues and business associates in New York, Livingston has sought refuge in New Orleans to 
escape his past. In exchange for his legal services, Gravier offered Livingston a parcel of land on 
the batture to develop for himself (Kelman, 2006, 28).   
Up to this point, local law held that the riverbank was owned by the public, therefore, the 
batture was perceived as public space and Gravier’s property right ended at the edge of the 
batture (Kelman, 2006, 28).  Local elites were outraged at Livingston’s attempt to privatize the 
batture and grew infuriated when justices of the territory ruled in favor of Gravier and Livingston 
(Kelman, 2006, 30).  As Livingston attempted to develop his portion of the batture, locals 
organized into mobs and disrupted the work.  The conflict between Livingston and the locals 
continued to escalate to a dangerous level thus Livingston turned to the territory Governor 
William Claiborne to enforce his rights established by the territory justices (Kelman, 2006, 31).   
In the United States, the Federal Government owns the land beneath navigable waters up 
to the high water mark. Therefore, while Livingston was arguing for the territory justices to 
enforce his rights, the local council called on the Governor to help defuse the conflict by 
establishing the batture as riverbed sediment in federal jurisdiction (Kelman, 2006). President 
Jefferson then intervened for two reasons. First, was the fact that Jefferson’s animosity towards 
Livingston played a huge role in taking away Livingston’s claim to the batture (Kelman, 2006).  
Second, he took the position that riverbanks are public space trusted to the people of the nation 
(Kelman, 2006).  
Livingston would eventually regain control of this property. Using Manhattan as example 
of how the local council handed out land grants to develop their waterfront and save their city’s 
beleaguered financial condition, Livingston appealed to locals that it was in their best interest to 
have someone develop the property and maximize the economic benefit for the public good 




ordering him evicted and one in New Orleans district court against the marshal, Le Breton 
D’Orgenois, that evicted him (Kelman, 2006, 44).   
While Livingston lost his case in federal circuit court, he won his case in New Orleans as 
D’Orgenois had nothing but the merits of the case to stand on. The local government, Counseil de 
Ville, continued to fight with Livingston creating injunctions against him meanwhile granting 
other riparian proprietors favor until they haggled Livingston into donating part of the batture to 
the city, allowed sediment to be removed by citizens for personal use, and forced him to build a 
levee to protect the property (Kelman, 2006, 47).   
The battle over public space on the batture changed the landscape and the “public 
character” of the riverfront (Kelman, 2006, 49).  Losing control of the riverfront led the general 
public to be extremely concerned about how problems associated with the natural force of the 
river would be dealt with (Kelman, 2006).  They felt that there would be both economic and 
environmental disasters as a result of losing control of the riverfront. This critical juncture or 
pivotal point created crucial change and lasting legacy (Collier and Collier, 1991) as power was 
gained by the growth machine dynamic and diminished for regular citizens.  
Historical Underpinnings:  River Navigation and Controls 
While serving as Minister to France under the Jefferson administration, Robert 
Livingston, Edward’s older brother was instrumental in the Louisiana Purchase.  Basically this 
purchase included not only Louisiana, but also a large swath of land west of the Mississippi River 
beyond the region that bordered the river such as Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and parts of 
Minnesota.  The Louisiana Purchase allowed the U.S. free and clear access to the Mississippi 
River.  Though the purchase itself was questionable as being unconstitutional, there was little 
dissent with the rhetoric that this provided all people within the nation free rights to access and 
use of the river which in turn would provide the economic growth to launch the U.S. into 




Contrarily, Robert Livingston then switched his position on a shared public river once he 
joined forces with Robert Fulton and Nicholas Roosevelt to form the Fulton Group, who 
successfully invented the first commercial steamboat (Kelman, 2006).  The Fulton Group 
appealed to Governor Claiborne to pass legislation that gave them sole access to the river and its 
tributaries within the Louisiana territory (Kelman, 2006, 53).  Kelman (2006, 54) explains that 
during this time period, granting monopolies allowed the country to develop infrastructure and 
garner revenue for federal, state, and local government that otherwise was impossible to attain.  In 
this period, monopolies stood for the common good and best use of public space. The private 
sector provided the capital and groundwork for infrastructure thus spurring economic growth in 
exchange for healthy profits and exclusive control of that area.  Though it seemed hypocritical for 
Claiborne to support Fulton Group’s request for a monopoly, given his previous intervention in 
the New Orleans riverfront, he championed the cause (Kelman, 2006, 53).   
There was reluctance among the citizens and local flatboat traders to embrace the Fulton 
steamboats as the logistical means to improve upon their present trading conditions. The 
economic boom promised by the Fulton Group did not materialize (Kelman, 2006, 56).  Local 
people in the Louisiana viewed the Livingston brothers as greedy eastern outsiders and their 
unpopularity limited their power despite their monopoly on the river (Kelman, 2006, 57).  In the 
meantime, Henry Shreve of Pennsylvania had garnered enough capital to improve upon the 
Fulton steamboat invention building two steamboats with greater capabilities for upriver travel as 
far as Louisville, Kentucky in a matter of record time-- 25 days (Kelman, 2006, 58).   
Rather than publically and forcefully challenging Shreve’s use of the river, Livingston, 
the ever unpopular outsider, was careful to challenge Shreve’s use of the river indirectly. He 
solicited a retainer from all local attorneys so Shreve would have no representation when 
Livingston took him in court (Kelman, 2006, 57).  The skirmishes between Shreve and 
Livingston escalated and Shreve’s attorney was successful in garnering enough public support for 




to enforce Shreve off the river (Kelman, 2006, 59).  At this point, commerce on the Mississippi 
River began to grow exponentially as the river was once again held in common by the public. 
Historical Underpinnings:  Changes to the Natural Landscape Increase Flooding 
River erosion was exacerbated by the onslaught of steamboats and the enormous amount 
of wood needed to fuel their engines.  Since space was limited given the large cargo holds, the 
steamboats would carry no more than a day’s worth of lumber on board to fuel the engines; 
therefore, “wood hawks” or loggers would cut and score wood for sale along the riverbanks (Poe, 
2006).  Flooding was beneficial for wood hawks as they cut wood in lowlands and then during 
high water, floated their loads and often cut holes in levees to move their wood to the riverside 
(Poe, 2006, 73).   
Flooding brought about more debris, and debris made river navigation hazardous for 
steamboats, three-fifths of steamboat losses were attributed to debris accidents (Poe, 2006, 53).  
Therefore, there was a growing need to keep navigation open and deal with debris and natural 
sediment building that created sandbars and obstructions. Who would be responsible for 
maintaining navigation?   The federal government would eventually step in and assist with 
navigation mitigation (Klein and Zellmer, 2007; Kelman, 2006) after the Supreme Court affirmed 
that regulating navigation lies within congressional authority (see Gibbons v. Ogden). 
Following the flood in 1825, former Livingston foe and established navigation expert 
Henry Shreve argued that all the timber from the edge of the riverbank up to 300-400 yards back 
should be removed in order to prevent tree debris from entering the river (Poe, 2006, 53).  The 
federal government began commissioning Shreve and his crews to do navigation maintenance on 
the river.  Within a span of six months, Shreve’s crews had cut 10,000 trees from the riverbanks 
and this would prove to be devastating and irreversible damage to the Mississippi River by 
exacerbating bank erosion (Poe, 2006). 
In 1831, Shreve was also responsible for cutting a canal at Trumbel’s Bend to improve 




the Red River was high and then west to east if the Mississippi River level was higher.  Shreve’s 
shortcut proved to be problematic as experts learned more about the river later.   
Growing trade had increased settlements on the river and individual efforts to build 
levees provided protections from river flooding. There was little to no coordination on levee 
building and this protection was not very reliable.  By the 1820s the State of Louisiana had 
established a comprehensive levee system where landowners were required to maintain their 
portion of the levee at their own expense within the standards prescribed by law (Poe, 2006).  The 
local Parish Judge provided oversight for the system and police juries who had to construct or 
repair neglected levees sued the landowner for work and repair costs (Poe, 2006).  
Leveeing was a European practice brought over by the French and the most ancient 
practice in response to flooding (Poe, 2006).  Basically it was the only method considered 
because it was all early settlers knew.  However, the more complex the levee system became, the 
greater the problem of flooding.   Levees increased the height of the water within the channel.  As 
a result when they were overtopped, or worse, as they were breached, they created larger 
disasters.  In Louisiana, the velocity of the water was not strong enough to scour and deepen the 
channel, therefore the higher they built the levee, the higher the water rose as the sediment 
increased below in the riverbed.  
Historical Underpinnings:  Increased Flooding and Need for Levee Cooperation 
Locals and especially planters along the riverbanks found themselves in an unsustainable 
situation with several issues resulting.  They often could not afford to maintain the levee or were 
disgruntled with sacrificing the land.  They complained of the lack of cost sharing with neighbors 
behind them and sacrificing the labor that could be used for planting (Poe, 2006).  Levee districts 
developed within communities but the problems continued to grow.  Lack of uniform standards 
for levee building went across state lines and states were forbidden by the U.S. Constitution from 
entering into compacts without Congress approval (Poe, 2006).  Thus, the levee problem had 




Federal infrastructure development or internal improvements was a highly controversial 
issue during national elections throughout the first half of the 1800s and one of the main issues 
that led us into the Civil War.  The South and the Northeast had two very different economies. 
The Northeast was heavily industrialized and the South was primarily agrarian. Regional 
competition grew over western expansion, national markets and labor, international trading, 
transportation links, and Congressional power.  Some infrastructure projects were endorsed by 
Congress under the auspices of national defense and economic development.  The South felt 
slighted by the Northeast and upper Midwest as they made east to west trading routes with federal 
money that didn’t seem to provide enough benefit to the South (O’Neill, 2006, 46-47).  
Perhaps these routes potentially limited the South in this growing regional competition 
(sectionalism) for federal money for internal improvements.  It is disputed in various scholarly 
circles as to whether regional economic differences led to the Civil War or whether it was 
primarily the issue of slavery.  It is hard to extract from the circumstances that the need for free 
slave labor in order to sustain the Southern economy was a matter of economic disparity.  The 
free labor capitalism movement in the Northeast and Midwest was a progressive ideal.  
The South continued to press for federal support to build the levees.  They argued that the 
levees would improve the channel for navigation by scouring and deepening the river bottom thus 
help rid the river of snags thus improving the economic conditions for the whole country (Poe, 
2006).  Second, territories in the North and upriver drained into the lower territory causing the 
flooding.  They argued their means for drainage was a negative externality on the South.  
Therefore, the cost of flood control should be shared by everyone given that this was a national 
waterway (Poe, 2006).  Third, federally owned public lands in Louisiana bordered the river and 
therefore Congress should be responsible to build levees “in its capacity as a landowner” (Poe, 
2006, 56).   
Based on these three primary arguments for federal levee support, the South had growing 




Advocacy conventions had grown in popularity in the late 1840-50s.  The most notorious was the 
1845 Mississippi River Improvement Convention in Memphis led by John Calhoun which 
demanded attention to Southern infrastructure to be connected to the upper Midwest including a 
levee system and a canal to be built from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River (Kelman, 2006; 
O’Neill, 2006; Poe, 2006).  They were heavily opposed by those in Upper Midwest and the 
Northeast.  Therefore in 1847 in Chicago, they held the largest convention of the time with the 
intent to snub the South (O’Neill, 2006; Poe, 2006).   
The 1849-50 flood created a major levee breach at the Suavé Plantation (also known as 
Sauvé Crevasse) just 15 miles upriver from New Orleans.  High water left over 12,000 people 
homeless and 200 city blocks in New Orleans flooded for weeks (Kelman, 2006, 162; Klein and 
Zellmer, 2007, Poe, 2006).  The flooding brought about national attention to the levee problem 
and growing pressure on Congress to do something. In an attempt to appease the South, Congress 
created the 1850 Swamp Land Act which conveyed all uncultivated federal lands bordering the 
river to the South.  These lands also needed levee protection.  Therefore, their intent was for 
Louisiana to parcel out the lands and build a levee system from the sale profits (Poe, 2006).   
Prior to the Civil War, the levee system had started to develop into more than 740 miles 
(Poe, 2006) and most of this is attributed to the development of levee districts and state oversight.  
While the levees were pretty much continuous, they were still inadequate and weak. Numerous 
breaches and repetitive flooding was taxing Louisiana unduly as the State attempted to build a 
war cache. When the South entered the Civil War, the State did away with public works and all 
efforts to maintain the levees (Poe, 2006). 
Historical Underpinnings:  Breaking the Levees to Win the War   
In the beginning of the Civil War, the Union Army quickly took control of most all the 
Mississippi River and made their way deep into the South rendering Louisiana powerless quite 
early on.  Dominance on the river allowed the Union to maneuver more effectively to take 




military closer to attack on Vicksburg resulted in hundreds of miles of flooding in Louisiana (Poe, 
2006).  Within four years of the beginning of the Civil War, the levee system was totally 
decimated.  Adding insult to injury, the Union soldiers had been using the levee to bury corpses 
(Poe, 2006).  The South was wretched and crippled by the end of the war.  Devastation from the 
war had, among things, taken the majority of able bodied men and demolished the economy.  
With broken levees and fairly continuous flooding, recovery from the war was difficult.  It 
prevented landowners from producing crops and many were losing their lands to debt created 
from crop failures.  Yellow fever and cholera epidemics were rampant. Mindful not to minimize 
the impact of “violence and racism” on the Reconstruction, Cynthia Poe (2006) argues that 
flooding dealt a really significant impact as it “exacerbated” effects and conflicts.   
Those hit the hardest though were the newly freed people.  Sharecropping and wage-
based contracts actually made life worse for them than being under the possession and care of 
plantation owners (Poe, 2006).  Under the new labor system both freed people and plantation 
owners suffered debt and crop failures.  However, differential problems resulted and created 
greater disparity.  Landowners were going into greater debt for labor, seeds, failed crops; and at 
the same time, dealing with major tax increases to rebuild their communities.  When crops failed, 
freed people were broke, homeless, and further destitute than before.  If they rented or acquired 
land to live on, their homes were more likely to be within lower elevation flood prone areas. 
Freed people also lacked education so they had few options for employment. They lacked credit 
or suffered disadvantageous terms of credit and where often in competition with white farmers.  
Overall, they were pushed towards a state of  fixed dependency on government aid (Poe, 2006).  
Many of the freed people began to steal livestock, food, and supplies from white landowners and 
tore down bridges and used the wood for fuel (Poe, 2006).  Thus flooding exacerbated poverty 
thus created more tension between blacks and whites.   
Several state initiatives to build the levees back failed after the war.  The states tried 




then tried to create a public-private partnership with a local levee building company but then 
failed to appropriate the money to pay contractors (Poe, 2006).   
Political corruption and greed ran rampant as Reconstruction aid never seemed to touch 
the people.  While both Democrats and Republicans alike engaged in corrupt practices in the 
South, it was all blamed on the Republican North and sectionalist bias (Poe, 2006). As Poe (2006, 
183) states, “the experience of flooding and the experience of Reconstruction were one.” The 
attitude in the North was that the South needed to suffer the consequences of their own making.   
Historical Underpinnings:  Levees Only Policy 
The second recommendation of the 1850 Swamp Act was to authorize two separate 
studies of the Mississippi River flood problem but completion of these surveys were hampered by 
the war.  Two engineers, Charles Ellet a civil engineer and Captain Andrew Humphreys were 
commissioned to survey and develop a prescription for flood mitigation. This infamous battle is 
eloquently presented in John Barry’s 1997 book The Rising Tide of a battle between a civil and a 
military engineer.  Ultimately, Humphreys fell behind Ellet due to illness, therefore, Ellet was 
published first in 1852 (Kelman, 2006; Poe, 2006; Barry, 1997).  In his report, Ellet endorsed 
creating floodways, reservoirs, carve outs and levees as a means to mitigate flooding.   
Humphreys actually had arrived at the same conclusions but before he finished his work 
both he and Ellet were called to duty in the Civil War (Barry, 1997).  After the war, Humphreys 
returned to the task of completing his survey.  Humphreys, a rather inflated and bombastic fellow, 
could not merely support Ellet’s findings and allow Ellet to surpass him (Barry, 1997).  His 
contribution had to squash Ellet in order to maintain the notoriety that he felt he deserved (Barry, 
1997).  Therefore, he “corrupted” his findings and wrote in support of a “levees only policy” 
based on costs being too great to pursue Ellet’s grandiose ideas (Barry, 1997).  Ellet was killed in 




the “levees only” ideal and made it policy.  Humphreys became the Chief of the Corps of 
Engineers until the power of the Corps was diminished by the Mississippi River Commission.  
By 1879, it was determined that river management needed to be directed from a 
centralized authority.  The Mississippi River Commission was established and consisted of three 
Corps of Engineers representatives—a president, one from the U.S. Coast and Geodatic Survey 
and three civilians of which two must be engineers (Barry, 1997).  The appointments would be 
made by the President and confirmed by Congress. Due to lack of funding appropriations, little 
was accomplished under this initiative (Barry, 1997). 
Historical Underpinnings:  The 1927 Great Flood Gives Rise to “Project Flood”  
Again major flooding occurred in lower Mississippi and the losses were great in 1882, 
1912, 1913 and then most significantly in 1927.  The flooding in 1927 devastated the Delta region 
and is known as the most disastrous in history.  Over 600,000 people were left homeless and the 
disputed death toll is 1,000 (Barry, 1997).  Again, death toll numbers can be contested based on 
racial divisions. The Delta region was a catastrophic mess.  
Many felt President Coolidge was hiding from the public when he refused to visit the 
devastation.  Known as “Silent Cal,” he was very brooding and quiet, a man of few words.  He 
felt that visiting the devastation would be equal to political grandstanding.  At the same time, he 
also believed that flood recovery was strictly a matter of personal responsibility.  Like many 
presidents before him, President Coolidge’s address to the 70th Congress was adamant that the 
federal government was not in the business of protecting people from “Acts of God” and natural 
hazards such as floods (70th Congress Digest 46, 1928).  Herbert Hoover was sent to the South to 
direct flood relief operations and deal with racial discord.  Hoover gained the confidence of many 
Southern blacks who remained stranded in refugee camps while many others navigated north to 
Chicago to find better racial relations and work.  Hoover rallied Southern blacks in flood 
reconstruction efforts and promised them their efforts would not soon be forgotten if they helped 




However, he betrayed the black voters by ignoring civil rights issues and opposing federal anti-
lynching laws and ultimately suffered a loss in reelection.  
Headlining in Hoover’s highly dignified entrance to the White House, was the Flood 
Control Act of 1928 that ended the “levees only” policy.  The massive and comprehensive 
mitigation reform would be known as “Project Flood” (Figure 2.2).  Project flood provided for 
the use of levees, floodways, channel improvements/stabilization, and tributary basin 
improvements. In other words, revetments, cutoffs, dikes and dredging would be used for 
improvements and stabilization. Dams, reservoirs, pumping plants, and auxiliary channels would 
provide for tributary basin improvements.   
Levees, floodwalls and control structures constructed by the federal government would 
encompass 2,203 miles with 1,607 miles specifically on the Mississippi River and 596 miles on 
the Arkansas, Red, and Atchafalaya Rivers (USACE, 2006). These would be maintained by the 
local governments except when federal assistance would be needed during major floods.  
Inspections would be conducted by local levee districts and the Army Corps of Engineers.  
The Flood Control Act of 1928 was the first major piece of legislation that put the federal 
government squarely in the middle of protecting the population from natural hazards.  The cost 
would be greater than any undertaking thus far by the federal government besides World War I 
costing $325 million (Klein and Zellmer, 2007).  The Act also provided protection for the federal 
government against any litigation resulting from flooding and flood damage.  In other words, the 
federal government provided mainly structural protections against floods and otherwise was not 
responsible for outcomes associated with flooding.  Therefore, if their structures failed or caused 
a greater flood hazard, they were not held liable.    
What is attractive about the 1928 Flood Control Act is that it would centralize efforts to 
mitigate communities along the riverbank. It provided opportunity to dispel corruption and 
inconsistencies within local districts where some areas where marginalized for the sake of 




the system at least a foot higher than any known previous flood which would be quite 
accomplished. On the other hand, it also brought about a false sense of security behind the 
floodwalls and levees which resulted in increased development and greater issues later. 
Historical Underpinnings:   Old River Flow Problem   
Also by 1927, the engineers and experts began to realize there was now a constant 
westerly flow in Old River and the Atchafalaya was taking on more of the Mississippi River 
(Winer, 2010).  Shreve’s cut at Trumbel’s Bend had allowed the Mississippi to begin the 1,000 
year natural shift and take the steepest and shortest route to the Gulf of Mexico (Winer, 2010). 
Sediment would build and a saltwater wedge would turn the “Birdsfoot” mouth of the Mississippi 
into a swamp, effectively destroying trade and commerce for New Orleans and along the corridor 
leading to and including Baton Rouge.    
Old River Controls serves as a mechanism to keep the Mississippi River flowing towards 
New Orleans.  This structure provides a 70/30 split sending 30 percent down the Atchafalaya 
River via Old River and 70 percent to New Orleans and is designed to prevent the river from 
completely changing course and taking the Atchafalaya to the Gulf of Mexico (Kelman, 2006).  It 
was believed that if the government did not take action soon, the river would be totally consumed 
by the Atchafalaya by the early 1970s.  The Old River Controls structure was completed in 1964.  
Old River controls would first be tested in flooding during 1973.  In the aftermath, there 
was structural damage that scoured out area nearly the size of a football field, but it did hold the 
river in place (Kelman, 2006).  An auxiliary structure, completed in 1986, was built to provide 
support for Old River Controls.  Then, in the early 1990s, a hydroelectric plant was built behind it 
and some argue that the hydroelectric plant adds protection.  However, Harley Winer (2010) 
claims that the hydroelectric plant has a “sediment lean” system that disrupts the sediment 
controls and sediment is being shifted disproportionately towards New Orleans and causing a 
great sediment loss as it falls off the continental shelf into deep waters.   The coastal wetlands are 




sediment load in the Atchafalaya River would result in greater delta growth at both the Wax Lake 
Outlet and mouth of the Atchafalaya River.  
Winer (2010) is a strong advocate for detailed engineering studies that support changing 
legislation to allow the Mississippi River to overtake the Atchafalaya including moving 
communities, ports, bridges, and industry that would be in the way of the increased flows.  
Winer’s (2010) recommendation would include the entire area of Morgan City and The Port of 
Morgan City strategically positioned on the Intercoastal waterway.  After the 2011 floods, NASA 
provided satellite images (Figure 2.3) of sediment plumes at the mouth of the Mississippi River 
beyond New Orleans and at the mouth of the Atchafalaya.  These images could possible dispute 
claims by Winer (2010). 
Historical Underpinnings:  Flood Insurance Policy and Non-Structural Policy Focus  
The next notable legislation is the creation of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.  
The legislative initiative was led by Gilbert F. White who advocated for a more comprehensive 
package of flood mitigation including flood insurance and “nonstructural” floodplain 
management (Platt, 1995). The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was intended to 
mitigate the cost of disaster assistance during flooding by providing a low-cost flood insurance to 
floodplain resident.  Policy holders would then have a pooled resource in which to draw a benefit 
for flood repairs. However, there are problems and abuses related to this program and its 
ineffectiveness.  
The 1993 flooding on the Missouri River and upper portion of the Mississippi River 
brought about a renewed focus on flooding problems along the Mississippi River and specifically 
brings to light problems with the NFIP.  Those most affected by the flood were in poverty 
stricken areas in flood-prone areas or floodways.  Over 100,000 homes were destroyed yet there 
were only 16,167 claims whereas overall there are 90,000 policies in the nine states affected 
(Platt, 1995).  What is happening here suggests that the majority of these homes did not have 




flooding outside the floodplains (Platt, 1995).   Even if communities participate in the NFIP and 
make the necessary mitigation requirements, evidence thus far suggests that the NFIP is flawed 
and ineffective.  People within the floodplain are required to have flood insurance in order to 
obtain a mortgage.  However, they often drop the flood insurance soon after purchase because 
they cannot afford it.  If disaster assistance is still made available, these people are often 
incentivized not to obtain flood insurance.   
Gaming the NFIP is also a problem when it comes to waiting periods for flooding; and 
specifically a problem highlighted in the 1993 Flood at Chesterfield, Missouri were an 
agricultural levee was “upgraded to a 100 year level of protection” and industry was allowed to 
build up behind it without forcing them to purchase the mandatory flood insurance, nor did they 
have proper floodplain controls (Platt, 1995).  These corporations bought flood insurance just 
prior to the five day waiting period so they quickly enjoyed insurance benefits of $13.2 million 
accounting for five percent of the entire NFIP claims in nine states (Platt, 1995).  In light of this 
abuse, the Galloway Report (1984) recommended that the waiting period be extended to 15 days.  
Currently, the waiting period has been set at 30 days. 
The 1993 flooding was called the worst yet to hit the United States claiming 50 lives and 
forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands and destroying 10,000 homes (Larson, 1996).  
Flooding was limited to the upper Mississippi River because of severe drought conditions in the 
lower Mississippi Delta.  Having drought conditions in the south was a very fortunate 
circumstance given the differences in socioeconomic conditions between the populations of the 
South and North. The flood would have been catastrophic if the entire Mississippi River system 
had flooded.  Nonetheless, the damage was great and crippled the communities as this 300 year 
flood closed ten airports, shut down barge traffic for two months, destroyed bridges, and 
effectively halted railroad traffic and destroyed key infrastructure (Larson, 1996).   
Discussion of issues and problems resulting from the 1993 flooding is covered in the 




(1994) generated by the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee.  The primary 
cause that “exacerbated” flood levels were nonfederal agricultural levees and other means farmers 
used to control flooding.  In some cases farmers had taken wetlands for agriculture use and 
prevented the river from overflowing into natural floodplains.  Federal levees were nearly 
overtopped but they held and the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was successful in 
using reservoirs as intended.  Problems included failure of key infrastructure such as wastewater 
facilities and sewer backup.  Flood waters were contaminated by flooding at superfund sites and 
floodplains containing hazardous waste.  Total damage from the 1993 flooding was 
approximately $16 billion dollars (Galloway Report, 1994).  
Recent Major Mississippi River Flooding   
The 2011 floods left over three million acres of farmland submerged in water.  One of the 
most controversial losses of farmland includes a preliminary cost of $85 million (Plume, 2011) to 
the floodway at Birdspoint, Missouri.  When flood levels rose to 59 feet at Cairo, Illinois, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers placed 115 tons of liquid explosives into 27,000 feet of pipe fuse 
plugs within levees at Birdspoint; and then blew them to protect Cairo from total flood 
destruction. This decision forced nearly 200 people residing in 90 homes within the floodway to 
be evacuated and their property inundated in order to save Cairo (population of 3,000) from total 
flood destruction (Gay, 2011).   
The Birdspoint-New Madrid floodway has been steeped in controversy since the Flood 
Control Act of 1928 authorized the acquisition of easements for the floodway.  Approximately 
3,000 residents within the area were paid a one-time indemnity of $17 per acre for this land to be 
flooded if needed in order to save the nearby town of Cairo, Illinois whose population at that time 
was approximately 15,000 (USACE, 2011).  In 1937 a few residents armed with guns still 
attempted to prevent inundating the floodway.  National Guard members were ordered to protect 




During the 2011 flood, residents of the area attempted to block USACE from blowing up 
the levees by filing a law suit in Missouri objecting to the use of the floodway claiming it violated 
the Missouri Clean Water Act (1981).  A federal judge ruled that the USACE was authorized to 
breech the levee.  However, this decision was appealed and two Missouri senators wrote to the 
president requesting that he block USACE from blowing up portions of the levee (Barrett and 
Brat, 2011).  Flood waters continued to rise steadily and time was a critical element when 
USACE finally received orders to open the floodway.  It was not an issue of clean water that was 
upsetting the residents.  They made it clear to the national news media that they were attempting 
to block opening the floodway because they felt Cairo, Illinois, a predominately black 
community, was a dying city plagued with poverty and drug use (Gay, 2011).  These white 
farmers within the floodway felt that allowing an impoverished and drug infested Cairo to flood 
was more justified that destroying their homes and farmland (Gay, 2011).  In a USA Today report 
on May 18, 2011 (Frank, 2011) residents and farmers in Missouri asked: “Why is it more 
important to save one side and ruin the other?”  In a USA Today editorial, Rep. Jo Ann Emerson, 
R-Mo. responded, stating currently designed flood control measures and calls for returning the 
river to natural conditions “is a high ideal for environmentalists who live in safer places and an 
unthinkable violation of property rights and liberty for Americans who have lived beside the river 
for more than a century” (see USA Today online edition update 5/18/2011; Frank, 2011).   
Once the floodway was inundated, residents then filed a class action lawsuit (Minahan, 
2011) against the federal government claiming they were not adequately compensated for their 
losses.  Farmers complained that while they will be compensated for loss of equipment and 
expense related to planting, they would not be compensated for their lost profits. 
Communities in the lower Mississippi River would see record flood levels as a result of 
what is described as a 500 year flood.  Vicksburg flood stage is 43 feet and according to the 
National Weather Service (2011) it crested at 57.1 breaking the previous record in 1927 of 56.2 




record of 58 feet in 1937 (NWS, 2011).  Approximately 5,000 people were forced to evacuate 
from these areas (Branston and Finn, 2011).   
The Atchafalaya basin in Louisiana was also threatened during the 2011 floods.  As with 
Birdspoint-New Madrid floodway, the government had purchased easement rights to inundate the 
area via the Morganza Spillway.  This spillway is designed to take pressure off the Old River 
Controls and levees protecting Baton Rouge and New Orleans. The magnitude of 2011 flooding 
would have pushed levees beyond their design capacity if not for releasing the water into the 
Atchafalaya basin.  25,000 residents were prepared and partially evacuated and approximately 
11,000 structures within the floodway were at risk for inundation (Robertson, 2011).   
For nearly 20 years the people of Louisiana disputed the use of a spillway.  However, 
when faced with the realization that levee structures alone would not likely hold during severe 
flooding, residents there accepted this realization and scaled back development in the region 
(Robertson, 2011). According the USACE the Morganza Spillway, five miles wide and 25 miles 
long, can pass 600,000 cubic feet of water per second off the Mississippi River system. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) response was a bit amazing in 
some instances. Specifically, there was a well-orchestrated interagency initiative between the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) to conduct clean-up ahead of a disaster.  Containers of paint, bleach pesticides, oil, 
antifreeze and other pollutants we effectively removed by residents as they evacuated (Hasten, 
2011).  Roads were closed and only residents and officials were allowed into the area.  Police 
officers stood guard next to mobile signs which indicated how much longer residents had to 
retrieve items before the road closed.  Widespread police presence was an effective measure to 
keep sightseers out of the way and prevent further problems.   
Coast Guard C-144 aircraft was monitoring the advancing flood waters (Hastens, 2011) 
while others inspected and raised heights of levees around oil refineries.  In Krotz Springs, the 




tank levels were reduced just in case the levees were over-topped.  Hasten (2011) reported that 
167 oil wells were shut in and the State Department of Natural Resources were keeping tabs on 
592 other producing oil and gas wells.   
One of the most critical events of the 2011 floods was the discovery of a huge sand boil 
in the levee near Greenville, Mississippi that threatened to inundate the Yazoo River delta region 
and thousands of people.  The Corps and local officials organized a crew of inmates and created a 
human chain to build a berm constructed of plywood and sandbags while crews dumped tons of 
stone into the sand boil to stop erosion (USACE, 2013).  Another critical sand boil was 
discovered at the confluence of the Ohio River at Cairo early on in the flood fight and was 
immediately remedied before the largest water volume had reached the area.  The sand boil 
appeared to be the largest ever discovered by flood fighting crews in that region (USACE, 2013).   
According the USACE (2013) the 2011 floods resulted in 21,203 structures and 43,358 
people impacted by the floods and a total loss of 2.8 billion dollars in damages. However, some 
argue the cost is closer to $4 billion as Shelby County, Tennessee reported $2 billion in damages 
alone.  The volume of water flow in the Mississippi had never risen as high as 61 feet at Cairo 
before. Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour described the flood volume moving through the 
flood control system comparable to “a pig moving through a python” (Neuman, 2011).  The 
entire flood control system would be tested and there were critical concerns that if the Old River 
Structure Control did not hold or if there were problems at the Morganza Spillway or Bonnet 
Carre Spillway, it would result in a catastrophic event where the Mississippi River would entirely 
shift its course.  It was the first time that three of four floodways  (Birdspoint, Morganza, Bonnet 
Carre) were all put into operation together to reduce flood levels.  The West Atchafalaya 
floodway is the only floodway that has never yet been used.  
In 2014, flooding on the Upper Mississippi River barely caught national attention; 




what was considered a moderate flood.  The damage cost estimate for this flood occurrence was 
reported to be over one billion dollars (Gerencer, 2015).   
Most recently, flooding in the Upper Mississippi River Region in December, 2015 has 
resulted in 25 fatalities in Missouri and Illinois (Rice, 2016).  Federal authorities identified 19 
vulnerable levees at risk for failing in the upper region (Smith, 2015).  Overall, eleven levees had 
failed and a levee at West Alton, Missouri about 20 miles north of St. Louis was overtopped by 
flood waters resulting in the evacuation of 520 residents. 3,700 inmates were moved as flooding 
threatened a state prison in southern Illinois and twelve (12) Illinois counties were granted a 
disaster declaration (Smith, 2015).  The Mississippi River was nearly 15 feet above flood stage in 
St. Louis cresting at 42.58 feet which is just shy of the 1993 record.  In Missouri, over 7,000 
homes were impacted by floods and several wastewater treatment plants were impacted causing a 
large amount of sewer to enter the floodwaters and continue on downstream (Smith, 2015).  
There were a total of 33 counties with disaster declarations in Missouri. For the most part, the 
lower Mississippi Region has fared better with only moderate flooding in Memphis.  In 
Louisiana, the Bonnet Carre spillway was again opened to reduce the risk of flooding in New 
Orleans.  The cost of flooding has yet to be determined but preliminary speculation suggests that 









REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In order to understand the development of flood control in the United States and what 
influences have contributed to contemporary floodplain management problems, there was a wide 
range of literature examined to more fully understand the problem.  There is a historical path-
dependent nature of community development and government efforts towards flood mitigation in 
the Mississippi River region.  The interaction is dynamic and continuously growing in 
complexity.  The story of how populations adapted and how flood policy developed in the 
Mississippi River region is germane to having a comprehensive picture of the problem.    
When we look at theory related to problems associated with flood mitigation, researchers 
historically used systems theory to explain this phenomenon.  However, there is a paradigm shift 
and growing consensus toward growth machine theory as the best explanation.  The focus here is 
a discussion of systems theory and growth machine theory and whether both are theories of 
“middle range” or does growth machine theory provide the most comprehensive explanation for 
continued flooding issues?      
Also relevant to this research are the contributions from researchers who have conducted 
risk evaluation and focused on social vulnerabilities specifically.  One of the telling signs here 
when examining flood mitigation barriers, is how little consideration we give to social 
vulnerabilities.  The lack of consideration is evident in our planning tools and overall efforts to 
effectively mitigate flood hazards.   
Theoretical explanations for flood mitigation failures 
Ultimately failure in flood control results in disaster.  The current paradigm in the field of 




inherently a social phenomenon; 2) disaster is a social construct that reflects social change 
(Quarantelli, 2005a, 339).  Perry (2005, 11) says, “Disaster is characterized as a social disruption 
that originates in the social structure and might be remedied through social structure 
manipulations” which results in a social change.  Some argue that crisis and disaster are different 
and should be acknowledged (Boin and Hart, 2006).  For example, crisis can occur when social 
systems encounter a threat but a disaster is actually a crisis with a “devastating ending” (Boin, 
2005).  
Perry (2005) contends having a clear definition of disaster that is agreeable to everyone in 
the field of disaster research is not as important as having the researcher make explicit their 
definition as they begin their work.  In this study, the definition of disaster follows Oliver-Smith 
(1998) in that disaster is a social construct and a result of vulnerabilities within the social 
structure.  Basically, disaster occurs as a result of overwhelming local resources and capabilities 
in the social structure and disrupts normalcy in the community.  What is important to note here is 
how vulnerabilities within the social structure become key to the problem of flooding disasters.  
We are potentially creating our own flood disasters or, at the very least, potentially creating more 
detrimental outcomes by the way we fail to mitigate effectively.   
How is it, exactly, that we manage to create circumstances that add to flooding hazards 
we face?  Several theories have offered perspective in how we negatively impact our outcomes.  
According to Kathleen Tierney (2010, 661) most disaster research has been rooted in sociology 
theories such as functionalism and systems theory.  However, in the 1990s disaster research did 
begin to incorporate sociological perspectives regarding inequality and disparity as this relates to 
access to political power, but there had yet been a focus on political power as a dynamic force in 
the production of disasters (Tierney, 2010, 661).  Tierney (2010) suggests that growth machine 
theory may well be the “unifying theoretical paradigm” that moves U.S. disaster research in the 
same direction as those scientists outside the U.S. who are already focused on political and 




Biologist Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1950) developed the idea of general systems theory 
through his study of living organisms in the 1940s.  By the early 1950s he had determined general 
systems theory could be applied in sociology to explain social systems.  In 1953, David Easton 
adapted systems theory to political science by describing a political system as a simple organic or 
living system.  Easton (1953) described this step-wise process beginning with inputs (demands or 
public support) from the environment is fed into the political system.  Competition and 
compromise produces a solution within the political system (Easton, 1953).  This solution, 
usually in the form of policy, is then introduced to the environment creating an impact (Easton, 
1953).  This impact results in a feedback loop that generates new inputs (Easton, 1953).   
Easton’s (1953) partially holistic theory of political systems was adapted to disaster 
studies and expanded upon by in Disasters by Design written by Dennis Mileti in 1999.  Mileti 
(1999, 106) emphasizes the increasing complexity of subsystems and their interactions creates a 
condition where “the system is greater than, and is different from, the sum of its parts”.  Mileti 
(1999, 107) differentiates from the traditional systems theory model by arguing that due to this 
complexity, “the laws of additivity do not apply” as in the case where the whole is equal to the 
sum of its parts.  Mileti (1999, 107) argues that the traditional systems theory model is “typically 
linear” and “overemphasizes stability” because they usually only involve one “casual factor”.  
Traditional systems theory is limiting in that it describes change impact resulting in a negative 
feedback loop to create the input cycle again (Mileti, 1999, 107). Mileti (1999, 107) calls for a 
completely holistic and “non-linear approach” due to the multitude of variables with varying 
degrees of complexity in their interactions.  
There is merit to using systems theory to think about the flood control system itself and 
the processes within this system.  The federal flood protection system contains both hard and soft 
infrastructure, thus it is a very highly complex interdependent system.  Within these systems are 
self-organizing subsystems and usually these systems are evaluated for normal problems and 




systems can “predictably fail in unpredictable ways” which in turn will create “cascading 
failures” (Little, 2010, 29; see also Perrow, 1999, 212-220).  According to Mileti (1999) instead 
of calculating risk using probability distributions, it is better to think in terms of power law 
relationships. The failure of only a few subsystems can cause the majority of the damage.  
Ultimately, when these systems fail, it results in a non-linear outcome and, therefore, a non-linear 
approach to mitigation is needed (Mileti, 1999).   
Mileti (1999) does suggest that a nonlinear approach to mitigation is needed.  Each 
member of the network or subsystem is vital, should be included in mitigation planning, and 
given innovative empowerment.  These networks would have access to all the information and 
trends at all levels—local, state, national, and global.  They would have support in the form of 
various resources such as technical assistance, information networks, legal authority, political 
access, and all things related to their function as the institutional memory of that organization or 
subsystem.  Mileti (1999) argues that greater research in planning is needed in order to better 
understand how planning processes occur within the community and what planning processes 
would be most effective.   
Mileti (1999) explains that interactions occur both within and between systems. He refers 
to the natural, social, and built environment as the primary systems engaged in these interactions 
(Mileti, 1999).   Systems theory falls short here in that effective flood controls cannot be 
accomplished where differential power and motivation exists among actors within and between 
these networks.  
Growth machine theory does focus on political power as a dynamic force and the 
controversies associated with it.  Harvey Molotch (1997) coined the word “growth machine” to 
describe a relationship between local elites and local officials where their motivations and actions 
to draw revenues into the community and personal profits often create a problem of moral 
inversion.  These partners are constantly vying for external resources and growth-inducing 




good for local citizens.  Note that when it comes to protecting the health and welfare of the 
community, it is the primary responsibility of local government. Therefore, it should be the 
priority of the local government to choose projects carefully. However, Freudenburg et al. (2009) 
argues that this greedy risk-taking behavior among growth machine leaders has become a 
“politically legitimated process” and is actually fostered from the federal level.  Ultimately, 
federal government enabling results in a “liability crisis” and “circular evasion of responsibility” 
at the local level (Freudenburg et al., 2009).  Regardless of whether these projects actually make 
good sense for land use and regardless of whether they may do more harm than good, they favor 
growth machine leaders in three specific ways (Freudenburg et al., 2009, 157).  First, the benefits 
are concentrated to the elites and political players. Second, the costs of these projects are spread 
out among the citizen tax payers thus they are more likely to behave recklessly given that it is 
“other people’s money.”  Third, the risks are hidden from public view so that the general public is 
unaware they’re being put in this compromising situation.   
Take mapping the floodplain as an example.  The federal government mandates states 
and local officials to map the floodplain.  Standards and tools used by local government vary as 
much as the quality of the maps themselves.  Questions and controversies surrounding mapping 
methods has resulted in claims that some areas identified as having a one percent probability of 
flooding in 100 years have actually already experienced multiple floods within a 50 year period. 
Hydrologists actually prefer not to use the term “100-year-flood” because it is misleading and 
does not necessarily mean that flooding has a likelihood of occurring once in 100 years (USGS, 
2016).  Hydrologists actually refer to it as a reoccurrence interval and flooding the causal pattern 
for flooding is complicated by various factors and changes in the environment (USGS, 2016).  
Despite knowing these flaws, local governments continue to allow and subsidize development 
under the guise that federal mandates were met.  In turn, these properties are then sold to the 




Local growth machine leaders also look for federally funded high-dollar projects such as 
levees and floodwalls to allow development to occur behind them.  These structural fixes have 
historically provided a false sense of security for the community.  Given the government cannot 
be held liable for failing flood control measures (as established in the Flood Control Act of 1928) 
the engineering standards for these structures need to be challenged.  Freudenburg et al. (2009, 
152) point out that the U.S. policy guidance “effectively calls for engineering estimates to have a 
50/50 chance of being proved wrong by floods that occur within the period for which they are 
theoretically designed” which are 100-500 year probability floods.  The standard in other 
countries such as Holland and Germany is based on a 90-95 percent confidence level and are 
designed to protect for a 10,000 years probability flood (Klein and Zelmer, 2014).  The American 
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) warns that while levees may reduce the risk of flood, it is an 
essential fact that no levee is floodproof (Klein and Zelmer, 2014, 188).  Basically, a residence 
behind a 100 year levee has a 26 percent chance of being flooded over the course of a 30 year 
mortgage (Klein and Zelmer, 2014, 188).   
Flooding vulnerabilities are also exacerbated through policies and programs created as 
target reduction programs for flooding.  Many researchers will argue that the federal government 
subsidizes floodplain construction through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) brought 
about in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA 1968).  The measure was intended to 
promote land-use controls and reduce disaster aid by providing insurance to occupants to cover 
their losses.  In order for communities to engage in the NFIP program, they were required to 
create zoning restrictions, establish building codes, retrofit existing structures, and develop 
emergency response plans to respond to flooding.  There are no accountability measures or 
enforcement to actually ensure communities actually meet these standards.  The fact that there are 
no accountability measures is exactly the enabling behavior of the federal government.  Gilbert 




dynamics.  The problem here is that the NFIP turned out to be much different than White had 
intended due to influence from growth machine actors.  
In summary, when looking at systems theory and growth machine theory as it relates to 
disaster mitigation, and specifically flood mitigation, it becomes more evident that growth 
machine has more influence on the process.  Growth machine actors are actually creating and 
influencing all systems and subsystems.  Growth machine actors intervene in the systems model 
at all steps in the process—from inputs to decision-making and policy to outputs and impacts on 
the environment.  Growth machine dynamics have influence within and between these systems 
and their interactions.  These dynamics also hinder the feedback loop in system by discounting 
the potential hazard risk as an “inevitable by-product of economic expansion” (Freudenburg et 
al., 2009, 58) and ultimately avoiding responsibility for disastrous outcomes.  Thus, Tierney 
(2010) is correct in that focus on political power as a dynamic force in the production of disasters 
must be advanced. 
Attempting comprehensive assessment for flood mitigation  
Gilbert White (1945) attempted to comprehensively assess the “flood problem” in a very 
broad analysis of the entire United States.  He noted that the scope of his work was not to address 
the local (White, 1945, 9) or the regional (White, 1945, 102) factors that may be indicative of 
specificity problems. White’s (1945) primary thesis was that while appropriations for structural 
fixes continued to rise, so did the cost of the flooding problem.   
White (1945, 47, 128-203) theorized there were eight major classes of readjustments to 
flooding.  These eight flood adjustments or mitigation remedies were defined as: 1) land 
elevation, 2) flood abatement; 3) flood protection; 4) emergency measures; 5) structural; 6) land 
use; 7) relief; and 8) insurance.   
Prevailing policy in 1940s, according to White (1945, 47) was focused only on four 
primary types of mitigation.  These were structural or engineered fixes rather than non-structural 




upstream of the inundation areas which include reforestation, reducing debris flows, agricultural 
contour shifts, bank stabilization, and forest fire controls (White, 1945, 132-140).  Secondly, 
flood protection (White, 1945, 141-163) is defined as engineering devices such as building 
floodwalls, levees, cut-offs, and channel improvements.  Third, emergency measures (White, 
1945, 163-176) included evacuation, flood fighting, and recovery.  Today, these would be 
described as response phase and short-term recovery phases in the overall system of response to 
emergency.   Fourth then was the focus on relief (White, 1945, 196-203) measures such as federal 
grants and loans to the affected population. According to White (1945, 203) relief subsidies 
actually tended to enable flood problems rather than mitigate them.   
White (1945, 205-209) concluded that there were “four essentials” where prevailing 
public policy fell short in remedying flood problems.  First, policy solutions should take into 
account all possible types of adjustments that can be made to the flood hazard. Second, a cost 
benefit analysis should be conducted and evaluated on a consistent basis; and it should recognize 
costs associated with the best or most appropriate remedial action while also considering benefits 
such as the welfare of the potentially impacted community (White, 1949).  Third, White 
suggested that any mitigation action created should include of all possible adjustments or 
readjustments that factor into successfully occupying a structure within the floodplain (White, 
1949). Therefore, all possible retrofits must accompany the structure. Fourth, White (1949) 
suggested that any mitigation action taken should be favorable to the types of land occupancy that 
“contributes to effective use of floodplain resources”.  In other words, only those needed to be in 
the floodplain should be there.  
White summarized his findings by saying (1945, 209) that, of the eight possible 
adjustments theorized in terms of mitigation, all remedies with exception to land use management 
and an insurance program favored preservation of the status quo or enabled the flood problem to 
continue. While White’s (1945) assertion was not an explicit indictment of the growth machine, it 




Moral implications in policy and planning 
David Moss (1999) studied the transformation of disaster relief policy and the problem of 
taking federal disaster relief for granted.  Studying the historical narrative of flooding and flood 
policy, the public domain becomes increasingly sympathetic to the expansion of federal disaster 
relief.  By the 1960’s, Moss (1999, 321) described this federal policy expansion as being one of 
“an intricate patchwork of disparate programs and commitments”.  Charles Perrow (2007, 45) 
elaborates by saying this “taking for granted” of federal aid is actually “the cause” rather than 
“the consequence of increased funding”.  Perrow (2007, 46) indicts business and local 
government for realizing the opportunity to make profits from disasters. As previously addressed, 
local government and business are primary growth machine actors. Perrow (2007; see also Berke 
and Campanella, 2006) and other hazard researchers allude to the growth machine dynamic by 
explaining how federal relief costs are spread to all taxpayers for the concentrated losses of a few.  
This type of policy prescription will only work when there is reasonable responsibility placed on 
those individuals and businesses receiving such subsidies to retrofit structures, sufficiently insure 
property, and limit their presence in flood prone areas.  If federal policy does not effectively 
motivate businesses and individuals to take personal responsibility to reduce flood costs, the 
result is a “moral hazard” (Klein and Zellmer, 2014; Perrow, 2007; Berke and Campanella, 2006; 
Moss, 1999).   
The discussion of growth machine dynamics throughout this research points to another 
term and outcome that is somewhat similar to a moral hazard but is slightly distinguished.  A 
moral inversion can be defined as behavior or practice we might mistakenly consider as being 
good and correct action but in actuality it is very bad (Adams and Balfour, 2014). The problem of 
a moral inversion is that it creates what Adams and Balfour (2014, 4) refer to as evil, and more 
specifically, as “administrative evil” were the purpose, conditions, and actions resulting in these 
outcomes are masked and difficult to perceive as potentially wrong and harmful. Those often 




constituents.  Much like a moral hazard, a moral inversion results through growth machine culture 
and processes result in concentrating the benefit to a few and spreading the risk among the 
community or population.  Growth machine culture or “status quo” generates the false belief that 
through progress and advances in engineering and technology, we can and should build in hazard 
risk areas.  As Freudenburg et al. (2009, 10) point out, “the problem is that, like some twisted 
variation of the Peter Principle, the growth machine can move relentlessly ahead until it reaches 
its own level of incompetence” and rarely do the “key” actors concern themselves with what 
these limitations might be.   
Adams and Balfour (2014) elude to this problem as they discuss how a modern culture of 
technical rationality has upended the policy-making process.  Basically, through a technical 
rationality culture, highly specialized and compartmentalized experts see themselves as ethical 
because they are professional rather than vice versa.  Adams and Balfour (2014, 37) argue that 
ethics education has been marginalized and we face a problem of “moral vacuity” where 
professionals are over confident in their objectivity and overly reliant on the scientific mindset to 
solve social problems. Technical rationality culture also cultivates a sense of compliance from 
subordinates and the general population (Adams and Balfour, 2014, 38) as they grant 
unconditional regard for professionals; meanwhile support for advocacy and reform has devolved 
so there are fewer challenges to professional expertise.   
Basically, the population views growth machine actors as well-meaning community 
leaders focused on progress and economic prosperity while holding the community’s best interest 
in mind. (Freudenburg et al., 2009).  The population does not realize the ways in which disaster is 
socially constructed through policies and practices influenced by the growth machine dynamic.  
Policy changes and challenges 
Within five years of implementation, NFIA 1968 went through several revisions as 
Congress realized that flood losses continued to increase and development continued to grow 




control some of the loss by requiring all mortgage loans and federally insured loans to be 
contingent on purchasing national flood insurance policies for the property.    
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was the strongest attempt to date to 
reel in the problems associated with the NFIP and provide financial stability to the program.  
Primarily this legislation brought policy holders to bear the actual cost of flooding and raised 
premiums accordingly.  Some of the main features of Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform 
Act (2012) included removing businesses and secondary homes from coverage.  Basically, those 
wishing to do business and maintain secondary residences in the floodplain should bear their own 
costs.  Those primary residences in the floodplain would face higher premiums and those 
previously grandfathered into the NFIP would no longer receive a subsidized premium.  Upon 
sale of these homes, the new buyer would take on the property at current costs rather than the 
grandfathered rates.  However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (2012), there was such an 
outcry against the premium increases that the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 
2014 has postponed these policy premium increases until further notice.  Again, relief was 
politically motivated and politicians from flood prone areas fought premium increases under the 
Biggert-Waters Federal Insurance Reform Act (2012).  
The problem of premium increases was only the tip of the iceberg following the disaster 
of Hurricane Sandy. A secondary disaster evolved from systemic issues within the now defective 
and ineffective NFIP.  The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established that the most 
feasible way for the NFIP to be carried out was to establish a public-private partnership with the 
private insurance industry to implement the program (42 U.S. Code § 4001).  As evidenced in 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012, there are serious flaws in 
this program and its effectiveness.  In fact, after Hurricane Sandy, the problems with the NFIP 
came to a head with charges of fraud and wide-spread calls for reform (Sullivan, 2016). 
In June 2015, Brad Keiserman, FEMA Deputy Associate Administrator for the NFIP, 




survivors through the public-private partnership (Keiserman, 2015).  Keiserman (2015) claimed 
that the 1983 Write Your Own (WYO) Program established between FEMA and the private 
insurance industry to allow insurance companies to write and service NFIP policies in their own 
name had gone awry.  The WYO was allowing insurance companies to charge the federal 
government a fee of 33 percent on every premium dollar paid into the program (FEMA, 2015).  
In addition, these insurance companies also receive fees for settling claims post-disaster thus 
profiting even further (Sullivan, 2016).  Insurance profiting is a peculiar outcome that defies 
traditional outcomes; usually insurance companies lose money due to payouts after a disaster 
event.  
Keiserman (2015) argued that there was no possible way the federal government was 
staffed to provide effective oversight over the WYO and the approximately 82 private insurance 
companies that managed nearly 6 million flood policies purchased under the NFIP.  As a result, 
the autonomy given to these insurance agencies prevented the NFIP from determining systemic 
problems and evaluating program effectiveness (Keiserman, 2015).  Basically, the NFIP allowed 
the private insurance industry to operate with a blank check and no oversight.  According to 
Sullivan (2016), in addition to built-in profits from premiums, handling fees, appraisal fees and 
other expenses, the private insurance companies were making $3.25 million annually from 
flooding disasters (a 29 percent profit margin).  Private insurers netted profits of approximately 
$400 million from Hurricane Sandy.  In addition to the $9.3 billion paid out in claims for 
Hurricane Sandy, Keiserman (2015) stated that the NFIP was projected to spend over $1.45 
million in legal fees defending the insurance companies while they attempt to settle claimant 
court cases that were originally fraudulently denied.   Hurricane Sandy victims with NFIP 
insurance thus have suffered the expense of being out of their homes for four years and paid 
enormous amounts in legal fees to fight the NFIP to pay the full amount they are owed from their 
flood policy. 




Informed by Meliti (1999) and White (1945) in terms of the idea of comprehensive 
planning, this study focuses on the Mississippi River Region, a region notorious with flood 
problems and the primary area of reference from which flood policy has developed. The focus of 
this study is at a regional level rather than an effort to duplicate White’s (1945) national level 
analysis. Conducting a regional analysis is perhaps a better assessment because it is does bring 
issues of specificity into focus that White (1945) attempted to avoid.  The problem in this study, 
however, is determining how large this region should be. Should it include only the lower 
Mississippi area or the entire river and its tributaries?  White (1945) indicated in his findings that 
the lower Mississippi region was one of the two largest regions (urban northeast is the other) 
identified with high flood costs and this made studying the Mississippi River region even more 
attractive.  Ultimately it was decided that the scope of this study would include both the upper 
and lower Mississippi in order to examine upper and lower regional differences.  Secondly, a 
regional study of this size would be more manageable than a national study given the various and 
extensive amount of data that would be required.    
White’s (1945) analysis also fell short in that all he could measure was federal 
appropriations for structural mitigation against flood loss data (1902-1941) collected haphazardly 
by the National Weather Bureau and through federal appropriations data.  The Weather Bureau 
lacked consistency in methods to gather flood loss data as there were often redundancies in 
counts and estimations via mailed surveys to local government, newspapers, and shared 
information between agencies (White, 1945).  Likewise, as in this study, White (1945) struggled 
with not being able to differentiate between types of floods such as river, coastal, and flash 
flooding.  The flood data for this study did not differentiate between flash flooding and river 
flooding but does not include any coastal flooding such as that occurring during Hurricane 
Katrina.  The flood frequency and loss data used in this study was retrieved from a database 




the United States (SHELDUS).  Their latest edition actually does distinguish between flash and 
river flooding but it was not available at the time of this analysis.   
Another opportunity that allows for a more specified focus than that  afforded to White in 
1945 is the implementation of local planning tools such as the All-Hazard Mitigation Plan 
mandated via the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000).   DMA 2000 required states and 
counties to have hazard mitigation plans in effect in order to be eligible for post-disaster Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program funds, Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM), or Flood Mitigation 
Assistance (FMA).  Furthermore it tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
to provide guidelines for state and local plans and holds the state responsible for oversight and 
coordination of local plans.    
In order to make determinations about whether we are closer to effective comprehensive 
mitigation planning, a key indicator would be to examine these state and local hazard mitigation 
plans mandated by the federal government since 2000.  While the mandate helped steer more 
state and local governments into participating in mitigation planning, it does not necessarily mean 
mandated plans are going to bring about effective comprehensive planning.  A content analysis of 
these mitigation plans should tell us a great deal about how prepared we are to manage for 
flooding and what needs to be done.   
If the local level is being empowered and the federal government has created an effective 
planning tool, then this regional analysis of Mississippi River Region should shed some light on 
it. It should also support FEMA (2014) findings in the Nationwide Survey of Local Officials 
(NSLO) conducted annually by FEMA (see http://www.fema.gov/protecting-our-
communities/local-official-survey-findings-flood-risk).  Unfortunately, FEMA did not follow 
through with this annual survey beyond 2014 and there is only one year for comparison. 
Nonetheless, it does serve to compare a national study to this regional analysis.   
The FEMA NSLO report (2014) provided a mixed analysis of mitigation effectiveness 




they have a flooding risk within their community (FEMA, 2014). Findings suggest that local 
officials are very aware of their risk factors and thus can mitigate effectively.  However, less than 
one in ten of these officials actually believe that their community is truly at risk for flooding 
(FEMA, 2014).  Most local officials reported taking some sort of flood mitigation action 
regardless of whether they acknowledge there was a flooding risk within their community or not 
(FEMA, 2014).  Most concerning is the fact that one in three communities still did not have a 
FEMA approved mitigation plan in place (FEMA, 2014).  Finally, when it came to determining 
what they felt were the five most important mitigation needs addressed for their community they 
reported (FEMA, 2014) building drainage improvements (52 percent); elevation (44 percent); 
erosion control (41 percent); acquisition (31 percent); and floodproofing (26 percent).  According 
to FEMA (2014) the most sought after mitigation needs from the federal government are funding 
(73 percent); technical expertise (43 percent); flood maps (29 percent); planning assistance (26 
percent); and outreach materials (24 percent).   
After review of state and local mitigation plans, it appears that these planning tools can 
provide insight to principles, processes, choices, and priorities at the local level. These actions 
can be categorized into both structural and non-structural items that local governments feel are 
needed in order to adequately mitigate for flooding.  Based on a content analysis of the action 
items, these plans can inform the research as to whether or not FEMA NSLO (2014) effectively 
describes the need for flooding mitigation.  Secondly, mitigation plan analysis would answer 
questions that White (1945) could not—does a regional analysis of flood mitigation provide a 
better understanding of what is needed for effective comprehensive mitigation?  This research can 
also shed light on what White (1945) suspected regarding mitigation measures favoring the 
“preservation of the status quo”.  Has the status quo changed? If so then the priorities would not 
be focused on the same things identified by White (1945):  land adjusting, structural fixes, 




still primarily the same as it was in 1940, then this should provide support for the hypothesis that 
local growth machine dynamics confound the effectiveness of a centralized federal flood system.   
Mileti (1999, 144,145) says that the nation’s culture shapes the “selection of loss 
reduction strategies” and the focus is primarily on individual preparedness and not at the 
neighborhood or community level.  The problem of “sanctity of private property” and “right to 
accumulate profits” creates a barrier to the government implementing the proper mitigation 
initiatives (Mileti, 1999, 145).   The problem drills down to local government and what local 
government wants to acknowledge and address.  Mileti (1999, 136) says basically the processes 
that determine what local officials will do is based on who will gain or lose and overall the 
majority of evidence points to people being unaware or underestimating vulnerability and  
overestimating their ability to cope with a disaster impact.  Basically mitigation decision-making 
is left to local and state discretion and their attention towards mitigation varies quite a bit. Thus 
uneven mitigation will likely be the biggest danger of all. As Mileti (1999) stated previously, the 
system and subsystems have strong interactions to contend with and underestimation, 
overestimation or lack of awareness can send the entire system into failure-- cascading failures.  
What Mileti (1999) inadvertently acknowledged is that political influence from growth machine 
dynamics is the root of these uneven mitigation directives at the local level.  Therefore, systems 
level focus does not fully account for barriers to effective mitigation.   
Analyzing mitigation plans and the demographic information of the region can show 
where there are potential risks that are either not being addressed due to lack of awareness, 
lacking risk methodology or possibly lack of political feasibility.  According to Mileti (1999, 102) 
data needs, and specifically comprehensive data needs regarding the built and social environment, 
are needed in order to improve mitigation.  
Evaluating hazard mitigation planning 
In the 1981, the Reagan administration reorganized FEMA and through top secret 




established a strong relationship with the Department of Defense (Perrow, 2007).  FEMA’s focus 
shifted from natural hazard preparedness to developing classified technology networks with the 
military and building a nuclear war defense system (Perrow, 2007). The result was that state and 
local agencies suffered a disconnect from the federal government as top secret planning continued 
to expand within the federal level but state and local emergency management were denied access 
to much of the communication networks and technology being developed alongside the military 
(Perrow, 2007).   The shift towards homeland security planning resulted in a roll back on natural 
hazard mitigation planning (Perrow, 2007).  The Integrated Emergency Management System 
(IEMS) was developed as a streamlined approach to natural hazard mitigation planning focused 
on commonalities of response to most hazards or “all-hazards mitigation planning” (McLoughlin, 
1985).  This shift in mitigation planning to an all-hazards approach is the prevailing design for 
hazard mitigation. Given that this focus has been predominant for many years now, does the 
DMA 2000 initiative give generously enough to natural hazard mitigation?  Secondly, does the 
commonalities and response focus limit the effectiveness of these plans?  Third, does growth 
machine dynamics limit the effectiveness of these plans?  
Lindell and Perry (2007) point out that all-hazards mitigation planning approach allows 
for a more effective and efficient approach to utilizing resources when emergency managers can 
identify to what degree each hazard will draw upon these resources.  Caruson and MacManus 
(2011) claim that lack of empirical research on the effectiveness of an all-hazards approach was 
problematic.  They wanted to determine if “perceived commonalities” among local officials were 
congruent with the “broader theory that where commonality is an organizing principle, 
emergency management services improve” (Caruson and MacManus, 2011, 348).  What they 
found was that there are commonalities in terms of basic needs such as power, water, 
transportation, communication health care, etc. but there are differences between metropolitan 
and rural communities in terms of vulnerabilities to infrastructure and assets (Caruson and 




concentrated, have more commonalities and better access to resources such as training and 
funding but, at the same time, they have greater pressure to utilize resources more efficiently 
(Caruson and MacManus, 2011).  Caruson and MacManus (2011, 366) argue that more work 
needs to be done to determine whether commonality theory actually does save money and 
produce better results where there is a “high degree of convergence”.   
Berke and Campanella (2006) argue that barriers to effective local mitigation planning 
can be blamed on both the federal and state government.  The state government does not mandate 
the development of local comprehensive plans and the federal government does not provide 
enough support for local planning (Berke and Campanella, 2006).   
Covington and Simpson (working paper, 2006) provided a comprehensive overview of all 
disaster literature focused on disaster preparedness and developed four main categories regarding 
the role of disaster planning for communities and agencies: 1) fundamental features of disaster 
preparedness; 2) disaster preparedness metrics; 3) policy issues; and 4) recommendations.  They 
argue that there are two phases of planning that must be achieved (development and 
implementation) in order to create a comprehensive preparedness measure (Covington and 
Simpson, 2006). However, in order to accomplish this, consistency and accuracy in data 
collection must be determined; objective indicators must be agreed upon by both researchers and 
practitioners; and an agreed upon model design needs to be developed and tested (Covington and 
Simpson, 2006).  Their focus is strictly on the planning tool itself, and not necessarily based on 
collaboration and competition between policy actors that influence this process.   
The federal Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000 was an attempt to shift mitigation 
planning towards a more comprehensive design by integrating various projects, programs, and 
regulatory initiatives (Godschalk et al., 1999; Burby et al., 1999).  These enhancements to the 
original 1988 Stafford Act was an attempt to bring about greater compliance at the state and local 
level thus attempting to reign in some of the growth machine politics. In order to be eligible for 




or Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) there must be hazard mitigation plans in place at the state 
and local level (Berke et al., 2009, 5, 26).   Furthermore, in the FEMA guidelines for state plans, 
the state is responsible for oversight and coordination of local plans (Berke et al., 2009, 26).   
Since hazard mitigation planning was mandated in 2000, the literature on plan quality has 
started to expand.  It seems to originate in the mid 1990s with Berke and French (1994) and 
Burby and May (1997) addressing what should be three basic core components—facts, goals, and 
their mandates.  Since 1999, urban/regional planning scholars have begun to address more in 
terms of quality of the plans such as organization of the plan (Berke, 1999), plan principles 
(Berke, 1999), and plan evaluation and monitoring (Berke et al., 1999; Godschalk et al., 1999; 
Norton, 2005).  Others have examined consistency within the plan (Norton, 2005) and linking 
hazard mitigation plans to other strategic planning mechanisms in place (Brody et al., 2003; 
Brody et al. 2004; Termorshizen, 2007).   
To date, the most extensive work on all-hazard mitigation plan quality has been Berke et 
al.’s (2009) assessment tool for measuring state hazard mitigation plans and Lyles et al.’s (2012) 
focus on developing an assessment for local mitigation plans.  The Lyles et al. (2012) evaluation 
method is directed towards evaluating coastal jurisdictions but claim that core principles can be 
applied across planning domains.  They use two conceptual dimensions:  direction setting and 
action-oriented principles (Lyles et al., 2012, 3).  Direction setting principles involve establishing 
a clear plan direction such as developing: 1) facts regarding local conditions and needs; 2) goals; 
and 3) actions and supportive policies to ensure planning goals are achieved (Lyles et al., 2012).  
Action oriented principles involve addressing the four main components of the plan:  1) 
stakeholders participation or all people and agencies impacted; 2) inter-organizational 
coordination; 3) implementation; and 4) monitoring and evaluation (Lyles et al., 2012).  In all, 
seven principles are evaluated: facts, goals, policies, participation, inter-agency coordination, 




FEMA “Blue Book” guidelines categorized into four main sections: planning; risk evaluation; 
mitigation strategies; and plan maintenance (FEMA, 2008).   
Lyles et al. (2012, 9) found that local hazard mitigation plan quality was “moderate to 
weak overall” and there is wide variability “across the principles of plan quality” and the states 
involved in the study sample.  Their findings support those found by other researchers who have 
also mitigation plans in other areas (Kang et al., 2010; Berke and Godschalk, 2009). Given this 
finding, it could be that plan quality and plan enforcement continue to be hampered by the growth 
machine dynamics and influence by those political actors on the planning process.  
Other shortcomings in mitigation planning    
Cutter et al. (2000) argue that the FEMA guidelines for risk assessment falls short in 
defining hazard vulnerability by only looking at the presence or absence of a natural hazard risk. 
The best tool available for determining social vulnerability is the Social Vulnerability Index 
(SoVI) created by Cutter et al. (2003) and through several revisions has developed into a measure 
that examines 30 socioeconomic variables collected from five year estimates in the American 
Community Survey and the 2010 Census that contribute to social vulnerability.  Interestingly, 
seven significant components of this measure account for 72 percent of variance in the data: race, 
class, wealth, elderly, Hispanic, Native American, special needs, and service industry 
employment (Cutter et al., 2010).  This county level data was created using a principle 
components analysis which reduces the data into statistically significant components for 
comparison nationwide.  The SoVI 2006-10 (Cutter et al., 2013) shows three levels of risk rating 
based using three quartiles where high and low risk is established as two standard deviations from 
the mean (medium risk).   
While the SoVI 2006-10 (Cutter et al., 2013) could be used by local planners for an 
improved risk analysis, it does not fall within FEMA requirements.  Further, there are limitations 




level.  County level data can obscure true social characteristics in or near the floodplain when the 
overall county level demographics are vastly unequal.   
Another more recently developed indicator by Cutter et al. (2010) is called the Disaster 
Resilience Index (DRI) which is a composite score of social, economic, institutional, 
infrastructure, and community capacities. Overall, there are 36 variables addressing the potential 
resilience of each community.  However, there are assumptions within these variables such as 
“percent population covered by a recent hazard mitigation plan” that a positive rating could 
contribute to better resiliency.  The DRI (Cutter et al., 2010, 7) does not consider the quality of 
the mitigation plan, the variables within the subcomponent of “institutional” such as “percent of 
population covered by Citizen Corps programs” or the variable “percent population participating 
in CRS for flood” fall within the scope of an effective mitigation plan.  A comprehensive 
evaluation of effective mitigation, reduced vulnerability, or increased resiliency may not be 
assessed well by this measure especially if the mitigation planning process done at the local level 
is not robust in the first place.   
The Cutter et al. (2010) study also included three community case studies to support the 
significant of the DRI using the metropolitan area of Memphis, Tennessee for one.  The economic 
and infrastructural resilience of Shelby County was high. Cutter et al. (2010, 17) did point out 
that some limitations to the DRI are that national data sources were often out of date and 
inadequate to establish true local characteristics. A review of the Shelby County mitigation plan 
(including Memphis) indicates that there is considerable need for infrastructure improvement for 
effective flood control.  Therefore, if we overlay the region of focus (Mississippi River Region) 
with indices such as the SoVI or DRI, we still would not have an adequate understanding or 
comprehensive analysis of flood hazard mitigation needs.  We might even be led to believe an 
area is less vulnerable than it actually is.  
When considering the economic resilience of a community as being a positive in 




economic characteristics, does not identify the diversity of those characteristics, or does not 
include action items within the mitigation plan that address mitigating the private sector, it does 
not necessarily establish that there is truly economic resilience.  Mitigation planning needs to 
include an analysis of private sector readiness and create action items that promote public-private 
partnerships in preparedness and private sector outreach initiatives.  The economic characteristics 
and specifically addressing the private sector in mitigation planning is one area where a 
subsystem failure could potentially be devastating.  Looking within the action items of local 
hazard mitigation plans and determining how many action items address the private sector would 
indicate whether the economic sector is being considered an integral part of mitigation planning.   
This study will also establish whether or not local hazard mitigation plans are actively engaging 
in mitigating the private sector.  Absence of this element would be suggestive of growth machine 
dynamics in play in that these elites are ignoring or refusing to participate in the planning process.   
This study considers the institutional subcomponent in the DRI (Cutter et al., 2010) in 
terms of variables such as the extent the community participates in the Community Rating System 
(CRS) and promotes the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  These programs were based 
on the recommendations of Gilbert F. White (1945) and legislated into existence through the 
NFIA (1968) as part of the non-structural mitigation actions that were necessary to reduce flood 
costs.  The primary means of cultivating these programs is through local government and local 
planning initiatives which would include community engagement activities and other community 
actions.  Local hazard mitigation plans should provide clues as to whether there is community 
involvement in these programs and the extent to their effectiveness.  Also community 
participation in the CRS and NFIP can be determined based on data obtained from FEMA 
databases accounting for flood insurance policies and CRS participation.  If the community does 
not seem to be actively participating in these mandates and planning processes, then it seems 










This study seeks to comprehensively examine the mitigation efforts at the federal, state, 
and local level to look at the true characteristics of flood mitigation planning, evidence of policy 
and programs in action or lack of, and describe the social demographics at the census tract level 
where the population is most at risk in the county.  Along with pointing out persistent problems in 
floodplain management, this research attempts to answer the question:  Is there evidence that 
growth machine dynamics continue to render the federal flood control system ineffective? 
Secondly, despite implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation does the cost of 
flooding continue to rise? 
This research begins with the following hypotheses:  
H1:  As the number of flood mitigation actions increased due to the implementation of federal 
mitigation plan mandates, the costs associated with flooding decreased. 
H2:  Counties that have followed the federal mandate to implement all-hazard mitigation plans  
have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without all-hazard mitigation 
plans.   
H3:  Counties with a greater number of non-structural mitigation actions associated with the 
NFIP have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without non-structural 
actions associated with the NFIP.  
H4:  Counties with a greater number of non-structural mitigation actions associated with 
repetitive loss reduction have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without 




H5:  Counties that participate in the non-structural mitigation CRS initiative have experienced a 
greater reduction in flood costs than counties who do not participate in the CRS initiative.  
H6:  Counties whose hazard mitigation plans have a higher the ratio of flood mitigation actions 
relative to other hazard mitigation actions have lowered damage costs related to flooding.   . 
H7:  Populations near or within the floodplain have higher concentrations of social vulnerabilities 
than those populations outside the floodplain.   
In addition to exploring these hypotheses that are focused on the effectiveness of these 
mitigation mandates, some exploratory research was done to examine other factors that might 
contribute to the flooding problem.  Exploratory efforts specifically focused on some of the social 
characteristics that may be present within the region that are correlated to inequality and those 
populations who have less political power. These selected social characteristics may be 
confounding any attempts to effectively mitigate the region against disastrous flooding and may 
create greater vulnerabilities with their presence.  In addition, is it possible that these 
characteristics could be concealed in a way that prevents effective mitigation?  Furthermore, if 
there is evidence that these social characteristics that create greater vulnerabilities are present, 
then it lends to evidence that growth machine dynamics are at the root of these conditions.   
A comprehensive search for all-hazard mitigation plans from ten states and 108 counties 
bordering the Mississippi River was conducted from August 15, 2013 to April 15, 2014 by online 
searches in local government webpages, calls, and emails to state and local emergency 
management agencies.  Altogether, ten state plans and 62 county or local multi-jurisdictional 
plans were retrieved for this study.  Even though all-hazard mitigation plans were mandated in the 
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 in order to receive federal funding for post disaster mitigation, 
not all counties have managed to create mitigation plans or meet the required updating process 
within five years.  For the most part, there have been few changes in these plans during updates.  
Therefore, using outdated plans still provides sufficient information regarding mitigation actions.  




though it may be outdated (usually as a result of lack of available funding), the mitigation plan 
was included in this analysis.  Arkansas is the only state in which there were no county plans 
available.  A comprehensive list of states and their counties within the study and their ratio of 
flood mitigation actions to overall mitigation actions expressed as a percent is provided in the 
appendix (Figure 4.1 – 4.11).  
Content analysis was used to evaluate mitigation actions in the mitigation strategy section 
of each all-hazard mitigation plan.  Each mitigation action was first evaluated to determine 
whether the action was specifically aimed at flood mitigation.  The total number of mitigation 
actions overall and flood mitigation actions specifically to determine the ratio of flood mitigation 
items to others.  Two separate master lists of mitigation actions were made—one for the state 
plans and one for counties/local level plans.  Mitigation actions were then categorized by 
structural and non-structural actions.  Structural actions include building flood walls, levees, 
widening or enlarging culverts, raising roads, adjusting bridge ramps, and similar actions that 
involved construction activities or adjusting the natural landscape.  Non-structural actions are 
actions that are achieved through administrative processes and include such examples as technical 
support and education and outreach.  
Non-structural actions were categorized by similar function.  A total of 18 types of non-
structural actions were identified (Figure 4.12) and categories (Figure 4.13).  Non-structural and 
structural action items were then calculated and compared in order to make determinations about 
mitigation needs at local, state, and regional levels. This data will also be compared to the NSLO 
findings reported by FEMA in 2014. 
FEMA has generated a database called Flood Insurance Policies and Community Rating 
System Participation. This database provides a list of counties and cities within each state that 
participate in the CRS program, the class rating of that community, and the number of National 
Flood Insurance policies in effect for that county or community.  There is also a state percentage 




total communities available for participation.  This data will be gleaned to determine county or 
community level of participation in non-structural mitigation programs and compared to the 
jurisdiction repetitive losses information provided within the local hazard mitigation plans.  
The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database of the United States (SHELDUS) 
Version 10.0 launched as of August 2012 was used to determine flooding frequency and property 
damage costs for a period of 50 years for each of the 108 counties in the study.  It was determined 
that the best possible way to manage and present this data would be by ten year period (1960-69, 
1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-10).  This data was used to determine flood frequency and 
property damage costs to make determinations about the impact of historical policy changes and 
mandates for mitigation. This database provides data for all natural hazard disaster declarations 
within the county.  Therefore, the number of disaster types will help inform the research as to 
how much flood hazard is involved in each area in comparison to other natural hazard risks.  
Further analysis included a comparison of flood frequency and costs in counties with and without 
mitigation plans in attempt to determine if planning mandates have impacted the cost or 
frequency of flooding and whether there are local, state or regional differences in flood trends.  
Given the disparity of these preliminary results, it was difficult to establish that 
mitigation planning was having an impact on flood costs.  One thought was to return to the raw 
data and break out the flood costs by each year, rather than by decade, and then run several 
multiple regression discontinuity models to see if any patterns would emerge.   
In the first regression discontinuity model (Model 1), the dependent variable was 
established as “allcountyyes” which is the reported property damage cost gleaned from 
SHELDUS  from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all counties 
having a mitigation plan (n = 62).  The variable “timeline” is coded numerically as one through 
thirty-one (1 - 31). The “time-plan” independent variable indicates the two periods in time—zero 
(0) for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 - 1999) and one (1) for the years in 




“timeafterplan” was created with a value of zero (0) for all time prior to the mitigation planning 
mandate and the numbers one (1) through eleven (11) for the period 2000 – 2010.   
The second regression discontinuity model (Model 2) is much similar to the first model 
but in this analysis, the focus is all counties without a mitigation plan (n = 46).  The dependent 
variable “allcountiesno” is the reported property damage cost using SHELDUS data for each 
county without a mitigation plan for the same time period as the first model.  The “timeline” and 
“timeafterplan” variables are the same as the first model.  The “time-plan” variable indicates the 
two periods in time—zero (0) for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) 
and one (1) for the years in which these counties were mandated to have a plan in place although 
they do not.  
The third (Model 3) and fourth (Model 4) regression continuity models were drafted to 
explore in greater detail if there were any regional differences between the upper and lower 
Mississippi River counties. Using the same variables as the first model, plan data from all 
counties above the confluence of the Ohio River and Mississippi River were used in the third 
model—Upper Mississippi (Plan-Yes) with the only difference being that the dependent variable 
is labeled “cost”.  The fourth model is comprised of all counties with plans below the confluence 
of the Ohio River and Mississippi River.  
Several statistical analysis methods were considered for exploring factors discussed in  
this study such as the SoVI; CRS classification and participation; and mitigation actions within 
the mitigation plans to make determinations about their influence on flood costs.  Due to the 
small sample size and variability of flooding, it was not possible to attempt a multivariate or 
factor analysis of these variables.  Even if one of these factors show significance in the years 
following the 2000 mandate, the variability of flooding by year and when plans were 
implemented would significantly limit the usefulness of these determinations. Therefore, the most 
useful way to evaluate this data is merely to quantify and compare their prevalence in mitigation 




mitigation needs; and to compare flood mitigation needs in this region to the needs reported by 
local officials in the from the FEMA national survey.  
The 2010 U.S. Census and 2012 American Community Survey (5 year estimates) were 
used to collect social and housing characteristics on populations within the 108 counties and 
census tracts bordering the Mississippi River.  Arc GIS software was used in order to build maps 
to visually compare differences between the variables at the county and census tract level to 
determine if there are pockets of vulnerabilities buffering the river that would not otherwise be 
observed using county level data. This data can be used to contrast and compare to vulnerability 
indicators such as the SoVI (Cutter et al, 2012) and to advance the argument that mitigation 
planning should include a survey of social vulnerabilities in the risk assessment.  The variables 
selected for use in this section of the study were those that could be obtained at both the county 
and census tract level.  These eight variables are poverty (all races), white poverty, black poverty, 
renter versus owner occupied housing, median income, housing built before 1969, elderly 











Mitigation Planning Impact on Flood Costs 
Multiple regression discontinuity models were used to determine the accuracy of the 
independent variables at predicting flood costs. Model 1 (Figure 5.1) in this analysis is focused 
specifically on counties with mitigation plans and their influence on flooding costs.  The 
dependent variable was established as [allcountyyes] which is the reported property damage cost 
gleaned from SHELDUS from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all 
counties having a mitigation plan [n = 62].  The independent variables are first-- the consecutive 
years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second-- plan mandate 
years [Time-Plan] with zero [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 
1999) and one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third-- time as a 
variable [TimeAfterPlan] with a value of zero [0] for time prior to the mandate and then 
numbered consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010).  Regression results indicate 
that the overall model does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2  = .015, R_adj^2  = -.095, F 
(3, 27) = 1.36, p ≤ .938.   
Model 2 (Figure 5.2) is all counties without a mitigation plan [n = 46].  This dependent 
variable is established as [allcountiesno] again using property damage cost from SHELDUS data 
for each county in the same period.  The independent variables are, again, first—the consecutive 
years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second—plan mandate 
years [Time-Plan] with [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and 
one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third—time as a variable 




consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010).  Regression results indicate that this 
overall model is also does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2 = .019, R_adj^2= -.090, F (3, 
27) = .171, p ≤ .915.  
 However, the coefficients table for Model 1 (Table 5.1) and Model 2 (Table 5.2), the 
standardized coefficient for “timeafterplan” for counties that have a plan (plan = yes) and in 
Model 2 the coefficient for “timeafterplan” for counties that do not have a plan (plan = no) are 
telling. Both predicted-value curves in the models have similar upwardly slopes.  But looking 
closer at the data, the standardized coefficient for “plan yes” = .187 and “plan no” = .07 suggests 
that the coefficient for “plan yes” is 2.5 times greater than the coefficient for “plan no”.  In terms 
of real dollars, this result suggests that in counties with mitigation plans the cost of flooding 
increased by $3,200,873 each subsequent year from when planning was mandated.  At the same 
time, counties without mitigation plans after the mandate only had an increase of $1,920,725 each 
subsequent year.  We should actually expect this result to be the opposite of what the data 
indicates or at least these results should be similar.  The fact that flooding costs increase at a rate 
2.5 times higher in counties with mitigation plans than counties without mitigation plans would 
lend you to believe that having a mitigation plan actually increased the cost of flooding.   
A plausible explanation for this result is that counties with mitigation plans are reporting 
more flood damage than the counties without plans.  Counties with plans in effect are eligible for 
available FEMA post disaster mitigation funding whereas those counties without plans are not in 
compliance and, therefore, post disaster funding would not be approved.  
In Model 3 (Figure 5.3) and Model 4 (Figure 5.4), the discontinuity design was also used 
to explore if there were differences between counties with plans in the upper and lower regions of 
the Mississippi River.  Both designs have significant challenges due to the limitations of smaller 
sample size and also, potentially, flooding behavior itself.   
Model 3 is a multiple regression discontinuity model exploring the upper region of the 




Cairo, Illinois. Regression was conducted to determine the accuracy of the independent variables 
at predicting flood costs.  The dependent variable was established as [cost] which is the reported 
flood property damage cost gleaned from SHELDUS from each year in the period 1980 through 
2010 (31 total years) for all counties having a mitigation plan in the upper region [n = 37] of the 
Mississippi River.  The independent variables are first-- the consecutive years from 1980 through 
2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second-- plan mandate years [Time-Plan] with 
zero [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and one [1] for the 
years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third-- time as a variable [TimeAfterPlan] 
with a value of zero [0] for time prior to the mandate and then numbered consecutively [1-11] for 
the mandate years (2000 – 2010).  Regression results indicate that the overall model does not 
significantly predict flood cost, R^2  = .011, R_adj^2  =  -.099, F (3, 27) = 1.43, p ≤ .255.  
Model 4 (Figure 5.4) is also a multiple regression discontinuity model exploring the 
lower region of the Mississippi River which is defined as the area below the confluence of the 
Ohio River and Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois. Again, regression was conducted to determine 
the accuracy of the independent variables in predicting flood costs.  The dependent variable was 
established as [cost] which is the reported flood property damage cost gleaned from SHELDUS 
from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all counties having a 
mitigation plan in the lower region [n = 25] of the Mississippi River.  The independent variables 
are first-- the consecutive years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-
31]; second-- plan mandate years [Time-Plan] with zero [0] for the years prior to mandated 
mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs 
(2000 – 2010); third-- time as a variable [TimeAfterPlan] with a value of zero [0] for time prior to 
the mandate and then numbered consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010).  
Regression results indicate that the overall model does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2  = 




It was anticipated that the models again would lack significance given the wide 
variability of flooding and sample size (See Table 5.3, 5.4).  Comparing the slopes of Model 3 
(Figure 5.3) and Model 4 (Figure 5.4), there were some major differences.  The slope in Model 3 
(Figure 5.3) in the mandated period was very similar to the slope in Model 1 (Figure 5.1) which 
suggests that flooding costs increased at the beginning of the mandate period.  However, the slope 
in Model 4 (Figure 5.4) showed a drastic decline in flood cost in the mandated period.  In real 
dollars, counties with plans in the upper region reported a cost increase of $5,195,403 each 
subsequent year (standardized coefficient = .721) whereas the lower region counties with plans 
had a yearly decrease of $1,994,530 (standardized coefficient = -.127).  How might this 
discrepancy be explained?   
Model 3 and Model 4 discontinuity design have significant challenges due to the 
limitations of smaller sample size and also potentially flooding behavior itself.  There were more 
counties identified with plans (n = 37) in the upper region than the lower region (n = 25) in the 
sample.  The upper and lower regions do not necessarily flood at the same time or in the same 
frequency.  For example, in the 1993 Great Flood, the upper region experienced catastrophic 
flooding while the lower river region, in a state of drought, was not impacted at all.  Secondly, 
when flooding occurs in the lower region, it can be due to receiving higher volume flood waters 
from the upper region and/or from the Ohio River. A large volume of water from the Ohio River 
pouring in to the Mississippi River alone will often create flood conditions in the lower region.  
Analysis of Flood Costs and Flood Mitigation  
State Flood Costs  
Using the SHELDUS data provided from 1960 – 2009, the ten states within the sample 
were evaluated for property damage costs due to flooding (Table 5.5). Iowa has the highest flood 
costs over the 50 year period, primarily due to the Great Flood of 1993 ($702 million). The 




($363,770,517).  Kentucky has the lowest cost ($13.8 million) over the 50 year period and 
remains the lowest during the 2000-2009 period which is after mitigation planning was mandated.   
What is alarming here is that after mitigation planning was mandated, over half of these 
states have suffered the majority of their overall 50 year flood costs in the 2000-2009 period.  For 
example, Minnesota has a total 50 year flood cost of $267 million and the losses suffered in 2000-
2009 totaled $242 million or 91 percent of all costs; Tennessee had a 50 year overall loss of $131 
million and $115 million (88 percent) in the 2000-2009 period; Wisconsin has a total 50 year 
flood cost of $183 million and $146 million (80 percent) in the 2000-2009 period; Arkansas’s 50 
year flood cost totaled $23 million and had $15 million (65 percent) flood cost in the 2000-2009 
period.   
Also using SHELDUS data, the total amount of flood disaster declarations could be 
evaluated from the same 50 year period from 1960-2009 (Table 5.6) The total amount of flood 
disaster events increased most dramatically in Wisconsin (50 to 160 disasters), Minnesota (29 to 
89 disasters), Tennessee (51 to 80 disasters), and Mississippi (78 to 125 disasters) from the 1990s 
decade to 2000-09.   
Overall, disaster declarations (Table 5.6) and property damage (Table 5.5) due to 
flooding on the Mississippi River border has continued to increase despite the mitigation planning 
mandates of Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  Two specific exceptions, Iowa and Illinois did see 
a decrease in both disaster declarations and property damage due to flooding in their Mississippi 
River border counties (MRBCs) from the ten year period 1990-1999 prior to the enactment of the 
Disaster Mitigation Act period from 2000 to 2010.  In Missouri, the number of disaster 
declarations in border counties went down but property damage costs increased; meanwhile the 
opposite occurred in Kentucky MRBCs—two more disaster declarations but a decrease in the 
cost of property damage.   




A content analysis of state hazard mitigation plans (Table 5.7) revealed that the majority 
of state plans do have specific flood action items and these action items range from zero to 57 
percent of total action items.  Iowa has the best ratio of flood action items (57 percent) in their 
mitigation plan, followed by Minnesota (56 percent) and Mississippi (43 percent).  Louisiana did 
not have any mitigation actions related to flooding in their state plan.   
State plans were evaluated for structural mitigation (Table 5.8) and non-structural 
mitigation (Table 5.9) action items.  Minnesota and Iowa has evenly distributed the number of 
structural and non-structural flood mitigation actions, while the majority of states focus solely on 
non-structural mitigation.  These results suggest that states perhaps see their role as providing 
administrative and technical support to their counties and not one that focuses heavily on 
structural improvements.  It appears that the state relies heavily on funding non-structural 
mitigation actions either through the general fund, or as part of the administrative role of county 
emergency managers.  
Given that structural mitigation actions are usually high dollar construction projects, it 
appears that the states leaves it up to the local government to barter with the federal government 
for structural project funding.  While this is not stated explicitly in state plans, this assumption is 
made based on looking at county plans to see where they indicate their potential funding 
resources for all mitigation actions.   
It also suggests that states view their role in mitigation planning in terms of broad strokes.  
Mainly, their action strategies lack specificity in terms of non-structural mitigation projects 
outside of promoting awareness of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and Community 
Rating System (CRS).  Every state but Louisiana specifically addressed promoting the NFIP, and 
all states but Wisconsin, Illinois and Louisiana mentioned the CRS in their non-structural 
mitigation action items (Table 5.9).  Also notable is the fact that six out of ten states addressed 
repetitive loss properties in the action items; the four states that did not address repetitive loss are: 




County/Parish Mitigation Planning Overview  
A content analysis was conducted on 64 all hazard mitigation plans from counties 
bordering the Mississippi River.  A total of 2,562 all hazard mitigation items were evaluated and 
1,062 flood mitigation specific action items were identified. These flood mitigation action items 
were then divided into structural action items (509) that accounted for 48 percent of flood 
mitigation actions (Table 5.10) and non-structural action items (553) that accounted for 52 
percent of flood mitigation actions (Table 5.11).   
Structural mitigation need in MRBCs (Table 5.10) was most prevalent in Illinois (236 
items) followed by Louisiana (121 items).  All MRBCs showed the greatest need for road repairs 
and elevation (81 items) followed by widening culverts (75 items), fixing sewers (45 items), 
stabilizing banks with armour (33 items), repair/replace bridges (32 items) and building 
floodwalls and levees (30).  Illinois specifically seemed to skew the data for the most prevalent 
types of structural mitigation.  Specific to Louisiana, there is a critical need for building pumping 
stations (25 items) and retrofitting structures (18 items); and Tennessee specifically needs 
retention ponds and reservoirs (18 items).  The number one issue by State differs somewhat: 
Wisconsin (stabilizing banks); Minnesota (floodwalls and levees); Iowa (fix sewers); Illinois and 
Missouri (road repair/elevation); Kentucky and Mississippi (move buildings out of floodplain); 
Tennessee (retention ponds/reservoirs); Louisiana (pumping stations).   
Non-structural mitigation needs (Table 5.11) are also skewed by the high number of item 
needs in Illinois.  The highest non-structural mitigation need (in all states) is conducting studies 
on the floodplain to determine what can be done to mitigate issues (92 items). In fact, all state 
MRBCs  indicate the top three issues are 1) conducting studies, 2) promoting the NFIP, and 3) 
trying to get maintenance approved (clean debris from waterways and drains). All state MRBCs, 
with exception to Tennessee, show a need to address repetitive loss property issues (ranked fourth 
as an issue) and specifically they indicate this need is to identify these properties in the 




fifth, total 48) with exception to Kentucky and Tennessee (no need reported).  Overall, education 
and outreach ranked sixth with a total of 45 action items related to this initiative (no need: 
Tennessee, Mississippi).  The most concerning items noted during the analysis, because they are 
foundational for mitigation, are the needs  for warning improvements (Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Missouri, and Mississippi); evacuation and shelter planning (Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri) 
and make response plans (Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri).  The CRS program as an MRBC action 
item (total 12) only had relevance in three states (Illinois, Missouri, and Louisiana).  
Content Analysis: State & County Profiles of Flooding Costs and Mitigation Planning  
Minnesota & Counties 
The total amount of flood costs for the fifty year period (1960-2010) in the Minnesota 
counties bordering the Mississippi River was 266.8 million dollars (Table 5.12). The period from 
2000 to 2010 accounts for 91 percent ($242.3 million) of this total.  Flooding in August, 2007 
accounts for 34 percent (over $82 million) of this period and is confined to three counties—
Houston, Winona, and Wabasha. The second worst year for flooding occurred in 2001 ($77.7 
million) accounting for 32 percent of flooding in this decade with 13 counties reported flood 
damages primarily in the months of April and May.   
Comparisons were made between counties with and without mitigation plans to the 
amount of total disaster declarations per decade (Table 5.13) and also total property damage 
(Table 5.12) by decade.  Minnesota had an increased amount of flood disaster in the 13 MRBCs 
from 29 flood disasters in the 1990s to 89 total flood disaster from 2000 to 2010 (Table 5.13).  Of 
the total number of disasters in the 2000 to 2010 period, 46 of these declarations were in counties 
with no mitigation planning. The three counties with the most flooding frequency, flood disaster 
declarations, and highest cost for flooding from 2000 – 2010 are Houston County (21 disaster 
declarations/$54.1 million), Winona County (17/$49 million), and Wabasha County (16/$25.1 
million) accounting for over half (53 percent) of all flood costs within this decade.  Houston and 




without mitigation plans experienced 53 percent (1.28 million) of flooding costs in this 2000 – 
2010 decade.  Counties with plans also reported more flooding disasters and more total flooding 
costs than the total of all previous years combined.  The average flood cost per disaster was 
$74,000 prior to the year 2000, from here costs jumped $2.65 million to an average $2.72 million 
per occurrence.  Counties in specific where it is alarming to see such an increase in the average 
cost per disaster declaration is: Winona County, $2.88 million; Houston, $2.58 million; and 
Wabasha, $1.57 million.   
Looking at the Minnesota state and counties mitigation plans, in the state plan there were 
a total of 18 mitigation actions listed and flood mitigation actions (10) accounting for 56 percent 
of total actions.  This suggests the state does pay ample attention to the problem of flooding. The 
state evenly divided the need for structural (5) and nonstructural mitigation (5). Counties plans 
overall have a lower ratio (15 percent) with 61 flood mitigation actions out of an overall total of 
416 total mitigation actions.  Of these actions, the counties reported 17 structural actions and 44 
nonstructural actions.     
Does the state plan and county plans appear to agree on the priority mitigation needs (see 
Table 5.14)?  Both agree that they need structural mitigation actions such as culverts, levees, 
dams, and floodwalls. The State identified bank stabilization, bridges, and reforesting/greening as 
a need while the counties indicated a strong need for warning systems, elevating structures in the 
floodplain, and flood gates.  The State and counties agree on studies, NFIP, and repetitive loss 
funding being top five priorities. The State cited the community rating system and education and 
outreach being among the top five while the counties asked for technical support and equipment 
funding.  The State seems to be more cognizant of flooding problems and is encouraging counties 
to adapt the Community Rating System, however none of the counties have flood mitigation 
action items related to this federal initiative.  
Counties indicate that they would seek funding for structural projects primarily from the 




nonstructural mitigation actions would be requested from federal, state, and local governments. 
Overall the counties cited 19 actions seeking federal funding sources; eight (8) actions seeking 
state funding sources; and 32 actions seeking local funding.  In some actions, all levels of 
government were listed as possible funding sources.  
Wisconsin & Counties  
In Wisconsin, 80 percent of flooding from the entire 50 year period of study (1960 – 
2010) can be attributed to the 2000 – 2010 period, or after the DMA 2000 mandate for mitigation 
planning began (Table 5.15).  Flooding jumped to $146.1 million from $8.2 million in the 
previous decade (18 times higher). Vernon County ($53.5 million - no mitigation plan) makes up 
37 percent of the total for that period, followed by Crawford County ($35.5 million, 24 percent, 
with mitigation plan) and Grant County ($18.3 million, 13 percent, with mitigation plan).   
Grant and Crawford counties have flooded every year in this last decade except for 2005 
and 2006.  The majority of flooding occurred in 2001 ($25.5 million), 2007 ($73.8 million), and 
2008 ($26.8 million).  Those Mississippi River border counties without plans account for $88.5 
million ($35 million excluding Vernon County) of the total $146 million in property damage 
costs from 2000 to 2010.  Those Wisconsin MRBCs that do not have mitigation plans have 
historically had more property damage losses.  Comparing 1990s to the 2000s period, flood costs 
increased in mitigated river border counties by 96 percent and 93 percent in unmitigated river 
border counties. The cost of flooding (Table 5.15) and number of disaster declarations (Table 
5.16) increased significantly in both mitigated and unmitigated MRBCs in Wisconsin.  The 
average cost per disaster occurrence increased by $1.05 million in the 2000 – 2010 period from 
$40,000 per occurrence to $1.09 million average per disaster declaration.  In Vernon County, the 
average cost per disaster declaration is $6.69 million followed by $1.25 million in Crawford 
County.   
The Wisconsin state plan has 17 flood related mitigation actions (17 percent) of a total 98 




counties have mitigation plans with a total of 32 percent of mitigation actions related to flooding. 
Pepin County, second lowest flooding county, seems to concentrate the greatest efforts towards 
flooding with 21/37 (57 percent) of mitigation actions oriented to flooding (Crawford – 6/23, 26 
percent; Grant -5/40, 13 percent).  
In terms of structural mitigation, counties rank the need for culverts, sewers, bank 
stabilization, road elevation, and bridges repair/reconstructed/constructed as their primary need 
(Table 5.17). They are primarily focused on obtaining funding from the federal government for 
structural projects but also indicate asking at all levels on some actions, including nonstructural 
actions.  They reported seeking funds from the federal government- 16, state government- 8, and 
local government- 34 (Pepin making 28 requests from the local government).   
The State plan ranked the need for education and outreach as its first priority followed by 
technical support, training, NFIP, and repetitive loss funding (Table 5.17).  Counties ranked the 
NFIP as the priority need, followed by maintenance work (cleaning/checking for debris), 
repetitive loss funding, influencing local policy, and education/outreach (Table 5.17).  Neither the 
state nor counties mention the Community Rating System in their mitigation plans.  
Iowa & Counties 
Iowa had a significant decrease (348 to 154) in the amount of flood disasters from the 
period 1990 – 1999 to 2000 – 2010 (Table 5.19).  The property damage flood costs for the Great 
Flood of 1993 alone was reportedly $ 59.9 million or 94 percent of the flooding cost for that 
decade (Table 5.18).   
In the period 2000 – 2010 significant flooding increases have occurred when you remove 
1993 from the equation.  The highest repetitive flooding occurrences and flooding costs can be 
attributed to Allamakee ($12.9 million) and Clayton ($16.6 million) counties.  These counties 
alone account for 50 percent of the flooding in the 2000 – 2010 period.    
Clayton County, the highest flooding county, has a mitigation plan.  This plan has a total 




are to provide increased flood mitigation efforts and enhancements to structural mitigation and 
provide an increased awareness to NFIP participation.  These are very broad actions that would 
be expected within a state plan but more exact in a county plan. 
In Iowa, Mississippi River border counties (MRBCs) without plans accounted for 154 of 
the total 207 flood disasters in the 2000 – 2010 period (Table 5.19).  The total cost of property 
damage due to flooding was 59.8 million dollars which is just slightly higher that the cost of the 
1993 Great Flood (Table 5.18).  Counties with plans averaged $7.56 million per county and those 
without plans $8.55 million in flood costs for the 2000 to 2010 period.  On the surface, it seems to 
indicate that those counties with mitigation plans have less property damage on average.  
Comparing data from 1990 to 1999 and 2000-2010, unmitigated counties have experienced a 
flood cost loss reduction of 91.1 percent whereas mitigated counties have a 61.2 percent average 
loss reduction.  Therefore, it seems that hazard mitigation plans have had little, if any, effect on 
reducing property damage on MRBC’s in Iowa. 
Flood mitigation actions make up 57 percent (29 of 51) of the total mitigation actions in 
the Iowa state plan signaling that the state is very aware of flooding risks. Out of the 10 counties 
in Iowa bordering the Mississippi River only three (Clayton, Jackson, and Scott) have mitigation 
plans.  Since we already know Clayton has only two total flood actions, Jackson (33) and Scott 
(56) primarily provide for the 33 percent ratio (91 of 279) of flood actions.   
Comparing the state plan to county plans in terms of mitigation need (Table 5.20), both 
state and counties identify a structural mitigation need for culverts, levees, dams, and floodwalls 
in the top five mitigation needs.  The state cites a need for road elevation and repair; bank 
stabilization, and bridge improvements such as repair/construction/reconstruction. The counties 
number one primary need reported is improved sewer infrastructure and that they need to 
move/build/rebuild properties that are in the floodplain.   
In terms of nonstructural mitigation, both the state and counties report a need to address 




Community Rating System but there was no mention the CRS in any of the county plans.  Their 
primary nonstructural mitigation action is “policy influence” or to play a role in moving local 
government in terms of shaping land use/regulating the floodplain and other flood related 
subjects.  Their second ranked action was to enforce regulations related to floodplain 
management. Finally, the other highly ranked action for Iowa counties was “maintenance” which 
relates to checking and cleaning debris from various sources flowing into the Mississippi River.   
Iowa counties look to the federal government (five requests) and state government (four 
requests) for funding.  Only Clayton county sought funding (twice) from the local government. 
These counties are very vague about seeking funding overall, but efforts would be concentrated at 
the federal and state level.  It is assumed that they believe the majority of nonstructural actions 
would be funded through their operations budget.  
Illinois & Counties  
In Illinois, there was an overall reduction of property damage costs (Table 5.21) and 
flood disasters (Table 5.22) in both mitigated and non-mitigated counties bordering the 
Mississippi River.  The average loss per MRBC is $2,659,987 overall.  Mitigated MRBCs 
claimed on average $2,806,443 while unmitigated county property damage claimed, on average, 
half that amount ($1,488,335).  Mitigated MRBCs accounted for nearly 45 million of the 47.9 
million in property damage.  The total amount of flood costs in the mandated period (2000 – 
2010) was $47.4 million dropping from $210.2 million in the 1990s.  There are only two counties 
on the Mississippi River border without mitigation plans (Randolph County and Whiteside 
County).  The highest flooding county during the 2000 – 2010 period is Mercer County ($16.4 
million) making up 35 percent of overall flooding and $11 million of this total was reported in 
2003.  The majority of flooding during this period occurred in 2010 ($21.4 million) with $10 
million attributed to Carroll County and $5 million to Mercer.  Overall, the cost of flooding has 





The Illinois state plan has 41 flood mitigation actions (20 percent) out of a total of 207 
mitigation actions. None of the flood mitigation actions are of the structural type (Table 5.23).  
Counties (16 of 18 with plans), on the other hand, have 220 (57 percent) structural mitigation 
actions.  Road elevation and repair ranked first with 44 total actions specifically focused on this 
problem.  Culvert building/widening followed as a close second with 42 total actions.  Bridges 
(23), bank stabilization (22) and sewers (19) are the remaining structural actions within the top 
five.    
Counties had a total of 187 nonstructural items and cited a tremendous need for studies 
(52 total actions) followed by equipment funding (24), maintenance, education/outreach, and 
warning improvements. The State, however, ranks training as the first priority followed by 
repetitive loss funding, technical support, studies, and NFIP (Table 5.23).  The State plan does 
mention promoting the Community Rating System; however there were three action items from 
the counties sample.  These findings suggest that the CRS is very low priority in Illinois.  
Funding sources identified by the counties were primarily geared toward the federal 
government for structural projects and the state for nonstructural actions.  The overall funding 
breakdown was federal (92), state (55), and local (131).  
Missouri & Counties 
Missouri’s MRBCs experienced very little change in total number of flooding disasters 
(Table 5.25) from the 1990s to 2000s but does show a slight decrease overall (124 to 116).  Those 
two counties without hazard mitigation plans (Clark and Lewis County) reported an increase from 
seven to 31 flood disasters and accounted for 27 percent of flood disaster declarations.  Overall 
the two counties that did not have mitigation plans claimed twenty percent of the flooding 
property damage cost (Table 5.24).  Despite a decrease in number of flood events, the cost of 
flooding continues to rise.  Actually it more than doubled ($25.4 million to $66.1 million) from 
the 1990 – 1999 period to 2000 – 2010 decade when mitigation plans were mandated by DMA 




$120,000 to $290,000 per disaster occurrence. The highest flooding counties presently are Marion 
County ($7.3 million, has plan), Clark ($4.4 million, no plan), and Cape Girardeau County ($3.6 
million, has plan).  Most concerning is Marion County previously had an average $192,000 
average per disaster occurrence, and since 2000, this has increased to $3.65 million per 
occurrence. 
The Missouri state plan has six of 17 mitigation actions related to flooding (29 percent). 
None of these flood actions are structural in nature (Table 5.26).  The State is focused on 
repetitive loss issues, NFIP, CRS, education/outreach, and technical support.  Counties actually 
look pretty decent with 14 of 16 having plans and 28 percent of their mitigation actions (136/480) 
are focused on flooding.  The overall total of structural actions reported by counties is 13 while 
nonstructural mitigation actions amounted to 123 total.  In their detailed funding sections, they 
sought government funding as follows: federal- 62, state- 53, local- 90. All structural projects had 
federal funding requests; often the counties noted asking all three levels of government for 
funding.   
Their primary structural action needs are road elevation/repair, reforest/greening, bank 
stabilization, levees, dams, and floodwalls.  They ranked nonstructural actions as 1) influencing 
local flooding policy, 2) enforcing present floodplain regulations, 3) maintenance (check/clean 
debris in local stream outputs), 4) NFIP, 5) environmental considerations.  While the State 
acknowledges the CRS to be a high priority, this action was only mentioned once out of all 123 
nonstructural actions indicating it is not a very popular initiative in the Missouri counties. 
Interestingly, counties made 16 actions related to influencing local policy and 16 actions 
regarding enforcing local regulations. This suggests that counties are highly motivated to impact 
land use and floodplain management while the state does not acknowledge such things at all.   
Kentucky & Counties 
Kentucky appears to have an overall reduction in property damage losses (from $4 




MRBCs (Table 5.27 and Table 5.28).  However, the average cost per disaster declaration has 
gone up $60,000 per occurrence after the 2000 mandate.   Kentucky has the smallest overall 
increase in flood cost average per disaster out of the five states (n = 10) seeing an increase within 
this focus of this study.    MRBCs have the lowest overall property damage rate of all ten states 
examined on the Mississippi River border.  It is the only state within the sample that has active 
mitigation plans in place for all MRBCs.   
The state plan for Kentucky has a total of 24 flood mitigation actions (34 percent) out of 
a total 67 mitigation actions.  The counties have a ratio of 47 percent with 43 flood mitigation 
actions out of 92 actions total.  It is very evident that both the State and counties take flood 
mitigation planning seriously.   
In terms of structural mitigation, Kentucky cited elevating structures as their primary 
need followed by any “not yet identified” water reduction projects (two total).  The counties 
appear to be building their plans from state guidance (Table 5.29) as their second ranked action 
item is the same as the state “not yet identified” water reduction projects.  Their main priority in a 
total of 13 structural actions is to move/rebuild or build out of the floodplain, third is road 
elevation/repair, fourth-- bank stabilization.  The fifth ranked priority for the counties is retention 
ponds and reservoirs. This is interesting because this structural action item is starting to become 
prevalent within the areas above Louisiana and below the confluence of the Ohio River and 
Mississippi River.   
The State plan views nonstructural mitigation as the priority (22 actions) with influence 
policy decisions ranking first; and the followed by repetitive loss funding, NFIP, education and 
outreach, and technical support (Table 5.29).  Counties (25 nonstructural actions) ranked 
promoting the NFIP first, followed by education/outreach, maintenance, repetitive loss funding, 
and exploring environmental considerations.  There was no mention of the Community Rating 




Counties indicated funding sources from the federal government are a priority for 
structural projects supplemented by a local government match.  Overall, the requests to the 
federal government total 17 and local requests total 21.  The counties seek state funding for nine 
nonstructural actions.   
Tennessee & Counties 
Flood costs in Tennessee climbed from $7.5 million in the 1990s to $114.7 million in the 
2000s (Table 5.30).  $80.4 million can be attributed to Shelby County and $20.6 million to Tipton 
County.  Mississippi River border counties with mitigation plans (Shelby, Tipton) had 
considerable more property damage costs and flood disaster declarations (Table 5.31) than river 
border counties without mitigation plans (Dyer, Lake, Lauderdale).  The average loss in the 2000-
2010 for mitigated river border counties was $50.5 million in comparison to $4.5 million average 
loss per MRBC without mitigation planning.  Tennessee has the second largest increase in the 
average cost per disaster declaration ($940,000) from $490,000 to $1.43 million per incident.  
The Tennessee state plan had a total of six (10 percent; nonstructural) flood actions out of 
57 total mitigation items (Table 5.32).  Tennessee counties had a ratio of 61/113 (54 percent) of 
mitigation items directed toward flooding.  Tennessee counties have 49 structural actions and the 
main priority is building retention ponds and reservoirs (18 actions).  Counties complete ranking 
their structural priorities as 2) culverts, 3) channel improvements, 4) roads elevated/repaired, and 
5) construct/reconstruct bridges.   
Tennessee state plan prioritized nonstructural mitigation as follows:  1) repetitive loss, 2) 
studies, 3) NFIP, 4) CRS, and 5) training.  The counties concentrate their need on four priority 
nonstructural mitigation actions: 1) studies, 2) NFIP, 3) technical support, 4) maintenance.  None 
of the counties mention the Community Rating System.  All structural items were dependent on 
receiving federal funding (57 requests) followed by nonstructural funding requests from the state 
(12) and local (28) governments.   




The cost of flooding and number of flooding disaster declarations continues to rise in 
Arkansas MRBCs (Table 5.33 and Table 5.34).  The change in property damage between the 
1990s ($1.7 million) to 2000s (15.1 million) is a bit alarming.  The overall flood cost average 
increase per disaster declaration in the 2000 – 2010 period is $150,000 per occurrence which has 
doubled from $150,000 to $300,000 per disaster reported. While Crittenden County has the 
highest flood cost overall, Desha County’s cost of flooding since the 2000 – 2010 period from 
1990s had the most significant average increase.  Flooding costs have grown from an average 
$209,000 to $680,750 per disaster declaration.  
There were no county mitigation plans available to evaluate in Arkansas MRBCs.  
However, the State plan has a total of eight (13 percent, nonstructural) flood mitigation actions 
out of a total 62 mitigation action items (Table 5.35).  These are ranked as 1) NFIP, 2) repetitive 
loss, 3) technical support, 4) CRS, 5) training.   
Mississippi & Counties  
Mississippi counties bordering the Mississippi River experienced a rise in flood costs 
from the 1990s ($17.2 million) to the 2000s ($25.9 million) with the highest flooder consistently 
being Warren County (Table 5.36).  Disaster declarations (14) in Warren County in the 1990s 
yielded a total flood cost of $13.7 million, and then jumped to $53.9 million in the 2000s.  The 
change in average cost per disaster for Warren County is $2.19 million, moving from an average 
$980,000 per flood disaster to $2.19 million per flood disaster.  Flooding in April, 2003 
accounted for $10 million in Warren County which was 39 percent of the total flood costs in all 
border counties for the 2000 to 2010 period. Mississippi MRBCs had considerable increase in 
flood disaster declarations (78 to 125) from the 1990s to 2000s (Table 5.37). However, property 
losses were on the decrease in MRBCs overall.  The seven MRBCs with plans averaged $492,615 
per loss compared to unmitigated MRBCs average $4.28 million per loss. 
The Mississippi state plan concentrates 43 percent of total mitigation actions (63) towards 




and installing warning systems.  The top priorities for nonstructural flood mitigation are: 1) NFIP, 
2) technical support, 3) enforcing regulations for floodplain management, 4) communication 
(networking); and 5) conduct studies.  Promoting the Community Rating System is within the 
action items, as well as promoting the NFIP, and seeking funding for repetitive loss. 
Counties (7) with plans have a total 22 flood mitigation actions out of 108 mitigation 
actions total (20 percent) ranked promoting the NFIP first; followed by maintenance (checking 
and clearing drainage); technical support; repetitive loss funding; and warning improvements.  It 
is clear that both the counties and State understand they have a need for improving/acquiring 
warning systems (Table 5.38).  The primary structural mitigation needs for counties are to move, 
rebuild and build out of the floodplain, and focus on culverts, road elevation/repair, and sewer 
infrastructure.  
Counties primarily look to the federal government (7 requests) to provide funding for 
structural mitigation projects and depend heavily on local funding (10 requests) to match federal 
funds and support nonstructural mitigation. Only Desoto County sought funding from the State 
for nonstructural mitigation projects.     
Louisiana & Parishes 
Property damage (Table 5.39) due to flooding has dropped considerably in Louisiana 
MRBCs in the 2000 to 2010 period while flood disaster declarations (Table 5.40) were on the rise 
(2000s - $14.1 million; 1990s - $257.2 million). However, these results do not give any indication 
that having a hazard mitigation plan is reducing these costs. Actually, the cost of flooding for the 
11 MRBCs without plans averaged $700,253 whereas the average for mitigated river border 
counties was $1,065,333.  Flooding over the 50 year period of study was highest during the 
decade 1990 to 1999 with a total $257.2 million in flood costs.  In January, 1990, six counties-- 
West Feliciana, West Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and Ascension each 




The Louisiana state mitigation plan has 16 total mitigation actions that are very broadly 
based and do not mention flooding specifically at all.  Three specific items focus on developing 
mitigation planning towards historical preservation efforts.  Three actions are aimed at analyzing 
and developing education and outreach strategies.  Four actions emphasize a need to develop 
technical support initiatives.  Two action items are directed at identifying cost effective projects 
at various levels of government (state, local, municipal). The remainder has to do with improving 
mitigation planning and focusing on legislative and regulatory activities. This plan is remarkably 
underdeveloped and does not provide much guidance for local planning initiatives which is the 
primary focus of state plans. There is no mention of the primary federal initiatives towards 
flooding such as the NFIP or Community Rating System.   
Louisiana MRBC’s (17 total) have six parishes engaged in mitigation planning.  There 
were 197 flood actions identified out of a total 256 mitigation actions overall.  These Louisiana 
parishes have the highest ratio of flood mitigations (77 percent) of all states within the study 
sample. Their first ranked structural mitigation item is the need for pumping stations in 25 
different identified locations (Table 5.41).  They also identified elevation structures, installing 
culverts, improving sewer infrastructure, and making channel improvements as high priorities.  
Their main priorities for nonstructural mitigation were tied with needs for education and outreach 
as well as influencing flood related policies.  Studies, repetitive loss funding, and participation in 
the Community Rating System (8 actions) are the other three primary needs.  Interestingly, 
Louisiana MRBC’s have the highest amount of participation in the CRS.  There are six parishes 
within the sample that have achieved a CRS classification. 
The parishes look to the federal government primarily for funding their structural 
mitigation actions (144 requests) and expect matching funds to come from their local 
government.  In all, the local government (174 requests) is sought out to supplement federal 




have indicated they would solicit funding from state government related to their mitigation 
actions.     
State and County Profiles Summary Analysis 
While Mississippi and Kentucky MRBCs may have improved outcomes related to 
mitigation planning, the overall analysis suggests that having mitigation plans does not decrease 
the number of flood disasters or cost of flooding.   Looking at the overall results, there seems to 
be no improvement in flood disaster mitigation as a result of non-structural program initiatives as 
recommended by White (1945) or after the DMA 2000 took effect.  White (1945) argued that 
despite more spending in structural mitigation, the cost of flooding continued to rise.  These 
findings suggest that despite both structural and non-structural mitigation initiatives, the cost of 
flooding continues to rise.   
Less than eight percent (nine counties total) of the 108 counties/parishes evaluated in this 
study participate in the Community Rating System (CRS).  None of the Mississippi River border 
counties within Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Arkansas are 
actively participating in the CRS (FEMA, 2012).  Of these seven states there are cities bordering 
the Mississippi River that do participate: LaCrosse, Wisconsin (class 8); Davenport, Iowa (class 
8); West Memphis, Arkansas (class 7); and Greenville, Mississippi (class 8).    
In Illinois, the river border counties of Whiteside (class 8), Rock Island (class 7) 
participate in the CRS and the City of Moline (class 8).  Within the State of Missouri only St. 
Charles County (class 7) participates in the CRS.  Louisiana has the most river border parishes 
participating in the CRS (total of 6 parishes) which are East Baton Rouge (class 6); Ascension 
(class 8); St. Charles (class 8); St. John the Baptist (class 8); Orleans (class 8); and Jefferson 
(class 6).   
Content Analysis Findings Compared to 2014 FEMA Local Official Survey   
Comparing this analysis of mitigation planning to the FEMA Local Official Survey 




mitigation needs and also concerning the extent of mitigation planning.  FEMA OLS (2014) 
reports that one in three counties have mitigation plans and the “perception persists” that there is 
no flooding risk in their community.  Analysis of mitigation plans in this study indicates that 
flooding is the top natural hazard risk and 57 percent this sample has mitigation plans.  Giving 
generously to the FEMA OLS (2014) claim that “perceptions persists” among local officials that 
there is no flood risk in their community, states and counties are somewhat capricious in focusing 
on flood mitigation. According to FEMA LOS (2014) the primary mitigation action being taken 
by communities is storm water planning but it is unclear what exactly this may entail as it is a 
very vague and abstract strategic action.   
An attempt was made to compare and contrast the action items from this study to the 
FEMA LOS (2014). Structural and nonstructural mitigation items were evaluated together in 
order to rank the overall need and compare findings. The state plan rankings are based upon how 
many states cited the mitigation action and the county rankings are based upon how many states 
had their counties report a mitigation action.  
FEMA LOS (2014) has identified ten action items as the top needs for local flood 
mitigation efforts.  The actions would all be very useful to both the states and counties.  
Specifically 60 percent of the FEMA LOS 2014 mitigation actions are indeed in the top priorities 
of the states and counties even if they have not been coded exactly the same as the FEMA LOS 
2014.  These are: funding; addressing repetitive loss (acquisition); erosion control; expertise 
(studies); technical support (mapping/building data bases); and education and outreach 
development.   
States and counties have a strong agreement that NFIP promotion needs to be addressed. 
The federal government could be very instrumental in addressing this need and providing support 
for this endeavor.  Second, both the states and counties see a need to influence policies related to 
flooding and floodplain management.  There is an obvious awareness by the state and local 




local governments align themselves with the federal government.  Finally, both states and 
counties identify the need for expansion and/or improvements with levees, dams, and floodwalls.  
It is abundantly clear that they seek funding help from the federal government to satisfy this need.   
Particular to the state priorities and not addressed by FEMA LOS 2014 (federal) or 
counties in the top priorities is the need to promote the Community Rating System.  In fact, this 
action item is not prevalent in county plans.  The states also prioritize training and 
communication networks.  Counties identified road elevation and repairs; maintenance-- checking 
and cleaning debris from obstructing streams and waterways; and improvements to sewer 
infrastructure.  These action items are not acknowledged as priority needs by either the federal or 
state government.   
Social Vulnerabilities:  Populations and households potentially in the floodplain 
In order to make determinations about social vulnerabilities in the floodplain, it is 
important to try to identify who might be in the floodplain and why.  Thus far, social vulnerability 
indexes have depended on county level data in order to make inferences about hazard 
vulnerabilities. The problem here is that measuring vulnerability at the county level may not 
reveal concentrations of vulnerability in higher risk areas. This effort is beset by the limited 
amount of data available for study at the census tract level.  In this study, available population 
and housing data was selected at the census tract level from 2012 American Community Survey 
five year estimates and compared to the same data at the county level.  The use of Arc GIS to 
map this enormous amount of data served to provide a better visual aid for analysis.  The total 
area of study was divided into four mapped segments: Upper Mississippi River Region; Upper 
Middle Mississippi Region; Lower Mississippi River Region; and Louisiana Region (Figure 5.5).  
There are eight side by side maps within each segment that identify the specified social 
vulnerability variables at the county and census tract level.  These maps are accompanied by 
pullouts for six high density urban areas:  Minneapolis/St. Paul, Quad Cities, St. Louis, Memphis, 




5.15); white poverty (Figures 5.16 – 5.25); black poverty (Figures 5.26 – 5.35); elderly poverty 
(Figures 5.36 – 5.45); elderly population overall (Figures 5.46 – 5.55); median household income 
(Figures 5.56 – 5.65); renter versus owner occupied housing (Figures 5.66 – 5.75); and housing 
built in 1969 or prior (Figures 5.76 – 5.85).  
The total population of all counties within this study is 10,243,374 and the total 
population within the census tracts bordering the Mississippi River is 2,264,845.  It is estimated 
that 22 percent of the total population in this study is considered to potentially be within the 
floodplain (Table 5.42).  Total households for this population is 4,011,674 and potentially 
896,807 (also 22 percent) of these households are within the floodplain (Table 5.42).  Looking at 
the region overall, large population centers are most evident in Minnesota, Iowa, and Louisiana 
(Table 5.42). The lowest population density lies in the middle region just below the confluence of 
the Ohio River with exception to the metropolitan area of Memphis, Tennessee (Table 5.42).   
One of the most interesting findings in this study is the fact that poverty is pushed up 
against the Mississippi River thus exposing a more vulnerable population to a potentially more 
risky area to live (Table 5.42).  Poverty conditions become increasingly prevalent in the lower 
Mississippi region and within urban areas (see Figures 5.6 – 5.15).  Breakdowns for each state 
provide an idea of what percent of populations and households may be in the floodplain and also 
what the highest level of poverty is within poverty pockets obscured by much lower overall 
county poverty levels (Table 5.42). 
Race does have significance in the overall poverty characteristics along the Mississippi 
River.  Black poverty along the Mississippi River is highest in urban areas and more prevalent in 
the middle and southern regions.  There is a large section of black poverty on the Illinois border 
in the Quad Cities region and a large section of white poverty in Baton Rouge.  Even though 
black poverty is much more pronounced, both white and black poverty is similarly situated by 




What is most concerning about the poverty population are the small dense pockets of 
elderly poverty along the entirety of the river and especially in Illinois.  There are large sections 
of elderly poverty in urban areas especially in St. Louis and Memphis and one glaringly large 
area at the tip of the bird’s foot in Louisiana.  Elderly population overall should be a concern for 
mitigation planning.  The upper region, upper middle, and lower middle region especially on the 
Arkansas side of the river have large elderly populations.  In urban areas, the most prevalent areas 
for elderly populations are in the Quad Cities region, Memphis, and Baton Rouge.   
In addition to high concentrations of poverty, over 30 percent of households are rental 
units.  The counties in the lower Mississippi River region have even higher pockets of rental 
housing buffered up against the river than the upper region.  The urban areas all have a large 
presence of rental housing buffered along the river, especially in Memphis and Baton Rouge.  
Furthermore, housing built prior to 1969, which would be grandfathered into the National 
Flood Insurance Program and Community Rating System, is extremely dominant on the river 
border.  The most dense areas are within the urban centers and in the lower region along the 
Arkansas side and upper Louisiana.  This housing stock would less likely be retrofitted and more 
vulnerable to flooding.  
Mapping these social vulnerabilities at the regional level using Arc GIS provided an 
opportunity to scan the region for problem areas.  Greater analysis within each state then provided 
further evidence of social vulnerability characteristics and these are explained in greater detail 
below. 
Minnesota Characteristics:  
Minnesota counties have the largest population (3,179,161) bordering the Mississippi 
River.  Within these counties, the census tracts bordering the river make up a total of 437,001 
people (14 percent).  Household totals are 1,247,595 with 167,229 (13 percent of total 
households) potentially within the floodplain.  There are approximately 21,000 structures (44 




NFIP program. Rental homes make up 28 percent of the total households within these census 
tracts and, for the most part, poverty levels are far greater than their county average with 
exception to Houston, Wabasha, and Wright County.  Higher levels of poverty, as much as 56 
percent (Winona County) are evident in census tracts bordering the Mississippi River.  These 
findings suggest that high pockets of poverty are being pushed up to the river’s edge and creating 
greater vulnerabilities.   
Wisconsin Characteristics:   
The population within the MRBCs in Wisconsin is 302,974 which ranks this state as 
eighth overall in terms of population and total households (119,384).  Census tracts bordering the 
Mississippi River within the Wisconsin MRBC’s have a population of 121,233 (40 percent) with 
a total of 50,624 households (47 percent) that could be potentially at risk for flooding or be within 
the floodplain.  Approximately 29 percent of these housing structures are rentals which creates 
greater vulnerability to hazard risk.  There are two counties that have high poverty pockets 
(Crawford, 16.6 percent; LaCrosse, 31.1 percent) buffered against the river borders and these two 
most populated counties within the Wisconsin sample.  Structures built in 1969 or earlier make up 
44 percent of the housing stock.   
Iowa Characteristics:  
Iowa MRBC’s have a huge vulnerability in the high level of poverty buffering the 
Mississippi River.  The population of the Iowa counties within this study is 490,616 and total 
households equal 198,055 which ranks Iowa sixth overall in terms of population density but it has 
the highest percentage of population (90 percent) potentially within the floodplain and has the 
second highest population of all states within the potential floodplain area.  Poverty pockets along 
the river range from 15.1 percent to 49 percent (Scott County) and include all counties with 
exception to Jackson County.  The population within these census tracts totals 440,858 (90 
percent) and is within a total of 177,101 households (89 percent) that are potentially at flood risk 




structures (60 percent) that predate 1969 and therefore are grandfathered into the NFIP program.  
These findings show that the overall housing stock is very dated along the river’s edge. 
Missouri Characteristics:  
Missouri ranks second in total population density in MRBCs (population 1,909,143) and 
a total of 748,535 households.  There are potentially 189,894 people (10 percent) at risk of being 
in the floodplain (72,483 households) in the counties bordering the Mississippi River in Missouri. 
Some census tracts that buffer the edge of the river have high poverty pockets such as St. Louis 
County (16.35 percent), New Madrid (17 percent), Pemiscot (20 percent), Cape Girardeau (29 
percent), and Ste. Genevieve (64 percent).  Rental properties make up 25 percent of the housing 
stock and 40 percent of the housing stock was built before 1969.    
Most interesting about Missouri is that while this state has the second largest population 
in this study, it has the second lowest population rate (10 percent) within the potential floodplain 
area.  Missourians, given the proper resources, can potentially further reduce their population 
within the floodplain.   
Illinois Characteristics:  
Census tracts bordering the Mississippi River in the MRBC’s show high concentrations 
of poverty buffering the river. Ten counties have poverty levels of 21 percent to 65 percent with 
Alexander County being the highest, followed by St. Clair County with 50.3 percent.  The 
housing stock is dated with 55 percent of these structures being built prior to 1969.  The 
population at risk of being within the floodplain is 177,454 (16 percent) out of an overall MRBCs 
population of 1,088,248.  The total amount of households within the Illinois MRBCs is 472,217 
with 87,431 households (also 16 percent) potentially within the floodplain and 21 percent of these 
households are occupied by renters.    
Kentucky Characteristics:   
There are 17,764 people and 7,311 households which accounts for 71 percent of the total 




in Kentucky making them potentially within the floodplain.  These figures reflect a broad 
estimate of who might be in the floodplain given that census tract borders in lower populated 
counties cover far more terrain than those with higher population density.  Kentucky has the 
lowest population density of all states within this study.  Kentucky’s border counties show 
poverty levels ranging from 13.2 to 24.2 percent but two of these counties have border census 
tracts with poverty levels six percent higher: Ballard County (13.2 overall; 19.6 census tract) and 
Fulton County (24.2 overall; 30.4 census tract).  Rental housing in the bordering census tracts 
accounts for 20 percent of overall households with exception to Fulton County (38 percent).  
Over half the structures within census tracts bordering the Mississippi River were built prior to 
1969 (51.4 percent) which is much higher than the overall average of the four counties (23 
percent). 
Tennessee Characteristics:  
Nine census tracts border the Mississippi River in the five MRBC’s and there is an 
overall higher poverty rate in some of these census tracts that should be noted:  Shelby County 
(20.2 percent overall; 44 percent in census tract) and Tipton (14 percent overall; 21 percent in 
census tract).  All of Lake County is included within the two census tracts reported and has a 
poverty rate of 30 percent (32.5 percent in one census tract).  The counties overall have poverty 
ranging from 14 – 30 percent which is rather high overall.   
When looking at population density within these census tracts, there are potentially 
30,565 people living within 10,557 households (three percent) that may potentially be within the 
floodplain. Rental units make up over 40 percent of this housing stock.  In Shelby County, rental 
properties make up 67 percent of total households within the census tracts bordering the 
Mississippi River.  Upon further inspection of the Shelby County census tracts bordering the 
river, one tract (CT 43) shows a very low poverty rate (5 percent) and the median household 




affluent community is pocketed within the riverfront.  Approximately 25 percent of the housing 
stock within these census tracts was built prior to 1969.   
Overall, Tennessee has the lowest percentage population within the floodplain, however, 
Memphis, Tennessee (Shelby County) has a high density overall, thus Tennessee ranks fifth out 
of the ten states in terms of population.  Therefore, this three percent is still a significant number 
of people (total population/household is 1,064,261/390,461) potentially within the floodplain.    
Arkansas Characteristics:  
The population within the census tracts bordering the river totals 43,000 or 28 percent of 
the total population (153,763).  Findings show that this includes 15,000 households which is 26 
percent of total households (57,508) that may potentially be within the floodplain.  Arkansas is 
the second lowest density state within the study sample.   
The Arkansas MRBCs have a poverty rate of 25 – 32 percent and there are concentrations 
of poverty within the census tracts bordering the river as high as 50.4 percent (Chicot County).  
Rental housing makes up 38 percent of the housing stock with exception to Phillips County (58 
percent) and Mississippi County (59 percent) and approximately 10 percent of the housing stock 
was built prior to 1969.  
Mississippi Characteristics:  
Mississippi MRBCs have a total population of 393,168 with a total of 142,445 
households. The population within the census tracts bordering the river is 103,404 with a total of 
38,629 households (27 percent) at risk of being within the floodplain.  Mississippi MRBCs have a 
poverty rate of 23 – 38 percent with poverty pockets within the census tracts as high as 51 percent 
(Washington County - CT 4).  Rental housing makes up 39 percent of the housing stock with 
exception to higher rental percentages in Bolivar County (53 percent), Warren County (58 
percent), and Washington County (66 percent).  Seven percent of structures were built prior to 
1969 which is rather low in comparison to other states/counties.   




Louisiana’s 16 parishes have a poverty rate ranging from 11 (Ascension, Plaquemines) to 
45 percent (East Carroll).  However, to further explore at the census tract level bordering the 
Mississippi River, Ascension Parish (11 percent) has a 35 percent poverty rate buffering the river.  
The actual county poverty rate hides the higher poverty pockets buffered against the Mississippi 
River and this pattern is very predominant in Louisiana: East Baton Rouge Parish (18.5 - 56.4 
percent); Jefferson (15 - 44 percent); Pointe Coupee (19 - 37 percent); St. James (16 – 41 
percent); St. John the Baptist (16 – 30 percent).   
The total population within these census tracts bordering the Mississippi River and 
potentially within the floodplain is 703,672 , with a total of 264,442 households. The population 
in the floodplain represents 43 percent of the total Louisiana parish population/households 
(1,636,976/625,118).  While Louisiana ranks third overall in terms of total population, it has the 
highest number of population/households potentially within the floodplain.  Of these households 
over 94,000 or 36 percent are rental properties and 46 percent (122,223) total households built 
prior to 1969.  The highest pockets of rental housing are found within census tracts in East Baton 
Rouge Parish (99 percent); Jefferson Parish (99 percent); West Feliciana Parish (84 percent); 
Plaquemines Parish (78 percent); and Orleans Parish (72 percent).  
Summary analysis of social characteristics 
In the overall Arc GIS analysis (see Figures 5.5 through 5.84) there are several 
concerning factors to consider.  This analysis shows the potential population and households at 
risk in the floodplain (Table 5.42) in each state.  Potentially 22 percent of all households 
(896,806) within this study are near or within the floodplain (Table 5.42)  Louisiana (703,672), 
Minnesota (437,001), and Iowa (440,858) all have nearly double the amount of people potentially 
in the floodplain (Table 5.42) in comparison to the other seven states within the study.  In terms 
of percent of population and households within the floodplain in each county (108) analyzed, 
those ranked in the top three are: Iowa (89 percent), Kentucky (71 percent), and Louisiana (43 




Other interesting trends in housing demographics include median household incomes 
(Figures 5.55 – 5.64) are much lower and more prevalent in the middle to southern region and all 
urban areas regardless of region.  The greatest volume of dated housing (Figures 5.75 – 5.84), 
such as those units built in 1969 and or before (grandfathered into the NFIP), are actually in the 
north and upper middle regions of the river.  The most dated housing density is located in Iowa 
and Illinois and within urban centers such as the Quad City area and Minneapolis/St. Paul 
Minnesota.  In the southern region, dated housing exists primarily in urban centers such as St. 
Louis, Missouri; Memphis, Tennessee; and Baton Rouge, Louisiana with exception to a few areas 
along the Arkansas border and upper Louisiana.   
Those who rent property within the floodplain are also more vulnerable to disasters.  
Over 30 percent of properties located within the floodplain are rental units.  In some places this 
number goes as high as 99 percent (East Baton Rouge Parish).  Rental households trend higher in 
the southern region, the top ranking states with high rental volumes are Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee.   
When looking at poverty in these counties overall, there is a higher concentration of 
poverty bordering the river (Figures 5.5 – 5.14).  These pockets of poverty range upwards of 50 
percent in most cases and can go as high as 65 percent in some areas.  The most concerning are 
the following:  Illinois (65 percent), Missouri (64 percent), Arkansas (59 percent), (Louisiana (56 
percent) and Minnesota (56 percent).   
Overall, the ArcGIS analysis shows that white poverty (Figures 5.15 – 5.24) has a high 
prevalence in the south and urban areas with a large pocket present specifically in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana.  Black poverty (Figures 5.25 – 5.34) is more widely distributed with higher density in 
urban areas and south, but also much higher on the Illinois side of the Quad Cities.   
Elderly populations (Figures 5.45 – 5.54) are significantly distributed in the upper and 
middle regions bordering the Mississippi River and in the southern region along the Arkansas 




Quad Cities, Memphis, Baton Rouge and New Orleans.  High concentrations of elderly poverty 
(Figures 5.35 – 5.44) can be found in the most southern region of Louisiana at the tip of the 
Bird’s Foot; along the entire border of the State of Mississippi; and within counties bordering the 
river in upper Louisiana.  Other elderly poverty pockets are also concentrated in urban areas such 
as Rock Island, IL; St. Louis, Missouri; Memphis, Tennessee; Baton Rouge and New Orleans, 
Louisiana.  
Ultimately, Arc GIS analysis shows that urban areas have the highest density for social 
vulnerabilities but potentially the greatest value of this analysis is the revelation of pockets of 
vulnerabilities that would otherwise be undetected.  As more data becomes available at the census 
tract and block level, this tool will prove beneficial to exposing more hazard vulnerabilities and 
provide a more comprehensive analysis.    
Overall vulnerability summary 
In the 2000 to 2010 period following the DMA (2000) mandates for mitigation planning, 
this study shows Wisconsin, Iowa, and Mississippi had the most disaster declarations within the 
sample of this study.  Therefore, flooding events occurred most often within these three states.  
The highest flooding costs were attributed to Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Tennessee (Table 5.5).  
Also troubling here is that the cost of flooding per event was much higher in these same states; 
and property damages costs per event were upwards of three to five times higher in comparison to 
other states in the study.  The majority of these costs can be attributed to the four Minnesota 
counties of Houston, Wabasha, Winona, Wright; Wisconsin counties of Crawford, Vernon, Grant, 
LaCrosse; and Shelby and Tipton counties in Tennessee. In terms of populations within the 
floodplain, the states of Iowa, Kentucky, and Louisiana have the highest concentrations.  These 
attributes—highest number of flood events, highest cost per event, and population within the 
floodplain, are strong indicators for concern.   
This study also concludes that despite DMA (2000) mandates for hazard mitigation, the 




non-structural mitigation, these costs continue to increase.  There is low participation in federal 
programs associated with the DMA (2000) mandates with only 64 of 108 counties actually having 
mitigation plans.  Furthermore, only nine counties actually participate in the CRS program. Out 
of 2,562 total mitigation actions identified in these 64 counties, 41 percent (1,062) were related to 
flooding.  That figure is rather impressive compared to state plans where the overall ratio of flood 
actions to all other actions was 25 percent.  One very disturbing observation was that less than 
one percent of all mitigation plans considered mitigation actions related to the private sector.   
Most mitigation actions listed within the mitigation plans are unfunded.  Basically this is 
a list of action items that are nothing more than a wish list unless an actual disaster occurs 
prompting the federal government to make appropriates for these needs.  Counties that do not 
have mitigation plans are not supposed to receive any federal funds.  The main findings from the 
content analysis determine two things:  1) where local officials have focused their efforts on 
mitigation and 2) where they intend to seek funding.  Structural mitigation is very high on their 
priority list as was observed by White (1945).  Local officials also believe that the federal 
government is the primary resource for funding along with a small match by local governments.  
Non-structural mitigation actions are expected to be funded by both federal and state government 
when it comes to things such as technology support and education and outreach.  Otherwise, non-
structural mitigation efforts appear to fall in line with regular duties assigned to the local 
emergency manager’s office.  
Mitigation needs within the scope of the study varied according to region.  The most 
alarming needs that should be addressed are those actions related to warning improvements, 
evacuation and shelter planning, and creating emergency response plans (Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Illinois, Mississippi).  There is demand across the board for infrastructure repairs such as road 
elevation, culvert alteration, bridge repair, levee, and floodwall improvements. There are needs 
based on regions from the top to the bottom of the river.  The northern region needs warning and 




and funding to build retention ponds and reservoirs; and the lower southern region has a demand 
for structure retrofits and pumping stations.  
Finally, Arc GIS analysis shows a considerable percentage of people near or within the 
floodplain, especially in Minnesota, Iowa, Kentucky, and Louisiana.  This analysis shows more 
poverty overall lower household median incomes in the urban areas and lower Mississippi River 
regions.  There are high poverty pockets on the river edge that are concealed from analysis by 
overall county rates.  There are also significant populations of elderly and poor elderly along the 
river edge that should be caution for emergency planning. Arc GIS analysis of social vulnerability 










Do these findings provide support for the original research question:  Is there evidence 
that growth machine dynamics continue to render the federal flood control system ineffective? 
Secondly, despite implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation does the cost of 
flooding continue to rise?   
This study does provide evidence that growth machine dynamics are negatively 
impacting mitigation efforts within the federal flood control system; and despite both structural 
and non-structural mitigation, the cost of flooding continues to rise.  Kathleen Tierney (2010) 
argued that since the 1990s disaster research has started to shift from sociology’s systems theory 
or functionalist paradigms toward growth machine theory as the “unifying theoretical paradigm”.  
This study actually suggests that growth machine dynamics were evident in flood control far 
earlier than we realize. Harvey Molotch (1997) coined the term “growth machine” to describe the 
relationship between local elites and officials where their motivation is to consistently attempt to 
draw large revenues into the community to create growth-inducing projects that will general more 
profit and revenue for elites and political coffers regardless of whether it is actually good for the 
community.  It is easy now to identify what Gilbert White (1945) was referring to as the “status 
quo” as actually growth machine dynamics in play.  
Growth machine theory incorporates the element of political power and issues such as 
disparity and inequality as it relates to political power influence on the construction of disaster 
(Tierney, 2010).  Freudenburg et al. (2009) argue that growth machine behavior is actually 




“circular evasion of responsibility” and creates a problem of concentrating the benefits and 
spreading risk among the unwitting population.   
In this study we see various examples, not only through the historical development and 
focusing events that created path dependencies but in the policy mandates themselves. American 
culture grew from the belief in manifest destiny which is heavily steeped in exceptionalism and 
expansionism. From the beginning, the way we altered the river and its natural environment is 
evidence of growth machine dynamics in play.  Steamboat development accelerated this process 
through river erosion, a result of cutting timber to fuel steamboats and then to prevent timber 
snags during navigation.  
Early settlers brought with them the European practice of using levees to protect their 
land from flooding.  However, levees alone were no match for the Mississippi River.  What is 
true in growth machine dynamics presently was also true in early development, there were no 
limits and many errors made related to incompetence in river hydrology and engineering.  As 
settlement grew and experiments in navigation continued, demand increased for a centralized 
system of flood control.  A federal system for flood control (Project Flood) was then realized 
after the devastating flood in 1927.    
Project Flood was structurally designed to protect against flooding equal to one foot 
higher than any previous flooding occurrence. Along with this mandate, the federal government 
exempted itself from any potential legal action related to structural failures.  The legislation was 
paramount to the progression of growth machine dynamics and principal evidence in explaining 
how growth machine theory becomes the predominant theory providing explanation for how 
political power serves as the dynamic force that ultimately explains disaster as a social construct 
(Tierney, 2010).   Political power is the force that creates the system, and is a force on or input to 
the system; it operates as a force within and between subsystems; and it also impacts outputs and 
feedback that becomes further input.  The political power of the growth machine weakens  




In 1945, Gilbert White then observed growth machine processes in play as he claimed the 
flood control system was designed based on the “preservation of the status quo”-- through 
processes such as dirt moving, structural fixes, and grants/aid (White, 1945, 209). White (1945) 
found that as funding increased for structural mitigation, so did the cost of flooding.  Perrow 
(2007) further charges growth machine actors as being profiteers from disaster.  White’s (1945) 
influence on non-structural mitigation policy was manipulated by growth machine actors to result 
in a “patchwork of disparate programs” (Moss, 1999, 321); thus, costs continued to increase.  
Increasing costs could then be attributed to the myriad ways in which growth machine actors 
gamed the system, especially through the NFIP.  
Mitigation planning mandated by DMA 2000 has become a tool to perpetuate “growth 
machine” dynamics. These plans are designed explicitly to maximize funding opportunities from 
the federal government on high dollar structural projects.  This study concluded that cost of 
flooding continues to increase despite the creation of all-hazard mitigation plans mandated 
through DMA 2000; and even more shockingly, findings indicate flood costs have increased as a 
result of mitigation plan mandates.  Counties with mitigation plans report more flood costs than 
counties without mitigation plans perhaps because they are in compliance with mandates for 
mitigation funding.  Compliance mandates potentially create conditions where localities may 
over-report in order to generate more funding.  If disaster strikes in counties without mitigation 
plans, they are dependent on media attention which generates disaster sympathy phenomenon 
from the general public.  In turn, this behavior generates federal leniency and emergency aid 
appropriations.  The “status quo” is that congressional representatives will respond quickly to 
provide aid or they will experience negative exploitation if they vote against emergency 
appropriations.   
Disaster aid as a result of political manipulation creates another example of a moral 
hazard, a condition where localities behave in a more risky manner and expect all federal 




creates a moral hazard; as substantiated in this analysis—there are low participation rates in 
federal programs (CRS, NFIP) designed to reduce flood risk and flood costs.  
 Speaking of lower participation rates in these federal programs, consider what is in the 
guidance of the DMA 2000 on mitigation planning as it relates to the NFIP.  Within the plans 
themselves, the circular pattern of evasiveness is evident. For example, what actually happens 
when the local mitigation plan states as a non-structural action “promote the NFIP program”?  
They guide citizens to the FEMA website on the NFIP and flooding where they are directed to 
call their local insurance provider for all information regarding this matter.  Here they fall into the 
trap of the NFIP and WYO program.   
As Keiserman (2015) testified before Congress, the Write Your Own (WYO) program 
had created a scenario where insurance companies were drawing a 33 percent fee against every 
premium dollar that was paid into the NFIP program. They profited even further on the back end 
drawing more fees in claims settlements.  Then, the WYO program was not finished here with 
egregiously frauding customers.  These folks were actually paying the NFIP to provide millions 
of dollars in legal defense for insurance companies in their fraudulent claims denials (Keiserman, 
2015).  Generating participants for the NFIP program resulted in profitability for elite insurance 
corporations both at policy creation and then again during the claims period should disaster occur. 
The benefit falls largely on these corporations while the program participants invest to cover risk 
and then struggle to collect enough return to restore their property.  The disaster impacts and 
lengthy claims process eventually produces far more losers than winners.  This non-structural 
federal mitigation initiative is faulty by design yet continues to be a major component in 
mitigation.  
As reiterated throughout this study, mitigation plans are very steeped in taking actions 
related to structural fixes of which White (1945) cautioned were not actually addressing the 
flooding problem.  High dollar projects such as levees and floodwalls are strongly coveted by 




we see any suggestion that policy guidance in the United States might be strengthened to provide 
for greater security in structural designs beyond the 50/50 chance of failure (Freudenburg et al., 
2009).  Given the federal government cannot be held liable (as established in the Flood Control 
Act of 1928) we continue to throw money at projects designed to fail and provide a false sense of 
security to residents.  
Reform Federal Mitigation “All-Hazard” Planning  
Local hazard mitigation plan actions, in general, are primarily focused on emergency 
response actions; and then, specific to flooding, they are concerned primarily with funding and 
structural mitigation or dirt moving/land adjusting projects.  What is most concerning is that, even 
71 years after White (1945) addressed poor performance in emergency response; there are still 
inadequacies in emergency response planning. There are six items identified within local 
mitigation plans that specifically focus on the need to develop emergency response plans and 
establish first responders.  There were ten items requesting improvements to/or the development 
of warning systems.  There are 19 items focused specifically on the need to develop emergency 
evacuation and sheltering plans. This need is primarily based in the upper Mississippi region and 
specifically, counties within Wisconsin, Missouri, and Illinois.  A serious concern here is that, 
even though these plans go through an approval process at the state and federal level, there is no 
oversight process that would alert the state or federal government to quickly dispatch aid to 
resolve this immediate need.   
This study, focused specifically on flood mitigation within the local hazard mitigation 
plan, also exposes potential weaknesses within the planning process.  As stated previously, the 
State plans have actions that are basically painted in very broad strokes.  Therefore, one would 
expect that local plans would be far more detailed and specific.  In conducting the content 
analysis of these plans, it became clear that the low quality of local mitigation plans offer support 
to previous research findings especially Lyle et al. (2012) in terms of wide variability and 




Intriguingly, though, this analysis led to further consideration of the all-hazards approach 
to mitigation planning and its effectiveness.  It appears the “all-hazards approach” to mitigation is 
inherently flawed in that while it guides the planning process toward commonalities, it creates the 
dilemma of moving it away from identifying and addressing needs that are hazard specific.  These 
conditions create a state of aporia where the closer one moves toward one goal, the farther he 
moves from another equally important goal (Boin and Nieuwenburg, 2011).  The result is an 
irresolvable contradiction that impedes effective comprehensive planning.  There is a problem of 
bounded rationality at the federal level in creating an “all-hazard” model guideline and then 
placing a planning mandate at the local level as a matter of frontline discretion.  Boin and 
Nieuwenburg (2011) explains how mandating a plan from the higher level creates “hard to 
predict” outcomes.  In this case, the federal government lacks the information to create feasible 
plans and prioritize conflicting goals and create feasible terms. Rather the federal government is 
quite ambiguous in establishing directives and providing feedback beyond addressing 
commonalities. Lacking specificity, we have problems such as states and local governments not 
implementing land-use planning that would effectively eliminate dangerous development within 
the floodplain.  Local planning officials tend to write plans geared toward federal funding 
opportunities which are steeped in ambiguity and lacking feasibility—basically it is a “wish list”.  
State guidance is also quite ambiguous and they basically play an interceding or mediating role 
between the federal and local government. 
The most glaring problem is there is no process during the mitigation plan approval stage 
where the state or federal government should be accountable to address immediate needs for 
emergency response action items.  If a county declares they have no emergency response plan, no 
means to organize emergency responders, no evacuation plan, no sheltering plan, or no warning 
system, it should invoke an immediate response from the federal and state government followed 
by an expedited resolution.  Here is where the top-down centralized approach to mitigation 




the federal government via their mitigation plan approval.  The “all hazards” mitigation plan 
crafted by the state should reflect analysis of each risk reported by counties and an analysis of 
mitigation need reported by each county.  Thus, in addition to top-down directives for local “all 
hazard” mitigation, the federal government should employ a procedure where the assessment 
results in a bottom-up assessment that guides the state and federal government on mitigation 
needs and planning.   
This study refutes Lindell and Perry’s (2007) claim that all-hazard mitigation is the most 
effective and efficient.  The findings within this study suggest that “all-hazard” mitigation 
planning directives from the federal government need to provide more regional specificity and 
improved standardization.  Emergency response capabilities, which primarily address 
commonalities, should be designated as a stand-alone section which would indicate risks or 
shortages to capabilities followed by mitigation actions to alleviate this risk.  Each hazard risk 
should have a section regarding risk evaluation followed by a mitigation action plan.  This 
practice allows the planning community to focus more specifically on each primary hazard risk 
and assess what resources and capabilities are on hand for this specific risk and what is needed 
specifically for managing this hazard impact. These suggestions provide a remedy for Caruson 
and MacManus’s (2011) concerns regarding commonality theory and commonality as the primary 
organizing principle.  It is highly likely that over time, a consistent set of best practices for each 
hazard would be tethered out from this process and captured through the process of top down and 
bottom up feedback.  
Action items should be further evaluated to determine priority level and cost.  Each 
action item should have a strategic plan proposal and itemized cost analysis. The state “all-
hazard” mitigation plans should then be designed from a bottom-up assessment of county needs 
and provide regional specificity.  Federal “all-hazard” plans should then identify need by region, 
establish response priorities, and direct mitigation appropriations to the appropriate regions.  This 




and feedback, thus incentivizing local and state governments to monitor their need more 
diligently in order to influence federal priorities.  The regional specificity element moves state 
and federal governments to address hazard risk regionally, thus avoiding the pitfall of equity 
distributions over efficiency distributions of funding.   
It was very clear within this analysis that flood mitigation needs had both commonalities 
and differences based on regional location.  All counties showed needs for road repairs and 
elevation; culvert alterations; bridge repairs/alterations; and levee and flood wall improvements.  
Specific to the southern region of the river is a need for structure retrofits, and specific to 
Louisiana there is a need for pumping stations.  The middle river region has a demand for moving 
buildings out of the flood plain, retention ponds and reservoirs; and the upper region needs to 
develop their emergency response plans, warning improvements and evacuation/sheltering 
assistance.  Effective mitigation, then, at the federal level, would be to focus on directing 
mitigation funding to the critical regions first for items that will significantly improve flood 
disaster outcomes.   
Nonstructural Mitigation and Federal Programs 
Digging deeper into the content analysis and evaluating the state role in mitigation 
planning, their action strategies are focused primarily on providing nonstructural mitigation in the 
form of administrative and technical support to counties.  State mitigation plans overall are 
focused on promoting awareness of the NFIP, the CRS, and identifying and addressing repetitive 
loss properties. Their method of promoting these federal programs is to direct the local 
government to develop education and outreach initiatives on these topics or develop their own 
ideas of addressing these topics.  The directives follow a centralized top-down approach but they 
are not accompanied by funding appropriations.   
  For example, the federal government says promote the NFIP, the state government says 
promote the NFIP, and then the local government says promote the NFIP.  From the content 




However, what should a NFIP education and outreach initiative require?  Reverting to federal 
guidance, the primary strategy is to refer the individual to their local insurance agent so the local 
insurance agent can provide this service.  As the Hurricane Sandy saga continues over the WYO 
program and lack of oversight within the NFIP administration, this is a real conundrum.  State 
and local governments both agree that NFIP promotion needs to be addressed.  The federal 
government’s public-private partnership with the insurance industry basically disconnects the 
state and local government from the process.  This ambiguous directive from the federal 
government for NFIP promotion results in a circular directive where no action actually occurs.  
Reform or Revoke the National Flood Insurance Program 
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act provided for necessary changes in the NFIP 
that brought flood insurance policy premiums closer to their true cost of risk and would make the 
program solvent.  It allowed for certain circumstances to trigger the removable of discounted 
rates for grandfathered properties.  When claims reached a certain level of market value (50 
percent), the homeowner would need to either make structural retrofits or pay higher premiums. 
Following Hurricane Sandy, there were so many properties meeting these criteria, the government 
balked at enforcing this legislation.  In this case, the economic consequences would have been so 
severe, that these areas could not recover.  Little did they know that systemic failures within the 
WYO program and the federal public-private partnership would ultimately create a comparable 
disaster.    
The NFIP is now 47 years old and beyond its usefulness.  The intent at this zeitgeist was 
to be equitable and provide affordable insurance through government subsidy for properties built 
prior to 1968.  This intent did not arise without consideration to future target reduction planning. 
At some point moving toward efficiency should have been established as a goal in order to avert 
the moral hazard of concentrating the benefit and passing the high cost of subsidizing risk to all 
taxpayers.  A roll-back in subsidized flood insurance is needed in order to bring local government 




In 2007, U.S. Representatives Ginny Brown-Waite and Vern Buchanan proposed a 
National Catastrophe Insurance Program that would establish coverages against natural hazards 
for earthquake and hurricane prone residents and dissolve the NFIP into this plan.  Critics argued 
that the same issues impacting the NFIP would just increase in scale and cost to the federal 
government.  Ultimately this initiative was rejected.  In the late 2000s Congress started to only 
approve short extensions for the NFIP and at times allowed the program funding to lapse. These 
changes prompted the private insurance industry to offer a Natural Catastrophe Insurance 
Program underwritten by affiliates with Lloyds of London to NFIP policy holders.  Individual 
natural catastrophe insurance might be an attractive solution if the federal government would 
mandate all U.S. citizens to purchase a policy.  In this scenario, each policy premium would be 
based on regional risk factors and the consumer could select additional coverages for relocation 
expenses, lost wages, and other miscellaneous expenses.  A policy solution of this nature could 
potentially thwart the tendency for Congress to appropriate large sums of disaster relief money 
for individual needs.  Instead, more money could be directed towards rebuilding infrastructure 
and post-disaster mitigation needs.  
Reform the Community Rating System Program 
There are very low participation rates within the Community Rating System program 
which was established along with the NFIP.  Communities participating in the CRS program 
receive flood insurance discounts by retrofitting their flood prone structures and regulating land-
use within the floodplain.  The CRS has four different classifications or series, with 19 objectives 
total.  Each mitigation action has a minimum and maximum point values range to be assigned for 
CRS credit to reduce insurance premiums. Class 10 is the lowest classification with points 
ranging from 0 to 499 and has no insurance discount. Insurance premium discounts begin at five 
percent in Class 9 and increase in five percent increments through to Class 1 (4,500 points, 45 
percent discount). 300 series has seven objectives (maximum 981 points) addressing public 




400 series has five objectives addressing floodplain mapping and regulation (5,841 points); 500 
series addresses flood damage reduction (4,692) which includes acquisitions, retrofits, drainage 
improvements and floodplain management planning; 600 series (790 points) has three objectives 
directed at flood preparedness which covers levee and dam safety and flood warning systems.   
The CRS program is not popular within this study sample, there is little movement 
towards participation and those that do participate (nine counties total) have low classifications.  
There are several things to consider.  First, are citizens who are required to have flood insurance 
unaware of CRS incentives? Second, do they lack the ability to collectively organize to move the 
local government to be more proactive?  Do community leaders believe that meeting these 
objectives is not feasible?  Further research is needed to determine why there are such low 
participation rates and why participating community ratings are heavily skewed towards the 
lowest classification levels.   
The primary weakness of this program is incentivizing premium holders as a means to 
garner participation. Given that growth machine dynamics are in play, premium holders lack the 
power to be an effective change agent.  Federal mitigation funding should be synchronized to the 
objectives within this program in order to effectively incentivize local communities and increase 
participation. 
Improve FEMA Nationwide Survey of Local Officials (NSLO) 
  Looking at the FEMA NSLO (2013), the first concerning factor is whether or not the 
survey sample is truly representative of the nation or, even more specifically, flood risk 
communities such as the region of focus in this study.  Secondly, 64 percent of respondents (n = 
1,710) identified their jurisdiction to be rural communities thus skewing the results to represent 
small population centers.  Third, 41 percent of these local officials fall into a category designated 
as “other”, 34 percent are local emergency managers or floodplain managers, and 25 percent are 




be identified and qualified.  Fourth, it is uncertain how many respondents actually came from the 
same community, therefore the summary data reported by FEMA may be confounded.   
In this FEMA NLSO (2013) survey, three out of four local officials believe they have a 
flood risk in their community, yet only one in ten of these officials actually believe their 
community is at risk (FEMA, 2013).  These local officials reported that only one in three of these 
communities actually have a FEMA approved mitigation plan in effect. This report does not 
distinguish the differences in results between communities with a plan and those without a plan.    
Comparing the FEMA NLSO (2013) to this study, there were 108 total counties in this 
sample and 64 plans available for evaluation thus 59 percent of this region have mitigation plans 
in place. This study relies on the content analysis of these 64 mitigation plans to determine what 
the primary mitigation needs are for their communities. FEMA NLSO (2013) reported that the 
top five mitigation (structural) needs reported by local officials are building drainage 
improvements (52 percent), elevation (44 percent), erosion control (41 percent), acquisition (31 
percent), and flood-proofing (26 percent).  In this study, the top structural mitigation needs are 1) 
road repairs and elevation, 2) widening culverts, and 3) fixing sewers, 4) stabilizing banks, and 5) 
repairing or replacing bridges.  In terms of what sort of support is needed from FEMA, the local 
officials reported 1) funding (73 percent), 2) technical expertise, 3) flood mapping, 4) planning 
assistance, and 5) outreach materials (FEMA NLOS, 2013).  In this study, the top five 
nonstructural mitigation needs are 1) conducting studies, 2) promoting the NFIP, 3) debris 
maintenance/drainage funding, 4) repetitive loss (acquisition), and 5) policy remedies for 
floodplain management.   
FEMA NLOS (2013) states that CRS participation is rising with 76 percent of 
respondents reportedly (n = 1,296) actively participating.  However, looking at the Mississippi 
River border counties, less than eight percent or nine counties in three states are participating in 
the CRS program.  States and counties in this study strongly agree that NFIP promotion needs to 




this study appear very aware that state and local mitigation planning is limited without policy 
changes at the state and local level that will align them with the federal policies and programs.  
FEMA NLOS (2013) makes no mention of this need.  There are commonalities between FEMA 
NLOS (2013) and this study; but a regional analysis such as this study does provide more insight.   
Therefore, as stated earlier, a better way to evaluate the need at the local level is for the 
federal government to critically assess mitigation plans during the approval process and set their 
mitigation objectives from local mitigation plan data. Covington and Simpson (2006) noted there 
are two phases of planning that must be achieved- development and implementation.  This study 
speaks to the problem that we are stuck within the first phase without a clear path to reach the 
second phase.  If the federal government cannot effectively accomplish this, then its mitigation 
efforts will remain as problematic as herding kittens.  
Clearly the greatest weakness in the way we do flood control is that policy makers only 
want to go so far as to recommend to local governments what they should do, but ultimately yield 
to local government to decide whether or not they wish to comply with these recommendations.  
Upon experiencing a flooding disaster, the status quo behavior of the federal government is a 
two-fold response.  First, federal relief arrives based on the stipulations within flood policy.  
Secondly, federal relief arrives based upon public pressure on Congress and disaster sympathy 
phenomenon.  Therefore, if the first relief is not sufficient because the local governments failed to 
be proactive, the second relief enables this behavior to continue.   
Mitigation Planning and Potential Social Vulnerabilities for Populations within the 
Floodplain 
Results of this study indicate there is a potential for 22 percent of the population and 
nearly 900,000 households to be located within the floodplain.  Even more concerning is the risk 
associated with high concentrations of poverty pushed up against the Mississippi River and a high 
volume of rental housing (30 percent).  As noted by Cutter et al. (2000) risk assessment 




presence or absence of natural hazard risk.  Therefore, determinations about social vulnerability 
and factors that increase risk such as high poverty levels are not included in the planning process.  
This shortcoming alone usurps the aim of effective and comprehensive planning. Thus, the next 
question is:  How can social vulnerability analysis be incorporated into all hazard mitigation 
planning?   
The most recent iteration of Cutter et al.’s (2013) social vulnerability index (SoVI) would 
not be an effective tool for flood hazard mitigation planning given that the social and economic 
characteristics were evaluated by using county level data.  The problem is that measuring socio-
economic characteristics at the county level may conceal concentrated pockes of social 
vulnerabilities that could negatively impact outcomes in flooding disaster.  Even using census 
tract level data, which as not as robust as county level data, would be problematic because census 
tracts can be quite large in lower density rural areas.  Despite this limitation (as noted within this 
study), mitigation planners are overlooking a source of vital information and a significant 
consideration in flood hazard risk.  Local officials must incorporate social vulnerabilities in local 
hazard mitigation planning and it must be done in a manner that couples social vulnerability to 
different types of natural hazard risk.   
The primary reason for coupling social vulnerability and natural hazard vulnerability is 
moving mitigation planning toward a better understanding of differential impacts on certain 
populations in response and recovery.  For example, Clutter et al. (2010) points out, those 
communities that have a high volume of service industry employment are at greater risk given 
they are traditionally lower wage type jobs, and the businesses themselves are more vulnerable in 
recovery.   Populations occupying rental housing often face greater constraints than traditional 
homeowners when it comes to being able to recover and resettle because they have greater 
dependency on affordable housing availability.   
Secondly, those populations in poverty will often behave differently during a disaster 




community emergency response capabilities, resources, and the population needs intersect.  Areas 
with higher density or extreme poverty pockets would be more difficult to accommodate than 
other areas especially when it comes to evacuation.  Local mitigation planners can be more 
effective if they have a greater understanding of their population.  The all-hazard mitigation 
planning process, therefore, should include an evaluation of the social, economic, and house 
characteristics of their population.   
Previously, Arc GIS software has been used by some mitigation planners to plot such 
things as critical infrastructure and building inventories owned by local governments. Arc GIS 
software offers even greater potentially to create an overall comprehensive assessment with the 
capability to add and subtract layers of data and perform analyses that were previously limited to 
Excel software.  Not only can planners take stock of critical infrastructure and building 
inventories, it can also be used catalog the types of hazard risks. It also has the capability to allow 
the planner to assess social vulnerability characteristics with the Census Bureau and American 
Community Survey data.  Mapping these characteristics would offer planners a comprehensive 
visual aid to detect problematic areas and further assess the need for resources or redistribution of 
resources.  One of the most notable advantages of using Arc GIS for analysis is that a high 
volume of data can be organized and manipulated in a variety of ways to explore vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, the increasing availability of Census and American Community Survey data 
gathered for census tract and block level is promising.  In this study, the use of Arc GIS at a 
regional level helped provide greater insight to the differences between regions along the 
Mississippi River.  It also exposed a pattern of social vulnerabilities being buffered against the 
river and hidden pockets that would likely otherwise go unnoticed. 
Future Research Recommendations 
Evaluating all-hazard mitigation planning through a content analysis method opens 
possibilities to look at the plans in a variety of ways and can offer valuable insights to improve 




easily obtainable and often previous plans are not available for comparison.  FEMA directives for 
plan changes occur more often than the actual plan updates.  Despite attempts by FEMA to direct 
these plans toward a more standardized format, they have such wide variation it is difficult to 
collect quantitative data.  Plan quality is so low, that there will likely need to be several plan 
iterations and studies over the next decade to help improve this planning process.   
Also missing from the planning process is a way to capture what this planning has 
accomplished.  Once a project is completed, in most cases, it is removed from the next plan.  If 
the plan could be designed as a living document, a register showing what has been completed 
would be useful for evaluation.  Archiving completed work would allow us to make 
determinations about what has been addressed and whether or not these changes impact disaster 
costs.  Specific to flood disasters, we may be able to determine what types of mitigation actions 
need to be repeated and within what time frame this should occur.  We could also determine 
whether we are effectively balancing a healthy distribution of both structural and nonstructural 
flood mitigation actions.   
There is an opportunity to look at these plans based on the “all-hazard” model and 
attempt to make determinations as to how useful or limiting this model may be.  With the “all-
hazard” plan in mind, we can also make better determinations about how we are distributing 
mitigation resources based on the level of hazard risk.  Does this model allow for better 
prioritizing of resources?  At the other end of the spectrum, does this model run the risk of 
weakening the focus needed to comprehensively address hazard specificities?   
Another research consideration should be whether there is a benefit to creating regional 
plans versus individual county plans.  Not only might this be a more cost effective method, but 
also more collaborative.  One of the most concerning issues regarding the mandate for mitigation 
plans is the lack of compliance.  It would be interesting to explore this issue further to see if this 
is due to lack of funding, lack of planning expertise, or some other issue that prevents county 




improved.  Would a regional planning process allow states to better assess mitigation needs and 
respond more efficiently with funding and resources?   
One of the most useful practices in terms of non-structural mitigation is education and 
outreach and it appears that it would be useful for further study on this topic. What types of 
education and outreach methods as a non-structural mitigation strategic action is effective?  How 
can local emergency management be more effective in reaching out to the population to prepare 
them for hazard threats?  Are the plans that specifically mention education and outreach in broad 
terms actually achieving deliverables?  What are these deliverables?  What are the most feasible 
methods?   
Finally, one of the most concerning discoveries in this research is the fact that the 
population, socio-economic and housing characteristics are missing in the risk assessments in all 
all-hazard mitigation plans.  In order to respond better to hazard threats, it seems that knowing 
exactly what issues and challenges within the population may impede effective mitigation and 
emergency response.  Does the population in the area change (increase or decrease) during day 
shift working hours?  Does the housing stock appear to be resilient? What is the ratio of special 
populations? What about the pet population?  Does the region have a plan to manage for pets in 
the event of an evacuation, sheltering, or extraordinary need for medical support?  What are the 
local business characteristics and what vulnerabilities exist here?  These are the sort of questions 
that should be addressed in mitigation planning and more research is needed to explore 
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MN Anoka 10   60 17 
MN Benton   4   73   5 
MN Dakota   7   94   7 
MN Goodhue 14   27 52 
MN Hennepin no plan available   
MN Houston no plan available    
MN Ramsey   4   35 11 
MN Sherburne  no plan available     
MN Stearns   3   71   4 
MN Wabasha no plan available    
MN Washington no plan available    
MN Winona 19   56 34 
MN Wright no plan available    











State  County  Flood Mitigation Actions Total Mitigation Actions Ratio (%) 
IA Allamakee  no plan available   
 
IA Clayton 2 15 13 
IA Clinton   no plan available   
 
IA Des Moines   no plan available   
 
IA Dubuque   no plan available   
 
IA Jackson 33 83 40 
IA Lee   no plan available   
 
IA Louisa   no plan available   
 
IA Muscatine   no plan available   
 
IA Scott 56 181 31 

































11 33 33 
MO Clark   no plan available    
MO Jefferson 30 37 81 
MO Lewis   no plan available    
MO Lincoln 9 37 24 
MO Marion 10 50 20 
MO Mississippi 5 21 24 
MO New Madrid 5 18 28 
MO Pemiscot 7 37 19 
MO Perry 10 32 31 
MO Pike 2 34 6 
MO Ralls 6 31 19 
MO Scott 4 43 9 
MO St. Charles 15 37 41 
MO St. Louis 13 38 34 
MO St. Genevieve 9 32 28 









Wisconsin and Counties:  Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions 
 







WI Buffalo     no plan available    
WI Crawford 6 23 26 
WI Grant 5 40 13 
WI La Crosse     no plan available    
WI Pepin 21 37 57 
WI Pierce     no plan available    
WI Trempealeau     no plan available    
WI Vernon     no plan available    









































IL Adams 1 12 8 
IL Alexander 8 23 35 
IL Calhoun 12 28 43 
IL Carroll 90 107 84 
IL Hancock 8 40 20 
IL Henderson 6 39 15 
IL Jackson 15 36 42 
IL Jersey 3 10 30 
IL Jo Daviess 192 212 91 
IL Madison 23 52 44 
IL Mercer 9 37 24 
IL Monroe 2 15 13 
IL Pike 6 38 16 
IL Randolph   no plan available    
IL Rock Island 15 38 39 
IL St. Clair 10 12 83 
IL Union 9 21 43 
IL Whiteside   no plan available    
























AR Chicot no plan available    
AR Crittenden no plan available    
AR Desha no plan available    
AR Lee no plan available    
AR Mississippi no plan available    
AR Phillips no plan available    











































LA Ascension no plan available   0 
LA Concordia no plan available   0 
LA East Baton 
Rouge 
22 22 100 
LA East Carroll no plan available  0 
LA Iberville 16 20 80 
LA Jefferson 2 7 29 
LA Madison no plan available  0 
LA Orleans 40 63 63 
LA Plaquemines no plan available  0 
LA Pointe Coupee   no plan available   0 
LA St. Bernard 15 16 94 
LA St. Charles 102 128 80 
LA St. James   no plan available   0 
LA St. John the 
Baptist 
no plan available   0 
LA  Tensas no plan available   0 
LA West Baton 
Rouge 
no plan available   0 
LA West Feliciana no plan available   0 











































LA Ascension no plan available   0 
LA Concordia no plan available   0 
LA East Baton 
Rouge 
22 22 100 
LA East Carroll no plan available  0 
LA Iberville 16 20 80 
LA Jefferson 2 7 29 
LA Madison no plan available  0 
LA Orleans 40 63 63 
LA Plaquemines no plan available  0 
LA Pointe Coupee   no plan available   0 
LA St. Bernard 15 16 94 
LA St. Charles 102 128 80 
LA St. James   no plan available   0 
LA St. John the 
Baptist 
no plan available   0 
LA  Tensas no plan available   0 
LA West Baton 
Rouge 
no plan available   0 
LA West Feliciana no plan available   0 



























KY Ballard 8 24 33 
KY Carlisle 18 24 75 
KY Fulton 9 22 41 
KY Hickman 8 22 36 





























TN Dyer no plan available   0 
TN Lake no plan available   0 
TN Lauderdale no plan available   0 
TN Shelby 43 72 60 
TN Tipton 18 41 44 

































MS Adams 6 23 26 
MS Bolivar   no plan available   0 
MS Claiborne 6 23 26 
MS Coahoma 2 6 33 
MS DeSoto 2 8 25 
MS Issaquena   no plan available   0 
MS Jefferson 3 22 14 
MS Tunica 1 6 17 
MS Warren   no plan available   0 
MS Washington   no plan available   0 
MS Wilkinson 2 20 10 





























Non-structural Action Item Category 
 
 
 Coded Non-Structural Mitigation Action Count 
Replos Actions that specifically address the problem of repetitive 
loss properties  
  50 
CRS Actions that specifically address participating in the 
Community Rating System  
  59 
NFIP Actions that specifically address the National Flood 
Insurance Program  
  12 
Policy Actions related to influencing policies related to flood 
mitigation  
  48 
Eduout Actions related to education and outreach to community 
stakeholders such as private industry, government, general 
population, public agencies, non-profit agencies, etc. 
  45 
Study Actions related to conducting studies, evaluating 
processes, or developing plans  
  92 
Tech Actions that involve technical work such as building 
databases, creating map products, creating inventories, and 
other technical support   
  36 
Train Actions that identify training needs     5 
Equip Actions related to purchasing items and equipment such as 
sandbags, signage, boats, portable generators  
  39 
Maint Actions related to maintaining equipment, performing 
inspection and maintenance on structural elements and 
floodplain,  removing debris from streams   
  50 
Warn Actions i volving improving warning systems    18 
Evacshel Actions involving developing evacuation routes and 
sheltering sites  
  19 
Enforce Actions related to enforcing policies associated with 
floodplain management  
  32 
Enviro Actions related to promotion and protection of the natural 
environment   
  15 
Comm Actions related to improving communication and 
networking between agencies  
  10 
Leveeacc Actions related to levee accreditation      4 
Resp Actions that involve creating response plans and 
establishing first responders   
    6 
Other Actions otherwise specified     9 






Structural Action Item Categories 
 
Structural Action Item Total 
Culverts 75 
Roads Elevate/Repair 67 
Reorganize Sewers 47 
Bank Stabilization 33 
Build Bridges  32 
Build Pumping Stations 30 
Elevate Structures 29 
Build Levees Dams Flood Wall 30 
Build Retention/Reservoirs 28 
Move/Rebuild/Build Structures 26 
Channel Improvements 26 
Otherwise Specified 23 
Build Perm Generators 12 
Build Warning Systems 10 
Reforest/Green 9 
Reorganize Electric Grid 6 
Build Shelters 6 
Flood Gates 8 
Build Potable Water Store 4 






















B                         Std. Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta      t.   Sig.  
Constant  28226526.24 28969839.27   .974 .339 
Timeline      304007.04   2418355.45   .046  .126 .901 
Time-Plan -28853442.31 48463198.30  -.235 -.595 .557 
TimeAfterPlan    3200873.20   6419107.43   .187  .499 .622 













B                         Std. Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta      t.   Sig.  
Constant  19470479.90 45429224.40   .429 .672 
Timeline    2117653.74   3792358.38   .206  .558 .581 
Time-Plan -48455542.00 75997850.30  -.252 -.638 .529 
TimeAfterPlan    1920725.49 10066161.20   .072  .191 .850 






Model Three Coefficients Table 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B                         Std. Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta         t.   Sig.  
Constant  18477323.50 11309277.43   1.634 .114 
Timeline     -725399.48     944080.24  -.265   -.768 .449 
Time-Plan -19484673.88 18919116.18  -.381 -1.030 .312 
TimeAfterPlan    5195403.22   2505898.15   .729   2.073 .048* 
a. Dependent Variable: Cost   *p ≤ .05 
 












B                         Std. Error 
Standardized 
Coefficeints 
Beta         t.   Sig.  
Constant   9749202.74 26789600.81   1.634 .114 
Timeline   1029406.89   2236352.67  -.265   -.768 .449 
Time-Plan  -9368768.43 44815910.91  -.381 -1.030 .312 
TimeAfterPlan  -1994530.02   5936012.41  -.127   -.336 .739 






Figure 5.1    







Figure 5.2    







Figure 5.3    
 


















Table 5.5    
 
Property damage costs by decade for 50 years (SHELDUS) 
 
  
State 2000-2009 1990-1999 1980-1989 1970-79 1960-1969 Total 
Minnesota 242,325,655 2,477,500 4,265,872 10,266,667 7,494,648 266,830,342 
Wisconsin 146,177,840 8,247,024 266,349 27,736,869 505,693 182,933,775 
Iowa 59,816,833 637,964,447 3,231,817 500,000 560,606 702,073,703 
Illinois 47,431,769 210,239,965 101,884,721 3,432,694 1,004,512 363,993,661 
Missouri 25,440,510 18,872,279 9,795,181 12,056,374 942 66,165,286 
Kentucky 2,843,976 4,061,036 335,659 2,471,881 4,130,161 13,842,713 
Tennessee 114,729,530 7,525,261 5,720,798 2,504,184 363,858 130,843,631 
Arkansas 15,190,714 1,772,545 4,989,502 1,078,788 0 23,031,549 
Mississippi 25,903,500 17,245,090 85,531,169 47,045,139 13,929 175,738,827 
Louisiana  14,119,000 257,268,400 86,573,426 5,079,461 730,230 363,770,517 






Table 5.6    
 

































Minnesota 89 29 26 16 23 183 
Wisconsin 160 50 11 76 43 340 
Iowa 153 349 138 1 6 647 
Illinois 121 158 275 42 77 673 
Missouri 115 123 71 131 19 459 
Kentucky 25 23 55 96 29 228 
Tennessee 80 51 30 50 18 229 
Arkansas 51 17 30 6 0 104 
Mississippi 125 78 60 85 8 356 
Louisiana 69 60 99 24 41 293 




Table 5.7    
 




















Total % NFIP CRS 
Rep 
Loss 
Minnesota 18 10 56 5 50 5 50 Yes Yes Yes 
Wisconsin 98 18 18 0 0 18 100 Yes Yes No 
Iowa 51 29 57 15 51 14 49 Yes Yes Yes 
Illinois 207 42 20 0 0 42 100 Yes No No 
Missouri 19 5 26 0 0 5 100 Yes Yes Yes 
Kentucky 66 24 36 2 8 22 92 Yes Yes Yes 
Tennessee 57 5 9 0 0 5 100 Yes Yes Yes 
Arkansas 61 7 11 0 0 7 100 Yes Yes Yes 
Mississippi 62 27 44 2 7 25 93 Yes Yes No 










Table 5.8    
 
State Mitigation Action Analysis:  Structural Mitigation Action Items 
 
State Plans Structural Actions WI MN IA IL KY TN MO AR MS LA Total 
Culverts   1 1               2 
Roads Elevate/Rpr     1               1 
Sewers                       
Bank Stabilization   1 1               2 
Bridges    1 1               2 
Pumping Stations     1               1 
Elevate Structures         1           1 
Levees Dams F Wall   1 2           1   4 
Retention/Reservoirs                       
Move/Rebuild/Build     1               1 
Channel Improve     1               1 
Otherwise Specified     1   1           2 
Perm Generators     1               1 
Warning Systems                 1   1 
Reforest/Green   1 1               2 
Electric Grid     1               1 
Build Shelters                     0 
Flood Gates                     0 
Potable Water Store                     0 
Roadway Gates                     0 





Table 5.9    
 
State Mitigation Action Analysis:  Non-structural Action Items 
 
Action Item WI MN IA IL KY TN MO AR MS LA Total 
Study   1 1 4   1     2   9 
NFIP 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 2 6   20 
Repetitive Loss 1 1 2 6 3 2 2 2 1   20 
Maintenance         1           0 
Policy Influence 1   1 2 4       2   10 
Education Outreach 5 1 1 2 3   1   1   14 
Purchase Equipment     1   1           2 
Technical Support 4     6 3   1 1 4   19 
Enforce Regulations       3         3   6 
Evac & Sheltering         1           1 
Warning  
Improvements     1 1             2 
Environmental  
Considerations 1                   1 
Other 1     1 1     1 2   6 
CRS   1 1 1   1 1 1 1   7 
Communication 1   1 4         3   9 
Emergency Response     2   1           3 
Training 2   3 7 1 1   1     15 








Table 5.10  
 
County Mitigation Plan Flood Action Analysis: Structural Action Items 
 































Action Item WI/3 MN/7 IA/3 IL/16 KY/4 TN/2 MO/14 AR/0 MS/7 LA/6 Total 
Stabilize/armour 
 banks  4 0 1 22 1 0 1 0 0 4 33 
Roads/elevating 2 2 1 59 2 5 7 0 1 2 81 
Widen culverts 3 2 4 42 0 9 0 0 1 14 75 
Repair/replace  
bridges 2 1 0 23 0 4 0 0 0 2 32 
Fix sewers 3 0 7 23 0 1 0 0 1 10 45 
Electric line issues 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 
Flood gates 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 
Retrofit structures  
in floodplain 0 2 1 7 0 0 0 0 1 18 29 
Build shelters 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 
Build floodwall 
 levees 1 3 5 12 0 2 1 0 0 6 30 
Warning systems 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 
Install generators 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 
Build pump stations 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 25 30 
Retention ponds 
 reservoirs  0 0 1 7 1 18 0 0 0 1 28 
Buildings out of  
floodplain 1 0 4 10 4 0 0 0 3 4 26 
Channel improve 0 1 0 7 0 8 0 0 0 10 26 
Reforestation 
/greenway 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 5 11 
Other  
improvements 0 1 4 8 4 0 0 0 0 5 22 










Action Item WI MN IA IL KY TN MO AR MS LA Total 
Study 1 10 4 52 1 5 9 0 1 9 92 
NFIP 3 4 5 12 11 3 12 0 4 5 59 
Repetitive Loss 2 9 6 12 2 0 8 0 2 9 50 
Maintenance 3 2 5 16 4 1 13 0 3 3 50 
Policy Influence 2 3 10 4 0 0 16 0 1 12 48 
Education 
Outreach 1 2 2 15 5 0 8 0 0 12 45 
Purchase 
Equipment 0 5 5 24 0 0 4 0 0 1 39 
Technical 
Support 1 8 0 4 0 2 9 0 3 9 36 
Enforce 
Regulations 0 0 6 8 0 0 16 0 0 2 32 
Evacuation & 
Sheltering 1 0 4 10 0 0 4 0 0 0 19 
Warning  
Improvements 1 0 0 12 0 0 4 0 1 0 18 
Environmental 
Considerations 0 0 0 3 2 0 10 0 0 0 15 
Other 0 0 3 6 0 0 1 0 0 3 13 
CRS 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 8 12 
Communication 0 0 2 3 0 0 4 0 0 1 10 
Emergency 
Response 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 
Training 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 























Anoka     6,084,150     4,883,049               0        1,389      625,000    574,713 
Benton     9,537,484     8,478,049               0      18,056      466,667    574,713 
Dakota   26,928,713   24,878,049               0    847,619      625,000    574,713 
Goodhue   11,525,197     7,679,715 1,653,125    114,286   1,500,000    578,071 
Hennepin     7,427,483     4,893,049               0    835,722   1,125,000    574,713 
Houston   56,167,123   54,088,333      69,792    180,952   1,250,000    578,046 
Ramsey     9,314,483     7,280,049               0    834,722      625,000    574,713 
Sherburne     7,495,817     6,903,049               0      18,056                 0    574,713 
Stearns   12,872,817   12,280,049               0      18,056                 0    574,713 
Wabasha   27,656,815   25,121,333    174,792    280,952   1,500,000    579,738 
Washington     6,915,817     4,878,049               0    834,722      625,000    578,046 
Winona   51,625,290   48,884,833    579,792    280,952   1,300,000    579,713 
Wright   33,279,150   32,078,049               0        1,389      625,000    574,713 








Minnesota Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS) 
 
Minnesota 
Counties Total Disasters 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Anoka 6 1 1 1 1 2 
Benton 9 1 2 2 0 4 
Dakota 8 2 1 2 1 2 
Goodhue 20 3 2 2 5 8 
Hennepin 8 1 2 2 1 2 
Houston 31 2 1 2 5 21 
Ramsey 9 1 1 2 2 3 
Sherburne 6 1 0 2 0 3 
Stearns 10 1 0 2 0 7 
Wabasha 30 4 2 3 5 16 
Washington 7 2 1 2 1 1 
Winona 33 3 2 3 8 17 
Wright 6 1 1 1 0 3 









Minnesota Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparison 
 


























Ranked: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
























Damage 50 yrs 








Buffalo 10,171,784     6,136,067     448,000         7,500   3,536,440       46,778 
Crawford 40,108,276   35,541,667  1,034,286     238,810   3,414,950       93,564 
Grant 23,176,364   18,356,267  1,282,952     238,810   3,419,771       93,564 
La Crosse 21,561,360   17,740,667     320,000       48,810   3,408,106       43,778 
Pepin   7,376,884     3,725,000     100,000                0   3,503,106       48,788 
Pierce   6,269,681     2,600,000       50,000       55,556   3,503,106       61,019 
Trempealeau 15,106,350     8,569,207  2,915,000       58,056   3,536,440       27,649 
Vernon 59,163,076   53,508,967  2,096,786       48,810   3,414,950       93,564 














1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Buffalo 41 4 10 2 8 17 
Crawford 57 7 10 1 7 32 
Grant 67 7 12 1 7 40 
La Crosse 35 4 8 2 5 16 
Pepin 19 5 8 0 2 4 
Pierce 17 5 8 1 1 2 
Trempealeau 40 3 10 2 10 15 
Vernon 64 8 10 2 10 8 









Wisconsin Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparison 
 




Ranked: 1 2 3 4 5 
 
State none none none none none 



















































Allamakee   90,996,322 12,951,000   77,932,828       97,342              0                 15,151 
Clayton 107,060,963 16,652,833   90,295,636       97,342              0   15,151 
Clinton   10,710,416   3,366,000     7,318,352       26,064              0            0 
Des Moines   93,992,726   7,235,000   85,626,156  1,131,570              0            0 
Dubuque 108,507,520   2,060,000 106,415,253       17,116              0   15,151 
Jackson   86,879,454   2,080,000   84,770,322       13,981              0   15,151 
Lee   92,720,430   6,164,000   84,877,360 1,179,070   500,000            0 
Louisa   88,466,968   3,175,000   84,913,979    377,989              0            0 
Muscatine   10,253,631   2,180,000     7,358,352    215,279              0 500,000 
Scott   12,485,274   3,953,000     8,456,209      76,064              0            0 














1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Allamakee 63     1 0 12 30 20 
Clayton 80 1 0 12 38 28 
Clinton 55 0 0 13 26 16 
Des 
Moines 
72 0 0 17 43 12 
Dubuque 61 1 0 13 41 6 
Jackson 52 1 0 12 34 5 
Lee 89 1 1 17 44 26 
Louisa 64 0 0 14 38 12 
Muscatine 50 1 0 14 26 9 
Scott 62 0 0 14 28 20 




























Iowa:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 


























































Adams 23,784,240 610,000 17,386,480 5,652,322      51,292      84,146 
Alexander 24,759,778 1,840,115 17,187,452 5,614,208 49,019      68,983 
Calhoun 23,215,405 0 17,432,645 5,647,321 51,292      84,146 
Carroll 17,272,767 11,015,500        66,342 5,823,624 363,971        3,331 
Hancock 24,370,476 2,835,000 15,744,119 5,658,191 49,020      84,146 
Henderson    7,732,443 1,875,250        63,564 5,658,191 51,292      84,146 
Jackson 25,010,094 2,410,949 16,938,119 5,542,779 49,247      69,000 
Jersey 23,270,653 46,000 17,441,666 5,647,322 51,520      84,146 
Jo Daviess    8,556,377 2,641,000        68,342 5,773,624 70,080        3,331 
Madison 25,143,667 51,000 19,447,566 5,524,808 51,292      69,000 
Mercer 22,717,623 16,433,000 116,341 5,798,706 366,244        3,331 
Monroe 23,055,546 0 17,394,748 5,542,779 49,020      69,000 
Pike 23,138,176 20,000 17,335,417 5,647,322 51,292      84,146 
Randolph 21,519,013 10,000 15,848,214 5,542,779 49,020      69,000 
Rock 
Island 
10,702,293 3,217,670 1,316,342 5,798,706 366,244        3,331 
St. Clair 24,931,225 221,000 19,048,814 5,592,411 49,623      69,000 
Union 23,983,295 1,838,615 16,412,452 5,614,208 49,020      69,000 
Whiteside 10,830,593 2,966,670 391,342 5,855,052 1,614,198        3,331 










































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Adams 34 7 2 13 9 3 
Alexander 52 3 1 15 13 21 
Calhoun 31 7 2 12 10 0 
Carroll 38 3 3 20 4 7 
Hancock 40 7 1 12 5 14 
Henderson 29 7 2 12 2 5 
Jackson 53 3 2 14 12 14 
Jersey 36 7 3 12 11 3 
Jo Daviess 38 3 3 19 5 8 
Madison 31 3 2 12 12 2 
Mercer 40 3 4 20 5 8 
Monroe 29 3 1 14 11 0 
Pike 30 7 2 12 7 2 
Randolph 26 3 1 14 7 1 
Rock 
Island 
56 3 4 21 13 15 
St. Clair 32 3 3 14 9 3 
Union 35 3 1 15 9 7 
Whiteside 44 3 5 22 7 7 

























Illinois:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 
























































7,879,492 3,596,000 160,833 3,218,425 904,190 4348 
Clark 6,684,761 4,425,000 1,412,502 251,020 596,195 4348 
Jefferson 2,857,776 600,000 1,465,048 163,369 629,316 4348 
Lewis 3,215,461 956,000 1,412,202 251,020 596,195 4348 
Lincoln 5,350,186 2,675,000 1,731,348 346,202 597,511 4348 
Marion 9,666,357 7,300,000 1,519,048 251,070 596,195 4348 
Mississippi 2,821,946 1,121,000 102,434 736,944 861,525 4348 
New 
Madrid 
2,235,390 1,122,000 70,434 181,388 861,525 4348 
Pemiscot 1,125,400 47,010 35,434 181,388 861,525 4348 
Perry 2,907,889 230,000 1,608,286 162,869 906,690 4348 
Pike 2,797,970 385,000 1,470,448 346,202 596,195 4348 
Ralls 2,666,489 255,000 1,469,048 346,202 596,195 4348 
Scott 4,410,593 763,500 82,767 2,681,388 882,894 4348 
St. Charles 5,316,923 1,852,000 2,519,948 346,202 598,647 4348 
St. Louis 3,782,615 103,000 2,411,548 168,619 129,652 4348 
St. 
Genevieve 
2,446,038 10,000 1,400,952 162,869 872,173 4348 







































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Cape 
Girardeau 59 1 13 6 11 28 
Clark 37 1 3 2 4 28 
Jefferson 25 1 8 5 8 3 
Lewis 12 1 3 2 3 3 
Lincoln 25 2 4 4 11 4 
Marion 14 1 3 3 5 2 
Mississippi 35 1 14 6 6 8 
New 
Madrid 31 1 13 5 6 7 
Pemiscot 29 1 13 5 5 5 
Perry 37 1 14 4 12 6 
Pike 17 2 3 4 6 3 
Ralls 14 1 3 4 4 2 
Scott 35 1 14 6 6 8 
St. Charles 33 2 5 4 18 4 
St. Louis 35 1 7 7 16 4 
St. 
Genevieve 21 1 12 4 3 1 






Missouri Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparisons 
 
Missouri:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 











































































Ballard 6,355,738 962,143 3,625,036 137,665 608,355 1,032,540 
Carlisle 2,338,060 610,000 17,000 70,165 608,355 1,032,540 
Fulton 3,0746,88 928,417 393,000 73,915 646,817 1,032,540 
Hickman 2,074,227 343,417 26,000 63,915 608,355 1,032,540 






















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Ballard 62 7 25 15 10 5 
Carlisle 57 7 25 16 3 8 
Fulton 55 7 21 14 7 6 
Hickman 54 8 25 12 3 6 






Kentucky Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparisons 
 
Kentucky:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 







Need none none none 
Counties 
Move/Rebuild 






















































Total Property  
Damage 50 yrs 
 
Total PD  
2000 
Total PD  
1990 






Dyer 12,066,650 9,865,667 1,523,452 194,160 468,100 15,273 
Lake   2,151,660 54,677 1,471,952 144,160 463,100 17,772 
Lauderdale   5,945,150 3,719,668 1,557,952 144,160 518,100 5,272 
Shelby 83,174,345 80,437,020 1,515,452 94,160 807,442 320,272 
Tipton 27,505,825 20,652,500 1,456,452 5,144,160 247,442 5,278 
Total 130,843,630 
 


















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Dyer 41 3 10 8 12 8 
Lake 35 4 9 5 10 7 
Lauderdale 37 2 11 6 11 7 
Shelby 76 7 12 5 11 41 
Tipton 40 2 8 6 7 17 


























Tennessee:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 
State none none none none none 
Counties 
Retention Ponds 










Funding Studies NFIP CRS Training 
 
Counties Studies NFIP 
Technical 








































Chicot 4,151,940 2,924,000 200,000 800,667 0 0 
Crittenden 8,502,528 7,589,750 51,000 850,667 11,111 0 
Desha 4,389,440 2,751,000 837,273 801,167 0 0 
Lee    831,778 10,000 0 810,667 11,111 0 
Mississippi 2,102,947 789,714 456,000 800,667 56,566 0 
Phillips 3,052,917 1,126,250 51,000 875,667 1,000,000 0 


























1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Chicot 25 0 0 4 3 18 
Crittenden 20 0 1 5 2 12 
Desha 13 0 0 5 4 4 
Lee   8 0 1 6 0 1 
Mississippi 22 0 2 4 7 9 
Phillips 16 0 2 6 1 7 






Arkansas Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparisons 
 
 
Arkansas:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 
State none none none none none 












































Adams 12,073,837 1,348,000 2,023,020 8,560,285 142,533 0 
Bolivar 10,030,641 1,425,500 2,095,327 6,371,951 137,624 2,381 
Claiborne 30,537,342 322,000 1,903,020 6,421,951 21,890,371 0 
Coahoma   8,309,838 277,500 920,137 6,795,187 136,776 2,381 
DeSoto 12,531,030 5,337,500 681,329 6,375,187 136,776 2,381 
Issaquena   9,902,571 604,000 1,769,686 6,381,951 1,146,696 2,381 
Jefferson 11,530,087 1,073,000 1,853,020 8,455,285 142,533 6,250 
Tunica   7,490,530 300,500 677,829 6,375,187 136,776 2,381 
Warren 53,899,592 13,741,000 2,589,565 14,676,951 22,885,826 6,250 
Washington 10,033,712 1,349,500 2,055,327 6,481,951 146,696 2,381 
Wilkinson   9,399,646 125,000 676,829 8,455,285 142,533 0 
















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Adams 38 0 7 9 10 12 
Bolivar 46 1 9 4 8 24 
Claiborne 28 0 10 4 7 7 
Coahoma 31 1 6 7 6 11 
DeSoto 42 1 6 6 7 21 
Issaquena 25 1 9 4 5 6 
Jefferson 23 1 7 4 5 5 
Tunica 19 1 6 5 4 3 
Warren 49 1 10 7 14 17 
Washington 38 1 9 6 8 16 
Wilkinson 16 0 7 4 3 2 










Mississippi Mitigation Actions:  State to County Comparisons 
 
 
Mississippi:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 






Systems none none none 
Counties 
Move/Build 











































































Ascension 51,460,119 2,600,000 41,833,711 6,519,897 505,747 0 
Concordia    1,774,790 608,000 50,000 781,250 343,391 301,149 
East Baton 
Rouge 
51,6764,66 2,452,000 42,073,711 6,639,879 505,747 5,129 
East Carroll   3,837,755 1,748,000 270,000 1,289,583 501,613 28,559 
Iberville 50,701,133 2,400,000 41,983,711 5,806,546 505,747 5,129 
Jefferson 13,131,675 345,000 350,000 12,431,546 0 5,129 
Madison   5,316,755 1,272,000 850,000 2,664,583 501,613 28,559 
Orleans   8,397,327 365,000 550,000 7,481,546 0 78,125 
Plaquemines   5,900,008 130,000 500,000 5,264,879 0 5,129 
Pointe 
Coupee 
45,750,119 590,000 41,763,711 2,889,879 505,747 78,125 
St. Bernard   8,376,675 330,000 610,000 7,431,546 0 5,129 
St. Charles   7,828,719 500,000 1,092,044 6,231,546 0 5,129 
St. James   5,679,467 85,000 152,044 5,264,879 172,414 5,129 
St. John the 
Baptist 
  6,572,386 327,000 642,044 5,264,879 33,333 5,129 
 Tensas   3,495,873 332,000 300,000 2,039,583 501,613 322,677 
West Baton 
Rouge 
47,669,466 25,000 41,743,711 5,389,879 505,747 5,129 
West 
Feliciana 
46,201,785 10,000 42,503,711 3,181,546 505,747 78,125 



































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Ascension 18 1 2 8 4 3 
Concordia 18 3 3 1 1 10 
East Baton 
Rouge 28 3 2 8 10 5 
East Carroll 15 2 3 3 2 5 
Iberville 21 3 2 7 6 3 
Jefferson 26 3 0 9 4 10 
Madison 16 2 2 4 3 6 
Orleans 18 1 0 9 3 5 
Plaquemines 10 3 0 5 1 1 
Pointe 
Coupee 14 1 2 5 3 3 
St. Bernard 16 3 0 8 3 2 
St. Charles 19 3 0 8 4 4 
St. James 17 3 1 5 4 4 
St. John the 
Baptist 16 3 1 5 4 4 
 Tensas 22 3 2 3 2 12 
West Baton 
Rouge 14 3 2 6 2 1 
West 
Feliciana 13 1 2 5 4 1 



















Louisiana:  State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs 
 
Structural 
Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 










Mitigation 1 2 3 4 5 
 
State none none none none none 
 


























Minnesota 437,001 14 167,229 13 56 
Wisconsin 121,223 40   50,624 47 31 
Iowa 440,858 90 177,101 89 49 
Missouri 189,894 10   72,483 10 64 
Illinois 177,454 16   87,431 16 65 
Kentucky   17,764 71     7,311 71 30 
Tennessee   30,565   3   10,557   3 44 
Arkansas   43,000 28   15,000 27 59 
Mississippi 103,404 27   38,629 27 66 









Upper Mississippi River Region: Overall Poverty 
 
   
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
was mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the 





Upper Middle Mississippi River Region:  Overall Poverty 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 







Lower Mississippi River Region:  Overall Poverty 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 






Louisiana Region:  Overall Poverty 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 







Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN:  Overall Poverty - Census Tract Level 
 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 









Quad Cities (Side View):  Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level 
 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 







St. Louis:  Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 









Memphis, TN Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level 
 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
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Figure 5.14   
New Orleans, LA:  Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level  
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  White Poverty 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 













American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 







Lower Mississippi River Region:  White Poverty 
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American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 















Louisiana Region:  White Poverty 
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Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN:  White Poverty – Census Tract Level 
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Quad Cities (side view):  White Poverty – Census Tract Level 
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St. Louis, MO:  White Poverty – Census Tract Level 
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  Black Poverty 
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Memphis, TN:  Black Poverty – Census Tract Level 
 
 
American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data 
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri.  ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  Elderly Poverty 
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Louisiana Region:  Elderly Poverty 
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Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN:  Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level 
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Lower Mississippi River Region:  Elderly Households 
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  Median Household Income 
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Baton Rouge, LA:  Median Household Income 
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  Renter Occupied Housing 
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Upper Mississippi River Region:  Housing Built Prior to 1969 
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